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ABSTRACT
Wood, Paul Ph.D., Purdue University, August 2016. Improving the Resilience of
Cyber-Physical Systems under Strategic Adversaries. Major Professor: Saurabh
Bagchi.
Renewable energy resources challenge traditional energy system operations by
substituting the stability and predictability of fossil fuel based generation with the
unreliability and uncertainty of wind and solar power. Rising demand for green en-
ergy drives grid operators to integrate sensors, smart meters, and distributed control
to compensate for this uncertainty and improve the operational efficiency of the grid.
Real-time negotiations enable producers and consumers to adjust power loads during
shortage periods, such as an unexpected outage or weather event, and to adapt to
time-varying energy needs. While such systems improve grid performance, practical
implementation challenges can derail the operation of these distributed cyber-physical
systems. Network disruptions introduce instability into control feedback systems, and
strategic adversaries can manipulate power markets for financial gain. This disserta-
tion analyzes the impact of these outages and adversaries on cyber-physical systems
and provides methods for improving resilience, with an emphasis on distributed en-
ergy systems.
First, a financial model of an interdependent energy market lays the groundwork
for profit-oriented attacks and defenses, and a game theoretic strategy optimizes at-
tack plans and defensive investments in energy systems with multiple independent
actors. Then attacks and defenses are translated from a theoretical context to a real-
time energy market via denial of service (DoS) outages and moving target defenses.
Analysis on two market mechanisms shows how adversaries can disrupt market op-
eration, destabilize negotiations, and extract profits by attacking network links and
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disrupting communication. Finally, a low-cost DoS defense technique demonstrates a
method that energy systems may use to defend against attacks.
11. INTRODUCTION
New distributed cyber-physical systems improve and optimize grid-scale energy con-
sumption via wide-area communications. When they are attacked or disrupted, many
of these systems may fail or support adversarial profits. This thesis analyzes and im-
proves the reliability of such cyber-physical systems.
1.1 Motivation
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are an emerging class of systems which integrate
physical control and observation over potentially wide areas via cyber networks. These
systems promise increased efficiency, interoperability, and ease-of-use of a variety of
domains, including smart grid (SG), by changing the time scale of highly interactive
processes such as price negotiation from hours or days to minutes or seconds. This
scale allows for finer-grained control and thus efficiency improvements, especially in
the domain of energy consumption. One area of CPS growth is the smart grid (SG).
Consumers and producers of electric power have increasingly become distributed,
especially in regions where rooftop solar panels are common place, and there is ample
financial benefit to introducing fine-grained, rapid control.
The expansion of CPS is not without risk, however, as processes that were once
slow and easily observed become fast and buried in complexity. Consequently, the re-
silience of physical systems when combined with traditional cyber vulnerabilities must
be well studied. Broadly, this dissertation examines CPS resilience when faced with
security threats and network faults and provides metrics and strategies for improving
the dependability of such systems.
To study CPS security, the electric power domain has been selected as it grounds
the dissertation in a realistic economic and technical environment. In the context of
2SG, large scale CPS is used to coordinate the production and consumption of electric
power, often via energy markets. These markets exist as a form of homeostatic
control [1] that optimizes power consumption and generation via incentive signals
(market prices).
Traditional power markets are comprised of relatively few market players. A few
large generation companies and distribution utilities negotiate prices well in advance
of power delivery because of physical generation constraints. Some generators respond
slowly to transients because of thermal inertia, and sufficient notice must be given
to allow for adequate power availability. This problem is exacerbated when renew-
able generation sources permeate the grid because of the inherent unpredictability of
natural energy sources such as wind. Presently most demand in the grid is inflexible–
prices are negotiated months in advance and regulated. For this reason, expensive
sources of standby generation are scheduled to maintain grid security, ready to deliver
power during system transients. New technologies and the growth of SG/CPS tran-
sition consumers from a static to dynamic market where power prices are constantly
negotiated. In such a system, standby generation is replaced by demand-response
(DR)–consumers provide less demand rather than generators providing more power.
The shift to dynamic markets and demand-response improves resilience and ef-
ficiency by leveraging wide-area communication networks and potentially insecure
control devices to optimize load and generation. This dependence can undermine
the gains in efficiency when networks are disrupted through denial of service attacks,
insecure devices are taken offline, or compromised devices collude in the market. A
traditional system might have a backup generator available to respond to voltage or
frequency drops in the grid (independent of any communication network) and thus
survive most transient events. A dynamic system, however, may rely on communi-
cations to shed loads, and a DoS attack on the market during a transient can have
potentially severe consequences.
Furthermore, the explosive growth of rooftop solar in the Southwest United States
has been ratcheting up demand for SG technologies. When solar and wind generation
3operate in traditional power markets, the power distribution utility typically absorbs
the cost of solar’s uncertainty by raising power rates in the region. Generation short-
falls (e.g. caused by clouds) place high demand on expensive on-demand energy
sources. The consumer is generally shielded from the expensive energy price through
regulated markets. Recently, however, utilities like SRP [2] have begun to impose
penalties on homes with solar panels to recover parts of these rising costs. Smart
grid technologies such as demand response and real-time pricing systems that bridge
the gap between consumer loads and market prices can alleviate these penalties by
optimizing energy utilization via wide area controls. If this technology is successful,
it can support additional solar panel integration. The system may not be successful,
however, if the cyber components of the CPS introduce additional faults and insta-
bility that roll back the efficiency gains of the power markets. The remainder of this
dissertation analyzes and measures these risks and provides techniques to alleviate
some of them.
1.2 Contributions and Outline
This section summarizes the contributions and outline of this dissertation.
1.2.1 Energy CPS Models and Attack Strategies
The first contribution in Chapter 2 is a profit-oriented model for energy-based CPS
markets that supports modeling strategic adversaries. Prior work in real-time energy
markets does not consider the presence of adversaries who attempt to game the market
for additional profit. A new model is created that distinguishes between collective
social welfare and individual profits by introducing deregulated power markets with
multiple independent participants. Intertwined in this chapter is background material
that explains the underlying energy system on which this dissertation lies.
When the CPS model is viewed from an individual-player profit viewpoint, an
interdependent defensive game can be introduced to analyze strategies against at-
4tackers. This contribution is a game theoretic approach to optimizing defensive in-
vestments in the CPS when multiple defenders exist under a strategic adversary. With
limited budgets in hand, the attackers and defenders have an interest in optimizing
their strategies. Interdependent defensive games, however, exhibit strong positive
and negative externalities due to investments. This complexity is further exacerbated
by the competitor elimination problem–the owner of an asset may be different than
the most impacted party. In this contribution, an investment optimization game is
constructed and examined which accounts for these properties in attack and defense.
The game is further explored by introducing noise into model viewpoints and allowing
defensive collaboration or pooling of resources.
With these two pieces, a background and underlying profit model is established to
capture the profit motivations of strategic adversaries. Up to this point, the attacks
are more theoretical in nature–they exist at the energy-flow level. The next chapter
introduces technical market operations that utilize realistic communication interfaces
to negotiate energy flows and prices.
1.2.2 Energy CPS Operation
Chapter 3 maps the principles of market operation to realistic system implementa-
tions. The market players from Chapter 2 now exist in a market implementation that
models the actual negotiation processes between energy producers and consumers.
An existing market solution, dynamic market mechanism (DMM) [3], is analyzed in
a real-time communication environment. The response of DMM is dependent on the
state of the networking subsystem, and characteristics such as latency, jitter, and
dropped messages all have a negative influence on the system’s performance. It is
demonstrated that low-level network attacks can influence market pricing, and that
network disruptions can potentially crash the energy market.
A second model, a novel contribution created for this dissertation, is also included
in this chapter. A Nelder-Meade (NM) optimization technique is modified to support
5non-stationary objective functions such as time-varying energy demands. This modi-
fication enables NM to serve as the control system driving a real-time power market.
With this system, which is designed to operate on low-level distribution, can be used
to analyze the profits of network attacks on energy markets.
These communications models enable attack/defense studies at the network layer.
This bridges the gap between the more theoretical attack/defense models in Chapter 2
with the practical implementation in this chapter. The next chapter evaluates the
combination of attack/defense strategies on practical market mechanisms.
1.2.3 CPS Attacks and Market Manipulations
In Chapter 4, the energy CPS operations are attacked and evaluated by two
different attack strategies. In the first strategy, the attacks from Chapter 2 are applied
to the Nelder-Meade based market model from Chapter 3. The attack targets in the
theoretical model are mapped to DoS/outages on specific network links in the market
mechanism. The profit and defense strategies are evaluated, and it is shown how the
strategy can increase attacker’s incentive in a realistic system implementation.
An additional, heuristic-based attack is included in Chapter 5. An adversary
launches DoS attacks in an attempt to manipulate market prices while buying and
selling energy from a storage device. It is shown that an adversary with access
to a storage device can extract additional profits by launching such attacks. Some
defensive techniques are introduced in this chapter as a method to improve resilience.
The next chapter introduces a low-cost distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) de-
fense mechanism that can facilitate economical defense of CPS systems.
1.2.4 Low Cost DDoS Defense
Chapter 6 presents Denial of Service Elusion (DoSE) as an inexpensive method for
mitigating network layer attacks by utilizing cloud infrastructure and content delivery
networks to protect services from disruption. DoSE uses these services to create a
6relay network between the client and the protected service that evades attack by
selectively releasing IP address information. DoSE incorporates client reputation as
a function of prior behavior to stop attackers along with a feedback controller to limit
costs. We evaluate DoSE by modeling relays, clients, and attackers in an agent-based
MATLAB simulator. The results show DoSE can mitigate a single-insider attack on
1,000 legitimate clients in 3.9 minutes while satisfying an average of 88.2% of requests
during the attack.
This defense technique facilitates the economical defense of CPS from DoS attacks.
Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation and provide directions for future work. Addi-
tional material in Appendix A describes the simulation frameworks used throughout
the dissertation.
1.3 Work Publication
This section covers previous, current, and planned publications supporting this
dissertation.
CPS – Completed Works:
• Interdependent Defensive Games in CPS
Paul Wood, Saurabh Bagchi and Alefiya Hussain – Presented March 23rd, AAAI
2015 Spring Symposium, Applied Computational Game Theory, 2015
• Optimizing Defensive Investments in Energy-Based Cyber-Physical
Systems
Paul Wood, Saurabh Bagchi and Alefiya Hussain — 20th IEEE Workshop on
Dependable Parallel, Distributed and Network-Centric Systems (DPDNS15),
2015
• Defending Against Strategic Adversaries in Dynamic Pricing Markets
for Smart Grids
7Paul Wood, Saurabh Bagchi, and Alefiya Hussain — 8th International Confer-
ence on Communication Systems & Networks (COMSNETS16), 2016
• Denial of Service Elusion (DoSE): Keeping Clients Connected for Less
Paul Wood, Christopher Gutierrez, and Saurabh Bagchi — 34th International
Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS15), 2015
CPS – Works Under Review:
• A Framework for Evaluating the Resilience of Dynamic Real-Time
Market Mechanisms
Paul Wood, Dylan Shiltz, Thomas R. Nudell, Alefiya Hussain, Anuradha M.
Annaswamy — (Under Review) IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, Submitted
October, 2015
• Attacks and Defense for Real-Time Price Signals in Smart Grids
Paul Wood, Saurabh Bagchi, Alefiya Hussain — (Under Review) IEEE Con-
ference on Communications and Network Security, October 2016, Submitted
April, 2016
Related Completed Works:
• Synthesizing and Specifying Architectures for System of Systems
Kenley, C. R., Dannenhoffer, T. M., Wood, P. C., & DeLaurentis, D. A. (2014,
July). In INCOSE International Symposium (Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 94-107).
82. ENERGY-BASED CPS MODELS AND HIGH-LEVEL
ATTACK STRATEGIES
This chapter covers power flow economics, vulnerabilities, and attack/defense strate-
gies in energy-based cyber-physical systems. The chapter first addresses the eco-
nomics behind deregulated power markets as a method for identifying valuable CPS
targets. A strategic adversary is then created in the latter half of the chapter to
capitalize on those targets. Much of the work in this chapter was presented at the
Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) Spring Symposium
in March 2015 and published in DPDNS’15 [4].
2.1 A Profit-Oriented Model for Energy CPS
2.1.1 Introduction
Industrial control systems are becoming more interconnected throughout all do-
mains and across corporations. Resources processed thousands of miles from their
consumption points may traverse multiple independent companies before arriving
at customers who are relying on them to operate, and these systems are gaining a
large cyber footprint as automation and efficiency improvements drive a demand for
internetworked components. This increased footprint creates more opportunity for
malicious actors to penetrate and manipulate CPS’s, especially when connected via
the Internet. Successful attacks are becoming more visible [5], as demonstrated by
Stuxnet [6] and shown in a recent ICS-CERT [7]. Corporations and industry needs
an analysis framework and decision support tool to aid in understanding intentional
attacks on interdependent CPS, their propagation through interconnected systems,
and the impact they have on profitability when financially independent but intercon-
9nected companies face attacks. With such a framework, defensive strategies can be
formulated for improving system security and minimizing the impact of intentional
attacks.
Understanding and measuring the complex interactions that occur in interdepen-
dent cyber-physical systems and creating an optimal response to attacks is a crucial
step toward the goal of optimizing system profitability in the face of rising security
threats. In a CPS with cross-domain interlinks, such as the natural gas pipeline and
electric power generation systems, identifying high risk components and making good
design choices is no longer a trivial or self-contained task. The large network of feed-
back created by corporate profit optimization complicates risk assessments, especially
when multiple companies are competing for revenues and relying on the same input
resources. Enron demonstrated in the 2000 California Power Crisis [8] that carefully
placed outages can net huge profits, and understanding where and how potential at-
tackers can profit is crucial to defending an interconnected CPS. The hypothesis is
that attackers who have profit-seeking motivations will attack a different set of targets
than one who seeks to simply disrupt the system.
The work presented in this section captures and models the interactions of inde-
pendent CPS and analyzes the impact of cyber manipulations and induced outages
on energy-based CPS components from the perspective of the overall system’s and
individual companies operational revenue. This lays the foundation for a utility func-
tion for subsequent sections. Using this function, experimental analysis necessitates
an independent actor model, motivates profit-based objectives, and evaluates several
security strategies.
To perform impact analyses, a model is created which abstracts the low-level de-
tails of components in the CPS into high level flow graphs that capture the interde-
pendent interactions in the CPS. The graph models the high level inputs, components,
and outputs that each CPS operator utilizes for profit maximization. The natural
gas–electric interdependent CPS motivates a translation framework for converting
perturbations in the physical system to changes in efficiency, capacity, and cost in the
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graph. These parameters, with the addition of revenue and demand, formulate an
optimization problem that minimizes the sum of costs, for both the individual play-
ers and separately the entire system. With this optimization, impacts are analyzed
by comparing the costs of contingencies when failures or attacks cause capacities or
efficiencies to change in the system.
In this chapter, the capacity, transmission costs, and revenues are modeled empir-
ically from data collected from the United States Energy Information Administration
(EIA). A model of 6 US states’ natural gas and electric power systems is used to
shows three key results. The first is that the independence of CPS operators creates
suboptimal risk assessments when performed in isolation. The second is that choos-
ing between profit maximization and shortage minimization results in two different
defensive strategies, justifying the need for economic incentive inclusion in defense
optimizations. In the final result, some security strategies are considered to deter-
mine whether or not greedy attack/defense strategies based upon easily observable
features of the system are optimal. The experiment shows that there is no strong
correlation between two graph-observable parameters and the financial impact on
the system which motivates the need for game theoretic approaches to optimizing
defensive strategies.
2.1.2 Background
In this section, the relevant concepts required to understand the design of the
impact analysis technique are introduced. The interdependence between the natural
gas and electric system are discussed along with the malicious attacker’s motivations.
Natural Gas System
Natural gas (NG) is a popular fuel used in heating, lighting, electric power genera-
tion, and transportation. Its production points are often far away from load locations,
so a system of transmission pipelines bridges this gap. The pipelines, which rely on
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gas-fired compressors, operate as a lossy but self-contained network. Gas companies
seek to optimize delivery by minimizing extraction and pipeline costs by selecting the
least-loss paths. Figure 2.1 captures the high level NG infrastructure, where gas flows
from production wells through a transmission and distribution system and to the end
users.








Fig. 2.1. High level layout of the natural gas infrastructure.
Electric Power System
The electric power system or grid is composed of generators, transmission and
distribution components, and consumer loads. Each generation source has a different
capital and operational cost which is tied to geographical features and climate, fuel
type and availability, and emission control designs. A set of generators, tied in to
the transmission system, responds to the instantaneous demand created by the loads
and attempts to provide the lowest cost power possible based on the transmission
system’s capacity and each generators operational cost. For this reason, bulk power
may be transmitted over long distances away from cheap generation sources toward
concentrations of loads. Figure 2.2 captures the high level electric infrastructure
where power is generated, transmitted, and distributed to the load.
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Fig. 2.2. High level layout of the electric infrastructure.
Natural Gas - Electric Interdependence
The electric power system relies heavily on natural gas-fired generators due to
their low environmental impact and agility in adjusting output power. Nuclear and
coal-fired sources often have day-long response times to transients, while NG-electric
generators can be activated within minutes. Because of the cost of fuels, natural
gas generators typically serve the grid’s transient needs and respond to unexpected
outages experienced by other generation sources while coal and nuclear sources run
at a constant output. For these reasons, faults that the electric system experiences
are often translated into demand spikes in the gas network. Additionally, outages in
the gas network can severely hamper the electric power system’s ability to respond
to events that it experiences [9]. This growing interdependence creates a complex
problem where impact analysis must span multiple CPS operators.
Attacker Motives
While some attacker motives are political, the work in this chapter focuses on
the financial motivations that an attacker has. Enron showed that outages can cause
supply shortages and thus spikes in prices that benefit power producers on the spot-
market–those selling power at on-demand rates benefit from supply loss. An easy
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avenue for profit is to speculate on the futures market for power delivery. An attacker
could purchase low-priced futures, cause a disruption, and then sell them in the
starved market for a profit. Another alternative is to short-sell stocks from public
power utilities and subject them to some outages to reduce profits and lower stock
values. While the executives of Enron faced federal prosecution, cyber attackers and
cyber forensics face more geopolitical barriers to be a proper deterrent of attacks.
Therefore, companies must make smart investments to defend their CPS’s.
CPS designers must consider security from two perspectives. The first is economic
incentives (EI) and the second is resiliency control (RC). The important distinction
between the two categories is the method by which a defender needs to predict failure.
An uninformed RC failure may occur randomly, based on a probability distribution
driven by physics and the environment, however an economically incentivized attack
will focus specifically on the most financially impactful components in the system.
This motivates the creation of a utility function that has a basis in revenues and costs
as opposed to an approach which only evaluates shortages or random failures. Since
resiliency control impacts can be forecasted, they are not the focus of this chapter.
System Security
The security of CPS revolves around a set of defensive and resiliency investments.
The core defenses are techniques such as encryption, intrusion detection, and malware
detection while core resiliency techniques focus on redundant, fault tolerant equip-
ment and spare capacity. Once a security strategy is developed, with the support of
an impact function, system architects can incorporate a realistic risk when deciding
which technologies to deploy and to what systems.
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2.1.3 Related Work
Utility System Modeling and Security
Minimizing costs in electric and gas utilities is not a new problem, and several
solutions have been created and utilized to solve these optimizations. They are not
suitable, however, for multi-player games. These techniques model each utility system
and produce device-level operational scheduling (unit commitment) aimed at mini-
mizing cost by using varying optimization techniques such as mixed integer linear
programming (MILP). When network conditions such as a minimum power delivery
rate are added to the unit commitment model, a security constrained unit commit-
ment (SCUC) is created [10] which improves system operation during failures. These
optimization problems are useful for planning the day-to-day operation of each utility,
and the SCUC has been extended to include a natural gas-electric combined optimiza-
tion [11–14]. While these techniques produce an optimal unit schedule, they do not
optimize the multi-player objective function as done in this dissertation. Instead they
consider the system as a monolithic (single player) entity for optimization purposes.
Market processes such as those utilized by New York Independent System Operator
(NYISO) allow power producers to bid into power markets. The model does not
consider profit, however, as the system attempts only to minimize cost not maximize
profit.
Graphical Approaches to Security
Graphs have been used extensively in solving cyber security problems, but most
approaches do not consider the continuous attacker objectives seen in attacks on
the power utility CPS. Most of this related work focuses on protecting a particular
component of a system where an attacker either has control or does not [15, 16] and
identifying at-risk components for protection using this assumption. Graph-based
metrics are often applied to power system problems [17], but the utility in identifying
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vulnerable targets by using static vertex or edge properties may be misleading [18].
In this work, dynamic and interdependent properties are considered in attack and
defense (i.e. actual impact instead of estimated). While the existing approaches are
useful for modeling the defense of particular components or observing how an attack
may progress across different cyber components [19], the problem of developing a
security strategy has not been adequately addressed for interdependent CPS.
Game Theory in CPS
Once an impact understanding is developed or assumed, game theory approaches
can be utilized to improve defensive decisions. Several recent techniques [20–24] have
been evaluated for defense application in the power grid. These approaches provide
a good framework for using game theory to solve problems in CPS security, and this
work aims to improve on the utility functions available. Little work has been done
in utilizing game theoretic approaches to evaluate the combined interdependencies
of gas and electric networks, however. More research is needed to understand how
to best defend interdependent CPS networks against an attacker especially when the
defensive objectives of each player is different.
Interdependent security games, as surveyed in [25, 26], optimize and study the
process by which defenders invest resources to mitigate and minimize risk from cy-
ber attacks. This class of games involves multiple defenders in the face of attacks,
excluding single defender-attacker games, and focus on the defensive investment strat-
egy [27,28]. Specific games are targeted toward networked control systems [29], how-
ever these models focus on the contagion [26, 30] aspect of security rather than the
market-level interdependence that this model consideres.
The financial impacts of attacks have been studied in [30]. A model is created
which has the property that defensive investments generally reduce the ability of
the attacker to sustain attacks. However, the interdependence effect only modeled
16
positive externalities and does not include the negative externalities modeled in this
section.
2.1.4 Overview
The section provides an overview of the interacting forces in interdependent CPS’s
and how they will be captured in a model. The actors in the system are defined along
with their independent objectives, and the threat model and device level impacts are
outlined.
The Actors and Objectives
The interdependent CPS in the natural gas-electric scenario is comprised of several
gas and electric entities. Gas is extracted by drilling companies, transported by
pipeline operations, and distributed to customers, and similar actors exist on the
electric side. Each group of actors has its own customer base, which may be another
actor in the system or direct consumers, and tries to maximize its profits as a cost
optimization objective.
Actor’s Resources and System Model
Each actor owns a set of components that are interconnected with the larger CPS.
These components perform one of four functions, and the first is production which
introduces resources from external, unmodeled sources into the CPS. The second is
consumption of a resource in the system, which acts as load. The third component
is the transportation or transmission function such as a power line or gas pipeline.
The final function is a transformational operation which converts a resource from one
form to another. These components are interconnected and divided among actors to
create a model of the CPS.
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Threat Model and Impact Analysis
The attack motivations categorized as economic incentives (EI) and resiliency
control (RC) drive distinct classes of failures. Under the RC umbrella, mechanical
degradation, random occurrences, and unplanned events act to perturb the actor’s
resources. A NG pipeline compressor may fail due to a worn bearing for example.
Under the EI umbrella, physical and cyber attacks actively seek to disrupt hardware in
the system with a specific agenda. The occurrence of failures under EI is systematic,
informed, and potentially widespread. In both cases, however, the actual mechanics
of an attack or failure translate into parameters in the system model. An equipment
piece that fails causes reduced capacity or increased loss in the system which maps
to suboptimal flows and reduced profits.
Given the system model and no perturbation, the most profitable flows can be
established by the actors. An attack can then reduce the capacity or increase the loss
of a component in the system model, resulting in a new profit. The impact analysis
then is the difference in profits for these two models.
2.1.5 Approach
In this section, the system model and optimization problem is formally described.
The resources are normalized to allow inter-domain comparison and evaluation. A
graph structure is defined that maps the core parameters of each component in the sys-
tem to a graph vertex or edge parameter. An optimization problem is then formulated
for solving single and multi-objective system models based upon this formulation.
Nodes
Nodes or vertices in the graph serve either as hubs, sources, or sinks, and these
components provide the interface with non-modeled processes.
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Hubs The hubs in the graph represent zero-sum routing components in the system
such as electric buses or gas distribution headers. The hubs capture points in the
system where alternate transmission paths or sources can be selected and enable the
splitting and combining of flows. Hubs also serve as geographic anchors and act as
abstraction points where detail is removed from the underlying system. A distribution
system which has both load and generation can be modeled as a hub with an in and
out flow to capture all of the low level electric bus impacts, for example. The hub’s
geographic property is used to calculate distance-based transmission losses.
Sources and Sinks Some nodes act as sink or source points in the system, and
these nodes are the interface between components not in the model. The various
sources of energy (gas wells, flowing water, coal mines) are the input sources to the
model and represent components that have a capacity and fixed unit flow cost. The
sinks in the system are loads or consumers of energy, and these nodes absorb flow
and generate revenue for the system and it is where the model terminates.
Edges
The links between most nodes model resource transportation components such
as gas pipelines or electric transmission lines. These edges have some capacity and
resource loss due to inefficiencies such as resistance. In the case of an electric trans-
mission, the line losses result in less energy at the output than was provided at the
input as a function of flow. Similarly, gas loses pressure in transmission as it flows.
Thus each edge has four associated parameters: capacity c(u, v), flow f(u, v), cost
per unit flow a(u, v), and loss l(u, v). Flow is the output of the optimization, and
cost is associated with edges connecting sources and sinks. For most edges, there is
only a capacity and loss parameter.
Electric Transmission Model Each high voltage transmission line has a designed
capacity that maps to c(u, v). The transmission line losses are a function of line length,
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voltage, and electric current flow and the magnitude of loss can be estimated [31] as
a ratio of percent per distance. A transmission edge connecting node u and v has a
loss per unit flow defined as l(u, v) = lossrate(u, v)× dist(u, v).
Fluid Transmission Model Similarly, by Bernoulli’s principle, the pressure in a
gas pipeline will be reduced as it flows requiring compressor stations to boost pressure.
As in the power case, this cost can be calculated as a distance dependent loss. The
capacity of the pipeline is also a known design parameter and is planned based on
long term demand forecasts made by the gas utilities.
Transformation Edges The remaining transformation edges convert the energy
in the CPS from one type to another. This transformation is identical to transmis-
sion with the caveat that efficiencies are much lower. In the gas-electric example, a
transformation edge converts natural gas into electric power with typical efficiencies
below 65%. l(u, v) = Conversion Efficiency.
Cost, Revenues, and Expenses
Certain links in the system have specific costs or revenues associated with them.
The operational costs for each type of power generation plant contributes to the
expenses while the consumers of energy provide revenue. These money flows are
captured by a positive or negative value of cost a(u, v). An additional function,
demand d(v), dictates how much a energy a consumer is willing to purchase or supplier
is willing to sell. The set L (loads) contains all of the vertices v for which d(v) > 0,
and are sinks. Additionally each source has the property d(v) < 0 and comprises set
G (generators).
Resource Normalization Resource unit conversions are required to normalize
pricing information based on different quantities–gas is often priced in a volume while
electricity is priced per joule or watt-hour. A system-wide view requires a normalized
20
unit of measure for all of the components in the system. In the case of energy based
systems, i.e. power and gas utilities, the standard SI unit of joule is be used and
converted to megawatts (MW), but other units can be used for other systems.
Utility Function
The components are combined into a flow graph representation, as shown in Figure
2.3. Linear programming and minimum-cost flow algorithms are then used to analyze
the system. The utility function for the entire system is defined as follows. Each edge
in the graph has a capacity c(u, v) and cost a(u, v) defined by the owning actor as
a property of the physical system. The vertices V contain all of the distribution
headers or power buses, plus any sink or source nodes. The following constraints are




a(u, v) · f(u, v) (2.1)
Subject to constraints:








c(v, u)for all v ∈ G (2.4)
∑
u∈V
f(u, v) ≤ d(v) for all v ∈ L (2.5)
∑
v∈V







f(w, u) ∀ u (2.7)
The first equation 2.1 measures the cost across all edges in the system, and its
minimization optimizes system-wide profits. Equations 2.3 and 2.4 constrain the
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Fig. 2.3. Flow graph of the combined natural gas and electric infrastructure.
potential demand values to ones that satisfy the input or output capacity of the
node, and equation 2.2 ensures the flow solutions are less than the edge capacity.
Equation 2.5 and 2.6 prevent over-selling to a load or over-production from a source.
Equation 2.7 is the conservation of energy at the intermediate hubs. The division by
1− l(u,w) on the left hand term captures the impact of transmission losses. The sum
of the inputs to a node will be larger than the outputs to account for the fact that
some of the input energy is lost in transit to the hub. The net cost of these losses is
dependent on the source cost, and placing the losses here ensures the optimal flow of
energy and causes the hubs to have a non-zero sum.
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Utility for Multiple Actors
The notion of multiple actors arises as a function of asset ownership and financially
competing entities. Each asset (edge) is owned by an actor (each edge has one owner),
and these owners are acting in a competitive market. The actors are autonomous
entities and will not cooperate or form cartels for profit maximization. Instead, a
cartel of individual actors will be modeled as a single actor.
Estimating the utilities in the presence of multiple actors entails a large body
of economic works that estimate supply and demand pricing in open markets. The
complexities of such assessments are not necessary for an accurate model of utility
provided certain assumptions are made. The first assumption is that if the graph
structure remains the same, then the addition of new actors or changes in owner-
ship do not change the optimal flows in the system. The rationale is that, given a
ground truth set of costs and losses, a competitive i.e. non-collusive set of actors will
eventually settle on the most cost-effective flow, since the lowest cost option provides
maximal profit system-wide (the system will enter a coalition-proof Nash equilib-
rium). The second, derivative assumption is that since the system’s sink and source
flows and prices are fixed, the net system profit is independent of asset ownership.
The sum of the individual actors profits equals the original system profit after any
changes in ownership. The rationale is that while some profit distributions may not
be entirely credible, it relaxes profit distribution from a negotiation problem to an as-
signment problem. The final assumption is that costs in the system include required
minimum profits for operation.
The problem for determining the utility in a multiple actor scenario is now viewed
as a fair profit assignment algorithm. The fairness piece comes into play by observing
what an actor can charge at each point in the system. Notionally this is done by
raising prices until the buyer goes somewhere else. Practically this is measured by
constricting the flow out of each actor, independently, and observing how much more
the system as a whole is paying to supplement that reduction (the system’s marginal
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cost). Since the prices at the end suppliers and consumers is fixed, and the flow
through the system remains unchanged due to the allocation of internal costs, the
marginal cost can be applied as a profit allocation. For example, if an actor constricts
her flow on a particular asset from 50 units to 49 and observes the system’s marginal
cost as $1, then he determines he can charge the original price + $1. In the model
view, the cost a(u, v) on the edge goes from $0 to $1 while the system flows are
unperturbed. The system’s net profit is decreased because this is a cost, however, the
actor’s individual profit is increased by that mount. The result is a profit distribution
that follows the assumptions above.
The marginal cost alone, however, cannot be used to distribute profits fairly be-
cause a reseller situation may arise. Imagine three independent actors are operating
in a series. Each actor determines its marginal cost to be $1. This cost was calcu-
lated, however, with the assumption that the other actors in the series would take
zero profits. Intuitively, the profits available at the last actor in the series must be
split among all three so that the total system profit remains constant. The fairness in
this situation is taken by attempting to uniformly distribute the profits among actors
in these situations. The solution approach, as listed in the proceeding algorithm, is
to grow from small to large fractions of the marginal cost uniformly across the actors.
Limiting Information Certain situations may arise where the model needs to be
explored from the perspective of an actor or adversary who has a restricted view of
the system. This is the case when someone estimates capacity for example. The
application of this knowledge level is to add noise to the different parameters in the
system, with a feasibility restrictions. The simplest way to do this is to center a
normal distribution around the mean of the original graph parameter and then vary
the standard deviation based upon the knowledge level.
For each parameter, except for the flow f(u, v), the knowledge level σ is defined
as c′(u, v) = N (c(u, v), σ2). The distribution is truncated such that the signs of the
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Fig. 2.4. The graph shows an example scenario where each asset is
owned by a different actor A-F. The three suppliers A, B, D have unit
cost of production $3, $3, and $9 respectively and the end customer
has a fixed unit price of $11. At each edge, there is a fixed unit
cost and a marginal unit cost. The fixed cost is a parameter of the
model, while the marginal cost is calculated by observing the system’s
response to constricting flow through that particular edge. In this
case, actors A and B are in direct competition, so no unilateral price
movement is possible. C, however, is in a position to mark up the
price an additional $6 because it is in competition with D. E and F
are in series and may mark up to the remaining purchase price at the
customer, cumulatively. A fair split of $1 for E and $1 for F is shown
as an example.
original parameters do not change. The new flows are determined by evaluating the
optimization problem for the new parameter set.
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Measuring Impact
Each parameter, cost a, capacity c, and loss l can be varied to determine the new
utility. Impact = Utility′ − Utility where Utility′ = Utility as a, c, l → a′, c′, l′. The
impact is computed when an attack or other natural forces act on the systems. The
impact can be negative to indicate a gain in the Utility when there are multiple actors
in the system. In the models, the gain is primarily due to actors selling spare capacity
in the event of a failure.
2.1.6 Experimental Model
Geographic Model
Six Western US states are captured in a moderately complex, interdependent gas-
electric system model. The state-level representation maps to data available from
the Energy Information Administration (EIA) [32,33], and the states of Washington,
Idaho, Oregon, California, Nevada, and Arizona are chosen because this region is
generally a net importer of energy. Each state’s hub is mapped to its geographic
centroid, and edges are created based on border adjacency. Each state has two energy
hubs, one for natural gas and one for electricity, and a customer base for each resource.
In total there are 12 hubs and 18 hub-to-hub transmission lines. Figure 2.5 depicts
the infrastructure for the two systems, and the interconnection occurs between the
load side of gas (b) and the generation side of electricity (a).
Interconnected Infrastructure Model
Four functions must be defined for hubs and edges in the gas infrastructure. The
cost function a is based on the average price paid in each state over a year. For import
edges, where gas is purchased out-of-model, the cost is taken to be 25% lower than the
price customers pay, motivating transportation. Next the loss function l is defined.
For this step, a calculation is made based on a typical loss of 1% per 400 km [34],
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(a) Electric Model
(b) Natural Gas Model
Fig. 2.5. A flow model is created for six Western US states for both
an electric (a) and natural gas (b) infrastructure.
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since the actual loss rates vary based on each individual pipeline’s construction char-
acteristics. The resulting loss rates are seen in Figure 2.5 (b). The capacity function
c directly maps to EIA’s dataset [32]. Each state’s energy information profile details
energy produced by gas-fired generators and their efficiency, l. Finally the supply,
imports, and demand for each state were calculated by averaging yearly consumption
into short term amounts.
Similarly, the values for the electric infrastructure are calculated using the EIA
sources [33]. Each state has a suite of electric energy sources to choose from, nuclear,
coal, natural gas, solar, etc., and each source has its own edge into the hub. The
prices for these different sources are estimated and the supply and consumer pricing
in the system is assumed static because most contracts are negotiated for terms of a
day or longer [35].
Model Adjustments
To represent a more challenging model, several modifications are done to the
calculated infrastructure. The installed electric capacity c is reduced by 25% to
account for inoperable generators due to maintenance and climate, and the demand
is increased by 65% from the daily average to represent a high-demand period, i.e. in
the peak of winter. With these adjustments, the system has about 15% spare capacity
which is in line with the EIA’s spare-capacity estimates.
Operational Complexity
To evaluate whether or not the model is sufficiently complex, the system’s response
to capacity reductions is plotted in Figure 2.6. Four example edges are selected and
their capacity c is reduced between 0 and 100%. The plot shows the marginal increase
in cost per additional percentage of reduction. The stepping behavior represents the
different alternative sources that replace the eliminated capacity. The solid line, for
example, has a cheap alternative in the 5-15% reduction range. However, after 18%
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the system selects increasingly costly alternatives to augment the reduced capacity.
Since the lines have a variety of steps, the 12-hub model is complex enough to study.
The model created in this chapter is evaluated for a combined natural gas and
electric power distribution system. Three scenarios are examined to answer several
questions. The first scenario looks to establish the need for cooperation to achieve
optimal defensive strategies. The second scenario investigates the difference between
objectives of profit versus shortage to show that the choice in objective is crucial when
analyzing an attacker/defender strategy. The final experiment investigates greedy
attacker strategies to see whether or not a game framework is necessary to answer
attacker strategy questions.
Quantitative Data and Model Creation
The goal of these experiments is to create a realistic scenario in which to test
hypotheses about the utility of different components in the system. The high level
flow amounts and capacities should reflect what is seen in reality to avoid creating a
problem and solution from a scenario that might never exist.
Information from the EIA was used to create a model of the gas and electric sys-
tems of the western region of the United States (California, Nevada, Arizona, Oregon,
Idaho, and Washington states). The geographic centroid of each state was used as a
node in the graph, and each adjacent state’s interconnections were summarized into
single edges. The six state region was selected because of its relative isolation geo-
graphically and form the natural gas infrastructure perspective. The region imports
most of its natural gas from fields adjacent to the modeled states, and several of the
states have no external edges such as Oregon and California, having only minor in-
teractions with imports and exports of gas and electricity from outside of the system.
The 12-node system (6 for each resource type) is still complex enough to capture the
interactions seen in large CPS without being too large to burden experimentation.
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The model uses two actors, one for the natural gas infrastructure and one for
the electric infrastructure. Each actor attempts to maximize its own profit in the
scenarios tested, unless otherwise mentioned.
Natural Gas Infrastructure The interstate pipeline capacities for each state are
available in the EIA database which provides several types of state-level data. Each
state has an exact import/export capacity to other states and a per-state consumption
volume. This provides the capacity and consumer information for each gas node. A
portion of the gas moved is utilized by electric power generating facilities, and the
interconnection is captured by the transformational edges in the graph.
The next component is loss due to gas transport. These losses are based on
estimates formed from the evaluation of various US FERC reports which provide
information about how much each pipeline is charging for losses and uses of natural
gas due to transportation. Finally, revenue information was collected from the EIA to
provide values for the general gas customers versus the electrical generation customers.
The electric utilities generally paid less for gas, likely due to the large contract size
and optimization or predictability of demand.
Electric Infrastructure Similar to the gas infrastructure, the information pro-
vided by the EIA was used to construct the same set of graph components for the
electric actor. The primary difference is that transmission infrastructure information
is not publicly available or easily accessible, so the capacities and losses are less exact.
The generation losses are based on the actual performance data of units in each state.
The transmission losses are estimated based on distance. These costs are operational
only and do not include the amortized capital costs associated with plant construction
and lifetime because these are considered sunk costs when making daily operational
decisions.
Combined Infrastructure The two subsystems rely on different energy measure-
ment units for basic transport and pricing information. Since both systems deal with
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energy, the standard unit Watt was used to convert all of the components into the
same unit system. Gas is transported in a volume and may have different amounts of
energy per cubic foot, but the variance observed in the measurements for each system
revealed less than a 1% difference in energy content between sources so a standard
value was taken.
To establish demand, the year average consumption of both gas and electricity is
provided by EIA for each state. This amount was taken as the mean demand and
increased by 20% for the gas system and 65% for the electric system to reflect the
variance seen in average daily load versus peak load. Additionally the capacity used
for the electric system is provided as installed capacity, not available capacity. This
amount is reduced by 25% to reflect typical plant outages or reduced water supply
availability.
When the system is combined, it is important to understand how the interde-
pendencies manifest in the real system, as captured by the model. Figure 2.6 shows
how the capacity reduction of four different edges in the system have substantially
different impact profiles. An important concept in the power system is understanding
which source the next watt of demand will be allocated from. The figure shows the
marginal costs of providing the alternative watt when it is lost from the attacked
edge. Low values mean that a cheap alternative exists while high values means that
the most expensive fuels are utilized to power the system.
2.1.7 Results
In this section, three experiments are conducted to study the impact of attacks
in a multi-actor interdependent gas and electric CP system. The first experiment
shows that co-operative strategies across the gas and electric CPS reduce the impact
of most attacks. The second experiment investigates the difference between shortage
and profit impact, and the last experiment shows that greedy security strategies are
not sufficient for impact analysis in interconnected CPS.
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Fig. 2.6. This chart shows the marginal change in the impact for
incremental reductions in capacity for four edges in the system model.
The incremental steps represent the costs of the marginal generation
that must be utilized to deliver energy to the customer.
Single Failure Impact Analysis
The impact of an attack on the interconnected gas and electric infrastructure is
studied. For each edge in the graph, the capacity c(u, v) of the edge is reduced to
zero to simulate an attack. The impact I of the edge loss is computed by computing
Utility′ (Equation 2.1) and then subtracting it from the computed Utility when the
edge is present.
Two scenarios are considered. In the first scenario, I is computed in the presence
of an edge failure with a single actor representing the interests across the complete
interconnected gas and electric network. This scenario indicates how information
sharing results in lower impact and enables a more secure interconnected CPS. The
impact computed in this scenario is indicated as combined in Figure 2.7. In the second
scenario, I is computed independently, with one actor representing the gas network
and one actor representing the power network. The impact computed for each actor
in this scenario is then summed together and indicated as independent in Figure 2.7.
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The following observations are made from Figure 2.7. (a) The impact of indepen-
dently operating actors is higher or same as the combined gas and electric CPS. While
only the results for the top 10, out of 38, edges are shown, this is also true for the
other transmission and transformation edges in the model. (b) The impact is much
higher for a small set of edges and then rapidly reduces for the other edges indicating
that some edges are more critical than others. For example, when Edge #1 fails,
which is a transmission edge to indicate gas imports into Arizona, the highest impact
is observed in the combined actor model but it is lower than the independent actor
model. The difference between the impact in the two scenarios, is due to redirecting
spare gas resources to satisfy the NG fired electricity generators in the combined actor
model where as in the independent model, the independent electric network must rely
on more expensive sources of power. (c) Failure of some edges have the same impact
in both scenarios. For example, when Edge #2 fails, which is a transformation edge
from a gas to electric hub in California, the impact is same.
Hence this section empirically shows how a combined CPS can be more secure
when the system is cooperative across different sectors optimizing resources across
the full interconnected gas and electric CPS rather than considering each system in
isolation.
Single Failure Shortage Analysis
In this experiment, the difference between shortage experiences within the system
and financial impact captured by the utility function is investigated. Based on the
methodology developed in the previous experiment, the capacity of an edge is reduced
to zero, and the impact is computed based on a single combined actor. Additionally,
for each failure, the shortfall (that is demand not met) in watts is computed at the
loads in the system. The results are shown in Figure 2.8 where the y-axis indicates
the normalized financial impact and the normalized shortage impact. The normal-
ized impact is computed by dividing the impact of the current edge failure with the
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Fig. 2.7. This chart shows the impact of objective independence in
ten edges due to a failure in the model. Combined indicates a sin-
gle actor model where as Independent indicates two actors acting
independently.
summation of the impact caused by the failure of each of the other edges. The finan-
cial and shortage impacts behave differently. For example, while financial impact for
Edges #3, #4 and #5 is similar, the shortage impact is substantially different, due to
the availability and cost of alternative generation resources. This indicates the need
for detailed models when incorporating financial impact of shortages, by associating
nuanced models to capture unmet demand in dollars. Shortages should be carefully
modeled to ensure a secure CPS. If shortages have associated penalties which are not
subject to a ”force majeure” clause, the financial ramifications should be included in
the impact analyses.
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Fig. 2.8. This chart compares the normalized financial impact (left)
to the shortage (right) caused during a complete failure of an edge in
the system. The impact analysis could be different based on which
objective is chosen, profit maximization or shortage minimization.
2.1.8 Security Strategy Analysis
In this section two greedy security strategies are evaluated. The first strategy is
to attack the largest capacity edges first and the second is to attack the highest flow
edges. If a greedy strategy is successful then a complex security strategy may be un-
necessary. It is shown that for interconnected CPS, a greedy strategy is not successful
since there is no monotonically increasing trend between the greedy selection metric
(capacity or flow) and the impact that it has on the system.
To evaluate each strategy, a failure on one edge is modeled and the impact the
failure has against the greedy selection metric is used for comparison.
Figure 2.9 compares the edge’s failure impact as compared to the capacity of the
edge. For this strategy to be successful, the impact should increase as the capacity
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increase from left to right in the plot. However, it is observed this this not the case
indicating that a greedy approach does not work in an interdependent CPS. It is also
observed that there are several high capacity edges that upon failure that do not have
a high impact on the interconnected CPS.
To understand the dynamics of such failures, part (b) shows the impact versus
capacity reduction for two representative edges. Both there edges have similar impact
but have different capacities. When a failure occurs, the interconnected CPS re-
optimizes its flow with the a new least-cost plan. The impact of the alternative flow
is shown as the points along the line, and its slope is driven by the cost at the source
of the new resource. When the edge’s capacity is reduced between 0-100%, source
square may be used at a low cost, thus a low slope. Between 80% and 100%, source
circle may be used which has a very high cost.
Next similar analysis with flow is conducted. The largest edges are not always
completely utilized hence flow can be less than capacity. Figure 2.10 indicates the
impact of the failure in edges based on the observed flow. Failures in edges causes the
volume of resources to be rerouted, but because multiple redundant paths and low-
cost alternatives may exist, the selection of the highest-flow edge is not universally
the best. To understand the dynamics of such failures, part (b) shows the impact
versus flow reduction for two representative edges. Both there edges have similar
impact but have different flow. The capacity of the edge is progressively reduced to
indicate a reduction in flow. The circle point has some spare capacity, as its initial
flat portion in the line. The small flow redirection in the square point results in a
high, steep penalty when compared to the shallow growth of the first line. The slow
growth is again due to cheap alternative sources.
2.1.9 Conclusion
In this section, an approach to impact analysis was presented to support game the-
ory application to a combined gas-electric utility system. The impacts of equipment
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(a) All Edges (b) Impact for Selected Points
Fig. 2.9. Impact of edge failure compared with its transport capacity.
A lack of a clear increasing trend suggests that this approach is non-
optimal in attacking. (b) shows how the impact of the two points
progresses differently as capacity is reduced. Since the impact is low
for a large capacity loss in the circle point, based on the slope of the
line, the attack has less overall impact on the system.
outages and capacity reductions on company profits and system-wide profits were
calculated. When companies act independently, it was shown that some sub-optimal
choices are made in defensive resource allocation which supports a cooperative game
approach to developing security strategies. Additionally it was shown that depending
on the attacker’s objective of profit or disruption, different defensive maneuvers would
be made, so a careful bridge between shortage-based and financial-based adversaries
should be created. The game theory approach to defense was motivated by showing
that naive security strategies are insufficient in determining the most valuable target,
implying a more complex decision process should be involved in optimization. The
security analysis of the interdependent gas-electric system is ripe for further game
theory development and provide an approach for measuring the utility of different
system components.
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(a) All Edges (b) Impact for Selected Points
Fig. 2.10. Impact of edge failure compared with its optimized flow.
The high flow edges, when attacked, result in the most redirection of
energy in the system. (b) shows how the alternative energy cost may
be much higher per watt for some sources than others, the greedy
approach will not work as show in (a).
2.2 High-Level Adversarial Strategies
2.2.1 Introduction
This section addresses the problem of asset protection in the face of strategic
adversaries in an interconnected CPS. The model that is developed in this chapter
is of autonomous organizations (equivalently, corporations) dubbed as “actors”. The
actors own and operate various assets, and cooperate to provide some end-user visible
service. For example, the natural gas provider(s) and solar energy provider(s) feeding
into the electric grid, provide electric power to end consumers. Attacks against these
assets impact the profits of the actors. Motivated by the prospect of financial losses,
defensive investments are made by the actors. The gamut of relationships that can
exist between the actors as they relate to the defensive strategies that they deploy are
explored. The gamut runs from actors behaving completely independently through a
subset of them cooperating in securing the assets to perfect cooperation.
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There are a few insights into improving the models for defensive investment opti-
mization. First, the implications of attacks in the cyber side should be measured on
the physical side. This enables dependencies to be drawn from complicated intercon-
nections rather than approximated via contagion. Second, when every actor in the
system is considered to be financially motivated, then attacks are driven by profits
and defenses are driven by losses. This allows for adversaries to be profit seeking and
creates a complication for defenders where the assets which cause the most harm to
one actor may be owned by another. When actors are mutually harmed by an attack,
they may wish to collaborate in defense and share the expense of defending an asset.
The solution captures the physical interconnections as a directed flow graph. The
nodes and edges capture the primary supply chain factors involved in a system such
as the interconnected natural gas pipeline and electric grids. These factors are the
maximum capacity, cost per unit flow, and loss due to inefficiency. The flow is then
optimized under a multi-actor model which measures the profitability of each actor.
This model then serves as the basis for impact analysis—the supply chain factors
are perturbed during cyber-attacks and the change in profitability is measured. The
strategic adversary model then optimally selects a subset of actors in the system and
targets which have a large positive benefit to the attacker. The defenders, estimating
the adversary strategy, independently select assets to defend.
The model is evaluated against an interconnected natural-gas, electric system
which is created from data available from the Energy Information Administration
(EIA). The impact of multiple stakeholders is evaluated in the impact model, showing
that the inclusion of independent actors significantly influences the observed impacts
of cyber-attacks on asset owners. The strategic adversary model is evaluated against
varying number of actors and noise to capture the adversary’s sensitivity to accurate
models. Finally, the defense strategy is analyzed in its effectiveness at protecting
against the strategic adversary.
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2.2.2 Model Overview
The section provides an overview of the interacting forces in interdependent CPS’s
and how they will be captured in a model. The actors in the system are defined along
with their independent objectives, and the threat model and device level impacts are
outlined.
The Overall System
The desired outcome driving this work is an optimal defensive investment strategy
for each actor in an interdependent CPS. The first component is an impact analysis
tool which measures the financial outcomes of perturbations in the physical system,
which are driven by cyber attacks. The impact analysis is then used to drive a
strategic adversary who evaluates the best targets to attack, given the particular
impact model. The final piece is the defender who takes the preceding two pieces
and combines them to estimate an attacker’s moves and counter them with defensive
investment at crucial locations in the system.
Refer to Section 2.1.5 for the impact model details.
The Actors and Objectives
The interdependent CPS in the natural gas-electric critical infrastructure scenario
is comprised of several gas and electric entities. Gas is extracted by drilling companies,
transported by pipeline operations, and distributed to customers, and similar actors
exist on the electric side. Each group of actors has its own customer base, which may
be another actor in the system or direct consumers, and tries to maximize its profits
as a cost optimization objective.
Each actor owns a set of components (assets) that are modeled in a directed graph.
The graph’s edges have weights which correspond to the costs and losses observed
40
by the system during operation, and an optimization problem is formulated that
maximizes the profitability of the system.
Threat Model and Impact Analysis
The threat model captures cyber attacks as actively seeking to disrupt hardware
in the system with a specific agenda. The occurrence of failures are systematic,
informed, and potentially widespread. The mechanics of an attack, whether it attacks
a particular programmable logic controller or some other sensor, are translated into
perturbations in the system model. An equipment piece that fails causes reduced
capacity or increased loss in the system which maps to suboptimal flows and reduced
profits.
Given the system model and no perturbation, the most profitable flows can be
established by the actors. An attack can then reduce the capacity or increase the
loss of a component in the system model. As a result, the system operates at a lower
efficiency, having higher costs or increased losses. The impact analysis then is the
loss in profits from these perturbations.
2.2.3 Attacker Strategy
In our model, the adversary takes on the role of a subset of the actors in the sense
that it tries to maximize the profit of some of the actors through a cyber-attack.
The rationale is that the adversary can get a share of the profits of the subset of
actors, e.g., by getting equity in the companies represented by the benefiting actors
or otherwise engaging in the market. Conceptually (and simplifying somewhat), one
can think of an impact matrix with the actors as the rows and the assets as the
columns. The value IM [a, t] implies the impact of taking down target t on actor a.
If this is a positive value, it implies actor a makes a profit out of this perturbation; if
it is negative, then it suffers a loss.
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Attacker Incentives and Constraints
In the impact model in Section 2.1.5, a few observations can be made which
motivate the existence of a profit-seeking strategic adversary. The first is that dis-
ruptions in the system cause a re-routing of flows around the problem area, and these
re-routings may shift profits from one actor to another, i.e. competitor elimination.
Assets in the impact model have several parameters that are properties of the
particular design and implementation of the CPS. These parameters are the cost
of attack, the cost of defense, and the probability of successful attack which are
in addition to parameters in the impact model. The cost of attack represents the
manpower and research required to disable an asset, the cost of defense represents
the same for mitigating attacks, and the probability of successful attack plays into
the expected return on investment.
Strategic Adversary
The strategic adversary (SA) assumes the role of an actor or actors in the system
and attempts to make investments with positive returns. Unlike in traditional impact
models, where the SA is viewed as only seeking damage, the SA here is causing
damages only to the extent that they support profits for some actors in the system.
This creates a scenario where attacks to some targets, which may be very damaging,
are unlikely because they do not create an opportunity for profit in the system.
Target Selection Algorithm
Each target t ∈ T has an expected cost of attack Catk(t) and an impact at actor
a, I(a, t), which is positive to represent gains, and a probability of successful attack
Ps(t). The attacker’s target set is T (i), actor set A(i), and is limited to spending MA














T (i) ∈ {0, 1} (2.9)
A(j) ∈ {0, 1} (2.10)∑
i∈T
(T (i) · Catk(i)) ≤MA (2.11)
Equation 2.8 maximizes profits to a strategic adversary by selecting the set of
targets to attack, T , and actors with whom to share profits, A . Equation 2.9 and
2.10 constrain the functions as binary variables, and equation 2.11 limits the cost of
attack to a particular budget MA. These equations can be solved using mixed integer
linear programming (MILP). Solving MILP is computationally expensive, and the
combination set of actors and targets can become large. However, given that the
impact model represents a physical system, some optimizations can be made. The
graph can be segmented into regions of operation that contain non-overlapping sets
of actors, as commonly found in large interconnected systems, and solved through a
divide-and-conquer approach.
The SA may be faced with limited information about the system, as described
in Section 2.1.5. When the adversary solves the optimization problem with the per-
turbed values of the edges and the nodes, it gets a perturbed impact matrix I ′, which
is different from the ground truth impact matrix I. It then bases its attack decision
on I ′. In Section 2.2.5, the impact of the imperfect knowledge on the expected gain
of the adversary is characterized.
2.2.4 Defense
The defenders are all actors in the system who are fundamentally optimizing their
defensive investment decisions. Given the likelihood of an attack Pa, the likelihood
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of a attack being successful Ps, the expected impact I, and the cost to defend Cd,
the actor decides to defend a target if PsPaI > Cd. The defensive model is integrated
with the other two components, the strategic adversary model and the interdependent
impact model, through the parameters I and Pa, respectively. The probability of
attack is created by the defender’s model of the strategic adversary.
Strategy
Each actor a in the system owns a subset of targets, Ta. For each target t, a
binary defense decision D(t) is made by the owning actor a. D(t) = 1 means that
the asset is defended, D(t) = 0 means it is not. The investment is limited by the





(Pa(t) · I(a, t) · (1−D(t))− Cd(t) ·D(t)) (2.12)
Subject to the constraint:
D(t) ∈ {0, 1} (2.13)∑
t∈Ta
(D(t) · Cd(t)) ≤MD(a) (2.14)
Equation 2.12 trades the cost of defense against the expected loss due to an attack
and results in an optimal defense subject to the constraint in Equation 2.14 which
caps the amount of expenditures on defense to MD. This can be solved using MILP,
as in the strategic adversary case.
Limiting Information
Similar to the strategic adversary, the defender may have limited information
about the system. The impact matrix that the defender bases her decisions on may
be formed by a noise-perturbed model of the underlying system, i.e. I ′. The defender
is responsible for determining which targets the strategic adversary will attack, Pa.
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This is done by evaluating the SA model from the defender’s view of the system. For
this, the defender perturbs I ′ with her estimate of the knowledge that the adversary
has and creates I ′′.
Collaboration in Defensive Strategy
Multiple defenders may wish to coordinate defensive operations for certain targets
in the system. Some links may have negligible owner impact but cause substantial
losses in other parts of the system. For example, the lowest cost power source becom-
ing disrupted increases costs for all energy buyers, so they may wish to pool resources
to defend the low cost source.
Collaboration may occur based on varying levels of agreements. In one extreme,
no actors are collaborating, and in another extreme, all actors are collaborating.
In order to cooperatively defend a particular asset, all actors interested must have
negative impact values for that particular target. At target t, CD(t) is the set of
valid cooperating defenders. The optimization is as follows:
Define:
Ccd(a, t) =










(Pa(j, i) · I(j, i) · (1−D(i)))− Cd(i) ·D(i)
 (2.16)
Subject to the constraints:
D(i) ∈ {0, 1} (2.17)∑
i∈Ta
(D(i) · Ccd(j, i)) ≤MD(j) ∀j ∈ A (2.18)
These equations are identical to the earlier set when |CD(t)| = 1. The optimiza-
tion in Equation 2.16 makes a decision on the total cost to defend a target when its
impact is combined across cooperative defenders. Pa(a, t) takes into account the fact
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that each defender, actor a, may have a different perceived attack probability based
upon the limited information model it uses in assessing defense.
2.2.5 Experimentation
CPS Model
Refer to Sections 2.1.6 and 2.1.7 for the detailed model explanation.
Attacker and Ownership Model The attacker in these scenarios has the ability
to reduce a target’s capacity to zero. If the attacker targets edge (u, v) then c′(u, v) =
0 and the impact assessment is done for this perturbation. Although there are several
models for attack behavior, this is chosen because it allows for large changes in the
system to occur. The impact of attack is measured as independent disruptions to
each edge in the graph.
Since this chapter makes no attempt to speculate on the best ownership distri-
butions, a uniformly random assignment of all the assets among the actors is taken.
When additional actors are introduced into the model, the number of edges (assets)
remains fixed and any one actor’s asset pool is subsequently reduced.
Experiment 1: Interdependent Model
The focus of this experiment is to analyze the behavior of the interdependent
system under attacker perturbations.
The premise of creating a multi-actor impact model is that having multiple actors
competing over resources allows for some actors in the system to benefit from attacks.
To capture this effect, the summation of positive (and negative) impacts are observed
in the system in this experiment. As the number of actors increases, two things will
occur. First, competitor elimination becomes more prevalent , i.e., for some functions
in the CPS, a monopoly is created, laying the foundation for more profits for some
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players. Second, since the attacks are really zero-sum, the gains will be met with
corresponding loss potentials.
Figure 2.11 shows the absolute value of gain or loss in the system, averaged across
random ownership, versus the number of actors present. The amount of gain in the
system increases with actors, as expected, but tapers off as additional competition
becomes impossible due to a nearly independent ownership model. The given model
has 12 points of competition mapping to the 12 hubs in the gas and electric system,
and so saturation occurs around the 12 actor mark in the graph. The takeaway here
is that gains are met with losses, and that gains increase with the number of actors.
Fig. 2.11. The total gain and loss in the system, as the sum across
impacts felt by all actors, increase as the number of actors in the
system increase up to a point of saturation. The sum of the gain and
negative loss remain constant.
Experiment 2: Strategic Adversary
The strategic adversary model is examined to determine what causes most damage
to the system.
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The SA’s goal is to extract profit from the system by attacking assets, subject to
a constraint on the total budget she can expend for launching such attacks. The end
result of applying costs to attacks is constraining the number of targets or particular
targets that the attacker can disrupt. For explorations in this section, the costs are
uniform across targets to remove some of the complexities involved in understanding
the model behavior and instead a limit to the number of targets will be used.
The SA launches an attack as a set of targets and actors with whom the SA will
share in profit, which is determined by solving the optimization function introduced
in Section 2.2.3 . To this end, the success metric of the SA is simply the sum of the
profits across the target and actor set chosen.
For this experiment, the SA is given a system with varying numbers of actors and
varying amounts of knowledge, represented as the standard deviation (σ) of noise.
The intuition is that an increasing number of actors provides a more granular option
for target selection. An attack on a particular target may cause, relatively speaking,
a gain and a loss to a particular actor. If that actor becomes subdivided into two
new owning actors, then the remaining profitable actor can be selected by the SA.
The other dimension is that when the SA knows less about the system, through the
addition of model noise, suboptimal decisions will be made. Experimentally the SA’s
target determination is done based on a noisy view of the system, while the actual
impact comes from what the ground truth model experiences due to an attack.
Figure 2.12 shows the profitability of the SA, averaged across random ownership
distributions, while selecting a maximum of six targets to attack. With a larger
number of actors in the system, the success of the SA is increased as expected, with
the 2-actor scenario having the worst profitability. This follows the curve in Figure
2.11. As the knowledge level of the attacker is decreased, the effectiveness of the
attack also decreases due to poorer decision making.
Figure 2.13 compares the SA’s anticipated versus observed profitability. As the
knowledge of the SA decreases, and the model becomes noisy, the attacker’s antic-
ipated profit does not decrease, but his actual profit does. This suggests a viable
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Fig. 2.12. This figure shows the profitability of the strategic adversary
versus the amount of knowledge (inverse of noise) that it has about
the system. As the noise increases, the profitability decreases. Addi-
tionally, as the number of actors increases, the profitability of the SA
also increases because of profit opportunities.
defense policy — deception, specifically, making the attacker think that he knows the
protected system better than he does in practice. Then, the attacker may be willing
to expend greater resources only to realize after launching the attack that he obtained
diminished returns (corresponding to the solid line in the figure).
Experiment 3: The Defenders
The defenders are comprised of every actor in the system, acting in self-interest
to mitigate losses due to attacks.
When making assessments about defense, a fixed system budget is assumed (12
assets) and then divided among the actors evenly. This means that in a 12-actor
system, each actor can defend a single target, and in a 2-actor system, each actor can
defend 6.
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Fig. 2.13. This compares the profit of attack for a 6-actor system.
The SA anticipated returns, based on the noisy model, do not decay
with knowledge level. This means that if the SA is overconfident, the
observed returns will be much less than anticipated.
The defender’s goal is to minimize the impact of an attack. The metric used for
this experiment is the reduction in the impact of the possible attack to the defenders.
To be successful, the defender must accurately reason about the strategic adver-
sary’s targets and then move to protect ones which cause a significant loss to itself
and are likely to be attacked. This it does under incomplete knowledge (hence the σ
for the various parameters that it has to estimate). Further, in estimatig the adver-
sary’s strategy, it has to speculate on the level of knowledge for the adversary (hence,
a speculated σ for the various parameters that the adversary uses). This mechanism
is as detailed in Section 2.2.4.
Figure 2.14 shows the effectiveness of defense for a varying number of actors across
the noise that the defender has in its model of the system. The Y-axis is the metric
that is calculated as follows: compute, for a fixed attack (single asset), the gain to
the adversary when the entire system is undefended; compute for the same attack
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the gain to the adversary when the defender makes the optimized decision to protect
some assets. The metric is the difference of these two values. As the noise increases,
the effectiveness of the defense decreases. Intuitively this is because the defender is
not completely aware of the impact that an attack has against a particular target and
therefore may choose the assets that she wants to defend unwisely. As the number of
actors in the system increases, the effectiveness of defense decreases for two reasons.
First, the actors are each operating with a smaller defense budget since the funding is
constant for the system, thus decreasing per-actor as the actors increase. Therefore,
the actor with large negative-impact targets may be underfunded. Second, the actor
who should defend an asset may not be the owner, leading to inefficient investing.
Fig. 2.14. The effectiveness of a defense is graded by its impact re-
duction in ground truth versus the knowledge level of the defender,
modeled as noise added to the ground truth. As the number of actors
increases, the effectiveness of the defense decreases due to misaligned
incentives and a lack of pooled defensive budgets.
Figure 2.15 investigates the impact of collaboration in a system of 4 actors. The
collaboration allows the defenders to share in defensive costs, in this case for all assets,
as long as they have an aligned defensive incentive. That is, if a target causes damage
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to actor A and actor B, A and B will split the defensive costs proportional to their
individual impacts. This allows for actors to more optimally defend assets by sharing
in costs. This effect wears off as noise increases and the defenders are unsure about
which assets are important.
Fig. 2.15. The impact of collaboration is measured by allowing the
actors to share in defensive costs. When the costs are shared, more
effective investments can be made.
Figure 2.16 compares the impact of collaboration across different actor sizes. In
the first case of 2 actors, it is likely that an attack on one target helps actor 1 and hurts
actor 2, resulting in a limited collaboration opportunity. In some cases, the attack
harms a common supplier or common customer which motivates collaboration. As
the number of actors increases, the opportunity for collaboration also increases and
results in larger gains. However, for a large number of actors - 12 in our experimental
scenario, where there are 96 assets - the incentive for collaboration increases but this is
counteracted by forces seen in Figure 2.14 that the effectiveness of defense decreases.
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Fig. 2.16. Collaboration allows for actors to improve their defenses. In
this case, the system-wide defensive investment is fixed as the number
of actors increases, resulting in reduced benefit of collaboration as the
number of actors increases and their individual budgets dwindle.
2.2.6 Conclusion
In this section, a modeling technique for evaluating cybersecurity defensive invest-
ments in interconnected cyber-physical systems was presented. An impact analysis
technique enables multiple actors to compete and maximize their individual profits
in a flow-optimization problem. The multi-actor approach allows for a strategic ad-
versary to exist who extracts profits from the system by selecting targets to attack
and assuming the role of some of the actors in the system. A defensive strategy cre-
ates defense optimizations in the face of a strategic adversary. Our experimentation
evaluates the impact of attacks, ownership, defensive investments, and collaboration
among defenders. It is found that as the number of actors increases and greater
competition results, a strategic adversary is able to net more profit from carefully
targeted attacks. However, collaboration among actors, even if budget limited, can
significantly blunt the effects of such strategic attacks.
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2.3 Model and Attacks Conclusions, Insights, and Future Work
This chapter presented the first pieces of the dissertation: a model for an example
CPS and an approach to attacking and defending it. These pieces, when combined,
provide high level insights into the operation of energy markets and how they can
be manipulated. The key insight from this work is that economic structures with
independent actors can capture strategic adversaries’ profit objectives. This model
enables new exploration into the energy-based CPS domain by focusing on economic
objectives rather than faults and disruptions. Chapter 3 grounds these high level
models with realistic negotiation processes. This improves the solution quality by
replacing the approximation for multiple actor profits in Section 2.1.5 with an online
iterative process.
The solutions presented in this chapter have a few shortfalls that future work can
address. First, for simplicity, this model assumes a linear combination of attack prof-
its. In practice, the interdependence of assets may not be linear, and more complex
models can better optimize both offensive and strategies. Second, the targets in this
work are abstract energy-flow disruptions. Specifically, the attacks constrain energy
flows to zero. These targets, however, may have multiple modes of failure that do
not necessarily map to a complete stoppage of flow. The model could be improved
in future work by analyzing multiple failure modes for each target. In Chapter 4, for
example, successful attacks disrupt the ability for energy flows to adjust rather than
bringing them down to zero. Finally, this work analyzes a static experiment system.
In practice, the system will evolve over time, and the strategy space for attack and
defense may not exist at a single optimal point. Future work could introduce a tem-
poral aspect to the strategy space. Tangentially, non-energy CPS may have different
objective functions, but many of the techniques presented in this chapter can still be
applied to different domains simply by replacing Equation 2.1 with another objective.
Future work could also address different domains.
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The next chapter introduces more technical models for energy system operation.
In these new models, communications exist between market players. Since these com-
munications occur in real-time, latency and temporary network outages can influence
market behavior.
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3. ENERGY CPS OPERATION
This chapter covers two technical market systems that use cyber-physical systems
to negotiate the usage of energy. The techniques presented here allow the targets
in Chapter 2 to be mapped to low-level network attacks. With the work presented
here, an adversary can attack a realistic smart grid deployment and extract additional
profits from the system, as later demonstrated in Chapter 4.
Section 3.1 is based on joint work with Dylan Shiltz and Thomas R. Nudell from
MIT’s Active Adaptive Control Laboratory. Sections 3.1.2, 3.1.4, and 3.1.5 and the
dynamic market mechanism (DMM) model are primarily the contribution of those
authors. The communication modeling in Section 3.1.3, experimental setup, and
experimental results and analysis are novel contributions for this dissertation. The
second half of this chapter (Section 3.2) is a market method created for analysing
real-time CPS.
3.1 A Framework for Evaluating the Resilience of Dynamic Real-Time
Market Mechanisms
3.1.1 Introduction
High penetration of renewable generation introduces challenges in many areas of
power system operations, including real-time market operations. In particular, the
fluctuations in renewable generation motivate a need for real-time coordination of
distributed energy resources, which can respond rapidly to intermittent generation.
A promising approach to facilitate this coordination is through dynamic economic
dispatch algorithms such as those proposed in [3, 36–43], paired with flexible con-
sumption through DR and flexible storage resources. These mechanisms enable ef-
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ficient integration of unpredictable generation and flexible loads into the power grid
with the goal of improving grid resilience and operational efficiency. Naturally, real-
time coordination of distributed energy resources, especially over a large geographic
region, requires communication across networks [44]. Such networks can experience
non-negligible latency, loss of information, and congestion. Dynamic market mech-
anisms and flexible consumption and storage will ideally improve grid performance;
however, less is known about their resilience behavior in the face of delays, outages,
and other disruptions to the underlying communication infrastructures, which may be
unavoidable. In this section, a framework is proposed for evaluating the resilience of
dynamic real-time market mechanisms for managing electric power grids in the face of
realistic network and power disruptions. This framework may be used to evaluate the
resilience of any number of market mechanisms (such as those described in [3,36–43])
operating on various communication infrastructures and power system networks.
In typical planning and operation of the power grid today, several market-based
control layers are already employed to maintain a balance between generation of
and demand for electricity. At the slowest time-scale, generation units are committed
well in advance, bidding to supply power in day-ahead markets (DAM). This creates a
tentative dispatch schedule for generators. Real-time markets (RTM), which operate
on the time-scale of minutes, revise this dispatch schedule to accommodate changes
in supply, account for inaccuracies in the predictions of load, and adjust to variable
renewable energy resources (RER). These markets also serve to reduce outage-induced
stress and inefficiency during power shortages or surpluses. Much of the intermittency
associated with renewables typically occurs at this faster time scale, necessitating
dynamic algorithms, including dynamic real-time market mechanism and price-based
coordination of DR.
In the current market structure, most loads are not price-sensitive (i.e. they are
price-setters rather than price-takers). For example, many residential consumers pay
a fixed rate for power that is set by utility companies and regulated by local and/or
federal agencies; these rates change, at the fastest, over the course of months. The
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DAM and RTM prices can potentially exceed these fixed rates during peak demand
or supply shortages, disrupting market efficiency. Traditionally, the market cannot
operate in a way that provides maximum social welfare to all participants because
of these traditional inflexible loads. In contrast, dynamic market mechanisms allow
flexible consumers to act as price-setters rather than price-takers, thereby allowing
near real-time negotiations of prices, generation, and flexible consumption set-points
which in turn can lead to optimized social welfare. Implementing a dynamic real-
time market mechanism, however, entails substantial communication overhead for
exchanging real-time information and iteratively negotiating prices.
In most existing algorithm designs [3, 36–43], the communication layer is typ-
ically idealized or ignored during market method evaluation. In reality, however,
communication networks cannot always operate with strict guarantees on latency or
disruption. Routing issues, link outages, and message loss are commonplace in large
networks due to the number of devices and their configurations. Large scale outages
on commercial networks are not uncommon [45]. Models of dynamic markets that
do not consider such network issues may prove unreliable or inconsistent when im-
plemented in a realistic communication environment that is prone to such outages.
Therefore, the influence of the dynamics of communication networks on markets and
their convergence, when driven by faults and failures, needs to be analyzed in detail
before these methods can be adopted widely on the smart grid. The framework pro-
posed in this section can be used for this purpose—to evaluate the resilience of these
market mechanisms and better understand how they may handle contingency events
in the power system under constraints of realistic communication implementation.
One strategy to account for realistic communication constraints is to design latency
aware algorithms, which assume a non-zero latency required for communication. For
example, DYMONDS [46] requires that communications be designed such that all of
the information required for operation is available in the central control location. It
is perfectly rational to design a latency aware algorithm in principle, but it may be
difficult to guarantee these specified latencies in practice. Hence, any latency aware
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algorithm can also benefit from the proposed framework by evaluating its viability
when the communication network does not operate as designed.
Several prior works evaluate the susceptibility of broader cyber-physical systems
to cyber-attacks. Work in [47], for example, focuses on cybersecurity aspects in con-
fidentiality and integrity, but it does not focus on the impact of network latency on
system operation. Work in [48] evaluates energy systems with distributed resources–
the target system for work in this section. Their security focus, however, is on in-
tegrity attacks via spoofed messages and insecure communications. In systems with
distributed energy resources, however, the communication network interconnections
may span large distances, and thus suffer from data availability concerns that have
not been addressed. The framework provided in this section focuses on the impact of
information availability on power grids, with an emphasis on market operation.
Framework Elements
The proposed framework consists of the market layer, including the decision mak-
ing components (ex. an independent system operator (ISO)), a communication layer
(ex. clients and servers), and the physical layer (ex. generators, loads, and power
lines) as shown in Fig. 3.1. The communication layer maps the agents in the physi-
cal network—generators and flexible loads—to nodes in the communication network.
The market layer represents decisions of economic dispatch where a balancing au-
thority (ex. ISO) and market participants (ex. generators and flexible consumers)
communicate with each other. In practice, the particular architecture of any of these
three layers may vary. This layered structure enforces causality across communication
boundaries and adds realism to the market mechanism design.
Using this framework, a standard scenario is considered by introducing faults
at the physical layer and failures in the communication network. Electrical power
systems must be designed and operated such that acceptable performance is main-
tained following a contingency. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation
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(NERC) defines a credible contingency as one that is both plausible and likely. The
failure of any single element of the power system may be considered a credible con-
tingency (sometimes referred to as N−1 contingency), while the simultaneous failure
of multiple elements that are not physically or electrically related is not likely, and is
therefore not a credible contingency [49]. In this section, the most common type of
single element failure is considered: generator outages.
Existing control loops are designed to stabilize the power system following such
disturbances. However, today’s traditional real-time markets (RTM), which deter-
mine dispatches on the order of 5 minutes, often clear some time before the operating
hour, and at best, can take several minutes to re-allocate generation. In contrast,
dynamic real-time market mechanisms can enable the grid to adapt more quickly,
responding to on-line information, making the grid more resilient to disturbances.
These new methods themselves, however, rely more heavily on communication in-
frastructure. The resilience study developed in this section attempts to evaluate the
ability of such mechanisms to respond to common contingencies within an adverse
communication environment.
A resilient mechanism will adapt to changes or threats to the system and still be
able to match supply and demand as closely as possible at all times. For this pur-
pose, metric is introduced that captures the impact of a physical disturbance and the
ability of the market mechanism to adapt to this physical contingency and reallocate
power in the face of simultaneous disruptions to the communication network. Hence,
this metric can be used to evaluate the resilience of any particular market mech-
anism with a given communication infrastructure and electric power system model
and contingency.
The remainder of the section is organized as follows. Section 3.1.2 introduces
dynamic electricity market mechanisms. Section 3.1.3 models the operation of these
market mechanisms over realistic communication networks. Section 3.1.4 formally
defines the resilience metric. Section 3.1.5 details the experimental scenarios, which
start with a 118-bus test case, used to illustrate the framework. Section 3.1.6 discusses
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Fig. 3.1. Each agent in the physical network—generators and flexible
loads—is associated with a client in the communication network, these
clients send and receive information to and from the server at the
independent system operator (ISO) who operates the market.
simulation results, and demonstrates the utility of the framework for evaluating the
resilience of dynamic real-time market mechanisms. Section 3.1.7 provides concluding
remarks.
3.1.2 Dynamic Real-Time Market Mechanisms
An electric power grid is a network of high voltage AC transmission lines that
route power between generators and consumers over large distances. Today this
network is managed through a hierarchy of electricity markets, in which generators
and consumers can negotiate the price and quantity of power at various locations in
the grid. In deregulated electricity markets, an economic dispatch is performed on
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the order of every 5 minutes. This dispatch, calculated in a centralized fashion by an
independent system operator (ISO), determines the most cost effective way to meet
power demands subject to constraints on generators and the grid.
The introduction of intermittency and uncertainty into the electric power grid
through the widespread adoption of RERs, however, has caused the traditional mar-
kets to become decompensated. Managing RERs, which commonly suffer from inter-
mittency on a very fast time-scale, and the potential of adjustable demand through
DR resources necessitate a dynamic framework. The former introduces issues of
strong intermittency and uncertainty, and the latter a feedback structure where de-
mand can be modulated over a range of time-scales. Both of these components dictate
a new look at market mechanisms with a control-theoretic perspective. In smart grid
literature this has sometimes been called price-based control (see [50] and references
therein) or transactive control (see [51] and references therein). Throughout this
section the underlying algorithms of these methods will be referred to as dynamic
real-time market mechanisms.
Dynamic real-time markets represent expanded participation opportunities in the
market process, which has been enabled by technical innovations that allow for rapid
communication among a wide, automated user base. This allows a market to ef-
ficiently embrace RERs and DR with real-time decision making but requires large
digital communication networks. In turn, frequent communication enables grid com-
ponents (clients) to quickly adapt to changing conditions. It also allows for more
accurate predictions of renewable generation and load fluctuations, as decisions are
made closer to real-time.
Market Mechanism Operation
Although electricity market mechanisms vary in their implementation, many of
the dynamic real-time mechanisms share a few common features. Each generator
typically has a cost curve that describes the marginal cost of generation as a function
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of the power being generated. These curves tend to be convex (i.e., as a generator
approaches its maximum operating limit, its marginal cost of generation increases).
Similarly, each flexible consumer has a utility curve that describes the marginal utility
of consumption as a function of the power consumed. It is assumed that these utility
curves are concave [3, 36–43]. In addition, all generators and consumers have limits
on how much power they can produce or consume at any given time. A concrete
implementation with quadratic cost and utility curves is shown in Section 3.1.5.
The objective of a market mechanism is to maximize system utility and minimize
system cost, subject to constraints of the market players as well as the physical
transmission system. This can be written as an Optimal Power Flow (OPF) problem,
which is an optimization problem of the form
min f(x) (3.1)
subject to
h(x) = 0 (3.2)
g(x) ≤ 0 (3.3)
where x is a vector of system states (including generation, consumption, voltage an-
gles, etc.), f is a cost function of these states, h(x) is a set of equality constraints
enforcing power balance at each bus, and g(x) is a set of inequality constraints en-
forcing bounds on generation, consumption, and line transmission. The most general
form of (3.1) is a fully non-linear AC OPF that is non-convex and NP-hard. Thus, for
real-time operation it is common to use a linearized DC OPF formulation [52], which
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neglects reactive power flow and AC line losses. This allows the equality constraints
h(x) to be written as a linear function









Bnm(δn − δm) = 0
∀n ∈ N (3.4)
where Dn ⊂ D and Gn ⊂ G are sets of flexible consumers and generators at node n,
Ωn is the set of nodes adjacent to node n, N is the set of all buses in the network,
and Bnm are the susceptances of the lines from node n to node m. Each bus also
experiences a conventional (inflexible) demand ∆n.
If the objective function f(x) is convex, then Problem (3.1) is convex and can be
solved efficiently. Price-based solutions of (3.1) usually involve calculating locational
marginal prices (LMP’s), denoted by λ at each bus in the system. The power produced
or consumed by each market player is denoted by Pi ∈ x, i ∈ V = D ∪ G, and is
typically some function of λ and the grid state x. That is,
P k+1 = ψ(xk, λk) (3.5)
where ψ may contain information regarding grid topology, cost and utility curves,
grid frequency, and other network parameters. In (3.5), the superscript k denotes the
iteration index, with zk denoting the value that z takes at time tk, and P denotes a
vector with its ith element given by Pi. The power setpoints are iteratively updated
with period Tk, such that x converges to x
∗, the optimal dispatch for the grid. It
should be noted that price-based mechanisms are not the only proposals in the lit-
erature (other approaches include dynamic programming, integer programming, and
other non-derivative methods), but in this section is focused on price-based methods.
The structure of (3.5) suggests a decentralized execution over a large digital com-
munication network with synchronized updates. If information is successfully sent
and received during the negotiation window Tk, then the algorithm works as de-
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signed. However, if communication is lost or is delayed, the algorithm suffers from
network impacts which may adversely affect its performance. In order to understand
the network impacts, the next part of the framework describes communication mod-
els.
3.1.3 Modeling Latency in Communication Networks
Solving the optimization problem (3.1) using a dynamic real-time market mech-
anism requires communication between widely distributed parties—namely clients
(ex. loads and generators) that may be several hundred miles apart and a server
(ex. ISO). To achieve a near real-time synchronization between the loads and genera-
tors, the market model must be fast enough to converge with reasonable computation
power, and the interaction between the clients and server must occur via a realistic
communication network.
Most market mechanisms operate by iteratively updating price in real time in
response to changing physical conditions such as increased load. These physical con-
ditions occur at the ends of the network and must be communicated with the central
market coordinator (ex. ISO) to establish optimal prices. Once new prices are avail-
able, these too must be communicated to the clients. When network conditions are
non-ideal, this communication process can become irregular, disrupting normal mar-
ket behavior.
Iterating Markets Over Networks
Market mechanisms are designed to find solutions to the optimization problem
(3.1), often using iterative solution techniques such as the Newton-Raphson [3] or
interior point [53] methods. Network-agnostic implementations of these methods
assume that the computations and iterations occur instantaneously and synchronously
in the system. On a practical computer network, however, each iteration takes some
non-zero time to complete. The numerical solution method is broken into discrete
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Fig. 3.2. Relevant time scales for distributed market mechanisms
steps with a real-time duration of Tk, and the maximum number of allowed iterations
to converge is Ts
Tk
, with Tk  Ts (see Fig. 3.2). The market mechanism sends a
negotiation xk and waits Tk seconds for a reply from the clients. If every client
replies within Tk seconds, then the algorithm operates as designed. If no reply is
received, however, the algorithm may enter an undefined operational state and can
suffer network impacts. The rest of this section defines how the market will operate
in the presence of irregular communications.
Latency Model
Latency is introduced to market mechanism algorithms by delaying the round-trip
interaction between the central market and the distributed clients, as a perturbation
of an iterative optimization algorithm. In this way, the control actions taken because
the market outcome are delayed [54, 55]. Each client i has a pair of states xi, λi
that is delayed by a latency function τi(k). This shift must be negative to maintain
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causality, and assuming time starts from zero, k − τi(k) ≥ 0. Delay is introduced to
(3.5) as
P k+1 = ψ(xk−τ(k), λk−τ(k)) (3.6)
where x and λ are defined in (3.5) and τ(k) can be thought of as a vector of the
latencies of each client.
An example of a latency model applied to client i ∈ V can be expressed as
τc,i(k) =
k k < `i`i k ≥ `i (3.7)
where k is the time-index and `i is a constant-latency value for client i. The simplified
constant latency model in (3.7) is applicable to network conditions where each client
has a fixed minimum latency to communicate with the ISO server e.g. speed of light
limitations due to grid geography.
Another model shown in (3.8) captures network outage situations, and we denote
this function as τx. In this case, a set of clients, denoted X ⊂ V , is unable to
communicate with the market. Formally,
τx,i(k) =
k i ∈ X0 i ∈ V \ X (3.8)
The client is unable to receive an updated price, and the market evolves as if the client
is unable to change its power level. The model (3.8) assumes the outage occurs at
k = 0, although the value of τx,i(k) can be shifted to the outage start time. The model
(3.7) and (3.8) are a compact representation of the latency models used in [54,55].
For simplicity it is assumed that the market mechanism uses a zero-order hold
during non-communication periods in both (3.7) and (3.8). That is the part of the
state x controlled by client i does not advance. It is also noted that (3.7) and (3.8)
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are primitive models which can be combined to create more complex scenarios that
include both disconnects and constant latency.
Practical Networking Constraints on Market Mechanisms
Up to this point, τ has been modeled as an integer parameter, offsetting k. Real
computer networks, however, experience real-valued latency L ∈ R≥0. The mapping







where τi(k) is the delay shift at time step k, tk is the mapping between the step k
and time, i.e. as tk = kTk, L(t) is the real-valued latency at time t, and Tk is the step
size.





) [56, 57]. Comparing L(t) = 2Tk to L(t) = Tk, for example, gives some
intuition to why this is true. In a network-agnostic implementation, τ may be forced
to 0 by increasing Tk to absorb the latency difference. As a result, the convergence rate
would be half. The τ model, however, operates like a pipeline where new iterations
may be based upon stale values. As a result, decreasing Tk with a fixed L provides
diminishing improvements in solution quality.
The communication systems of the future smart grid have not yet been final-
ized [58], and there is a direct relationship between reliability and cost. Internet-scale
communication, for example, relies on a best-effort model to keep costs low. This
means that there are no guarantees on delivery, bandwidth, or latency among clients
connected to the Internet. While many competing models in the past such as circuit
switching networks provided dedicated, rigid bandwidth and latency guarantees, they
were ultimately too expensive compared to best-effort methods since they eliminated
multiplexing opportunities (the use of idle bandwidth). Establishing high-reliability
latency-guaranteed networks between power generation stations, often located in re-
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mote areas, presents a high-cost barrier to reliable communication assumptions. For
this reason, best-effort networks may provide a cost-optimal solution, as long as the
market mechanisms can sustain operation in poor networking environments. If design
shows that there are significant benefits to reliable latency values, then more rigid
network constraints could be implemented such as those for the IEC 61850 technical
standard that requires performance minimums for certification.
In order to understand the consequences of the latency models in the above dis-
cussion in the context of resilience, the next section develops the final component of
the framework: a resilience metric.
3.1.4 Resilience Metric
The primary responsibility of the dynamic real-time market is to allocate resources
to match supply and demand repeatedly over very short time-scales. The dispatched
power matches demanded power as closely as possible at all times, but primary control
systems and secondary markets will always compensate for any discrepancies. In
other words, the amount of power that cannot be allocated by the market mechanism
must be accounted for by other means, either through costly ancillary services or
through adverse impacts to the grid such as frequency deviations from 60 Hz. The
effectiveness of the mechanism can therefore be measured based on the mismatch
between dispatched power and actual power generated at a particular time throughout
the system, termed as residual power, denoted Rp(t) ∈ R. The resilience metric that
is proposed in this section, therefore, is a measure of Rp(t).
In the current context, it is argued that a resilient mechanism should adapt to
changes or threats to the system and still be able to match supply and demand as
closely as possible at all times. A perfectly resilient mechanism will have an Rp(t) that
is always zero, that is zero impact, even in the face of disturbances. A non-resilient
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system can then be viewed as a system with non-zero Rp(t), with its magnitude
indicating the degree of non-resilience. Therefore, the resilience metric is defined as
R(t) = 1− |Rp(t)|
Rmaxp
(3.10)
which is a non-dimensional quantity with 0 ≤ R(t) ≤ 1. Notice that R(t) = 1 ∀t
denotes a perfectly resilient system and R(t) = 0 ∀t indicates a perfectly non-resilient
system. The metric in (3.10) captures the impact of failure, which is one key compo-
nent of risk modeling of cyber-physical systems [23,48,59].
Other aspects of risk modeling include threat and vulnerability, which capture
the likelihood of a particular failure in both the physical and communication net-
works [23]. Vulnerabilities include failures of the advanced metering infrastructure
and manipulation or disruption of SCADA systems [60]. Developing a more compre-
hensive resilience metric, in comparison to (3.10), which additionally captures threat
and vulnerability is still an active area of research and outside the scope of this section.
Using (3.10) along with realistic communication, computation, and market mech-
anism models allows us to evaluate and compare the resilience of future grid operating
strategies and provides insight into overall system performance. A concrete example
of such future grid operation consisting of the Dynamic Market Mechanism (DMM)
developed in [3] used to manage the IEEE 118-bus test system is described in the
proceeding sections. The experimental setup is presented next, followed by simulation
results in Section 3.1.6.
3.1.5 Experimental Setup
In this section, the experimental setup that is used to evaluate the resilience
framework is explained. Three experiments are designed that evaluate the resilience of
the DMM described in (Section 3.1.2) under different communication network stresses.
Each experiment uses the same physical system, the IEEE 118-bus. At the beginning
of each experiment the highest-output generator is removed from the system. The
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resilience of the DMM is measured by R(t) defined in (3.10) with Rmaxp = Pi of
the removed generator. All simulations were carried out in MATLAB1 using the
Matpower 118-bus test case [61].
Physical System Scenario
The experiment begins with the IEEE 118-bus test system [61] with a suite of
loads—two types of dispatchable DR along with conventional loads—and generators
connected to various buses throughout the system. The conventional generators and
loads are defined by the 118-bus test case [61]. There are fifty-four dispatchable
generators in this model. Additionally, a total of thirty dispatchable demand-response
units are distributed arbitrarily throughout the system with power consumption limits
of [10, 60] MW. The thermal limits on the transmission lines are assumed to be 300
MW such that the system is partially congested.
Cost and utility curves, mentioned in Section 3.1.2, used in this example are
quadratic curves with an additional barrier function [62] to accommodate minimum
and maximum bounds on power generation or consumption. Specifically, the cost and
utility curves are expressed as







(Pi − Pi)2 , i ∈ G (3.11)






(Pi − Pi)2 , i ∈ D (3.12)
where bi and ci are base and incremental cost/utility parameters for the ith agent,
respectively, and P i and P i are maximum and minimum generation or consumption.
The parameter M determines the steepness of the barriers, and in the experiments
M = 5. The cost parameters for the generators are defined in [61]. DR cost param-
eters are selected from the uniform distribution bi ∈ U(0, 45), ci ∈ U(−2,−1) for
i ∈ D.
1MATLAB is a registered trademark of The Mathworks, Inc
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Summary of DMM
The dynamic market mechanism used here was originally proposed in [3], and it
uses a Newton-Raphson-like primal-dual interior point method [62] to update (3.5).
The decision variables are Pi, i ∈ V = G ∪D, and δ, which denote generation, flexible
consumption, and voltage angles respectively. We denote the state vector as x =
[δTP T ]T and the objective function as f(x). The Lagrangian of the optimization
problem is L(x, λ) = f(x) +λTh(x) where h(x) denotes power balance at each bus in
terms of the state variables. The DMM iterates can be expressed as
xk+1 = xk − α(H)−1∇xL(xk, λˆk) (3.13)
λk+1 = λˆk − αh(xk) (3.14)
where λˆk = M1(h(x
k)−M2∇f(xk)), H, M1, and M2 are constant matrices, and α is
a positive step size. See [3] for specific details. In our experiments α = 0.01.
Networking Scenario
The communication network is a hub and spoke model where each client, either a
generator or a DR unit, has a direct link to the ISO who facilitates the market. The
nominal network scenario can be described by a particular τ function, as mapped
through (3.9). For these experiments, a DMM with negotiation iteration length of
Tk = 30 ms is used as specified in [3]. Therefore τ = 1 maps to L ∈ [30, 60).
Link outages are modeled as in (3.8), with the size |X | indicating the number of
links disrupted. In practice, multiple links could be targeted, representing a strategic
attack on the network. However, analysis of such attacks is outside the scope of this
section. Three networking scenarios are described next.
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Experiment 1: Single Link Outage For a single link outage |X | = 1. This
simulates a single fiber cut, for example, or other sudden network failures. In total,
84 outage simulations are evaluated, one for each client.
Experiment 2: Small Constant Latency Small constant latencies represent
minimum communication delays for deployed systems. These delays arise due to the
speed of light, the actual lengths of communication cables, the store-and-forward
delay of intermediate networking equipment such as routers and switches, and the
technology in use (fiber, radio transmission, etc.). Part of the system design is se-
lecting a communication rate for processes that use iterative solution techniques. If
this communication interval is too short, then the response of the system will become
degraded. Design values for latency may be exceeded with geographic growth of the
control area, backup network links, or general system design.
For Experiment 2, the latency of every client is identical and scaled from L = 0 ms
to L = 120 ms in 30 ms increments using model (3.7) with the parameter `i ranging
from 0 to 4 (i.e., L=0ms
Tk=30ms
= 0, . . . , L=120ms
Tk=30ms
= 4). In contrast to Experiment 1, no links
are taken offline in Experiment 2.
Experiment 3: Non-Uniform Latency Many cases can arise in networks where
there is a non-uniform latency across the different client to server connections. For
example, some clients are farther geographically from the server than others and are
therefore more susceptible to latency than those that are closer. Additionally, some
clients may use older communication technologies—especially in backup situations—
that have high latencies such as satellite-based communications.
To capture this, the model (3.7) is used, as in Experiment 2, but with non-uniform
`i across clients. This non-uniformity is introduced via independent Gaussian noise.
Each client’s latency is assigned from a truncated Gaussian with values between 0
and 2µ as N(µ = 60 ms, σ), where σ is the controlled parameter. This creates a
















Fig. 3.3. The system responds to a worst-case single-generator failure.
The market minimizes residual power in two identical experiments,
but one has a communication link outage to a single client–the one
that causes the most impact.
3.1.6 Experimental Results
Experiment 1: Residual Power with Single Link Outages
In this experiment, every network link between the ISO and the client (generator
or demand-response agent) is independently disrupted for a total of 84 simulations.
The cumulative residual power for each outage is used to rank the links in order of
impact. Fig. 3.3 shows the response to the power disruption for both the baseline
(outage-free) and worst-case link outage scenarios.
The results indicate that this particular market mechanism is resilient to single
link outages. In the worst case, a single link outage is identical to removing two
market players from the system for this scenario (one by power fault and one by
communication fault). As long as the underlying power system has the capacity to
adjust to these combined worse case situations, then isolated link outages will not
adversely impact grid resilience.
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In fact, one could argue that this dynamic real-time market mechanism has made
the power system more resilient at this fast time scale, despite the isolated link out-
ages. To understand this, consider the RTM used today, which will clear for 5 minute
intervals over an operating hour at least 60 minutes before the start of that operating
hour. This means that the market would make no adjustments over the course of
the simulation. Instead, the system operator must rely on ancillary services such as
AGC, or rely on corrective action—essentially a manual override implemented by the
central ISO. In contrast, the DMM has adapted to the physical fault and reallocated
most of the power optimally.
While the framework demonstrates that the DMM response is satisfactory, the
algorithm is unaware of its networking environment. At convergence, a small amount
of power has not been reallocated by the market mechanism. This amount is propor-
tional to the remaining difference between dispatched and actual power at the client
suffering a link outage. This quantity can be minimized by tuning DMM parameters,
namely α and M . Alternatively, if the algorithm were aware of the network failure,
then it could drop the affected client from the market and dispatch the power to other
market participants. This indicates practical design challenges in market mechanisms
of detecting and perfectly adapting to network disruptions.
Experiment 2: Small Constant Latency
Fig. 3.4 shows the impact of low constant latency values on algorithm performance.
As latency increases, the response of the system becomes slower. In an integrative
process, the effective gain of the control system is proportional to the rate of com-
municated updates since the state uses a zero-order hold in between update periods.
When the latency surpasses the design threshold of Tk = 30 ms, the impact is similar
to a reduction in the α gain parameter in update equations (3.13)–(3.14). While
the recovery of the test system slows down as the latency increases, the resilience
is still acceptable. In particular, DMM is still able to fully adapt to the loss of a
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Fig. 3.4. The mean latency for each client is increased. The higher
latency values reduce the rate of communication, and the convergence
speed of the system for different latencies is shown.
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Fig. 3.5. The variance in latency is increased for a small mean value.
After the system apparently stabilizes, the response begins to oscillate.
generating unit—even the highest constant latency case that was tested—well before
a traditional RTM would be able to take any action.
Experiment 3: Non-Uniform Latency
Non-uniform latency can create instability in the DMM, as Fig. 3.5 illustrates.
Initially, the system responds as expected with the resilience metric driving towards
unity. When the system nears convergence (after 30 seconds), the resilience begins to
deteriorate for all distributions of non-uniform latency. The oscillations in the R(t)
signal indicate instability in residual power due to commanded power levels. This
is because the utility and cost curves are non-linear around their upper and lower
bounds. Small changes near the bounds result in large jumps in the cost gradient
values that the DMM algorithm uses to optimize social welfare. Since some clients
can respond faster than others, many iterations can pass with these inflated gradient
values. As a result, the system moves much farther away from the power constraints
than it otherwise would. This behavior ultimately drives the system to instability
after sufficient time and crashes the market.
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An interesting note is that the distributions simulated here have a fairly small
variance from the mean. If larger variances are used, then the instability could occur
even more quickly. These results indicate that asynchronous iteration across market
players can lead to unstable operation, and that market designers should be aware of
the impacts of non-uniform latency.
In summary, the framework shows that the DMM is tolerant to single link outages
and small uniform delays. In these scenarios, nearly all of the power lost by a worst-
case generator trip is reallocated within five minutes. Hence, the DMM can make the
118-bus test system resilient to N − 1 contingencies despite non-ideal communication
network conditions. The framework has also revealed that non-uniform latencies, even
those with a small mean and variance, can lead to instability in the market mechanism.
These procedures and tests could be repeated on a different power system model with
a different market mechanism and/or communication network.
3.1.7 Conclusions
In order to efficiently embrace DR resources, the smart grid is steadily moving
toward dynamic, real-time markets that require frequent and reliable communication
over wide area networks. Yet, little is known about how such markets may perform in
real-world implementations as the underlying communication networks may be sub-
ject to latency and faults that can impact the market performance and ultimately
the performance of the physical power grid. In this section, a framework was devel-
oped for analyzing and evaluating the resilience of real-time markets in the face of
latency and faults in the communication network. The framework may be used as
a starting point to evaluate the resilience of any power system operating with any
given market mechanisms implemented with a realistic communication network. The
resilience metric developed captures the impact of physical failures and the ability
of the market mechanism to adapt to and recover from these failures in an adverse
communication environment.
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To illustrate the framework’s utility, a recently proposed dynamic market mecha-
nism was simulated with an IEEE 118-bus test system that was subject to a N − 1
contingency scenario of the physical grid. The framework illustrated that the system
was resilient to single communication link failures as well as constant low-latency
scenarios. This is a significant resilience improvement enabled through the fact that
the DMM was able to respond at a much faster rate than the typical time scales
of current RTMs. The framework also provided insight into some of the potential
vulnerabilities of the DMM. In particular, when there are non-uniform latencies, the
DMM may result in oscillatory behavior leading to instability. This in turn suggests
that attention should be paid to designing a resilient DMM that accommodates such
latencies.
3.2 Dynamic Pricing for Smart Grids in the Presence of Non-Linear Net-
work Conditions
3.2.1 Introduction
Modern electric grids and distribution systems are plagued by pervasive inelas-
tic loads that do not respond to changing grid conditions such as the unpredictable
availability of renewable energy resources (RER). Therefore, when market conditions
indicate scarcity, these loads happily consume energy, agnostic to soaring energy-
source costs. Unregulated power markets suffer from large, dramatic swings in prices
due to this inelasticity especially when unpredictable or transient power conditions
arise. These swings, absorbed by power producers, intermediate brokers, and dis-
tribution system operators, cause serious financial losses, drive companies such as
Duke Energy out of competitive markets [63], and result in grossly inefficient uses of
electricity. A study for the NY-ISO, the independent (power) system operator (ISO)
for the state of New York, indicates benefits from elasticity could be as high as $403
million per year [64]. A solution that introduces elasticity exists—demand side man-
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agement (DSM) in the smart grid (SG)—but it presents a unique set of networking
and optimization challenges that have not yet been solved.
Creating flexibility requires both exposing consumers to an incentive signal and
enabling them to act on it. Demand side management [65] embodies the set of tech-
niques and technologies that enable load elasticity. This section is specifically focused
on the transactive control elements–those which enable elasticity. For example, a tech-
nique may negotiate a price for power, send it to a consumer, and allow the consumer
to adjust a load via intelligent devices such as an Internet-enabled thermostat. Most
existing power markets operate with large bulk producers that are unable to respond
to rapid changes in price signals. For example, the NYISO estimates that 96% of
energy is cleared in their day-ahead market with only 4% of energy transactions oc-
curring in their 5-minute real-time market. At the same time, however, distribution
level system operators (DLSO) are burdened by rooftop solar panel integration [2],
charging penalties due to the disparity in net metering revenues and actual market
costs. DSM techniques are needed that can operate at the distribution level with large
numbers of individual consumers. Existing techniques, however, rely on predictable,
cooperative consumers and real-time information exchange to operate successfully.
In this section a technique for distribution-level transactive control is presented and
evaluated under non-linear network conditions.
DSM techniques can be broadly split into two categories: transactive control and
direct load control (DLC). In DLC, a central authority creates elasticity by directly
modifying the energy set points for various loads in the grid with the permission of the
user under a contract. An aluminum smelting plant may be asked to shut down for the
day or a clothes dryer in a home may be temporarily disabled, for example. Techniques
such as demand response (DR) and agile balancing [43] fall in this category. These
techniques, however, centralize control and eliminate consumer’s choices–choices that
often change in real-time. To account for time variations, a transactive layer is added
to DR via dynamic pricing signals. Instead of directly controlling loads, the central
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authority sends dynamic price signals, reflective of market conditions, and consumers
respond to these prices.
Several techniques and methods exist for managing price signals, but they have
two shortcomings that are addressed by work in this section. First, most techniques,
such as those in [41, 53, 66], rely on optimization techniques such as the interior
point method. These optimization methods require price-demand gradients to exist.
At a consumer level, however, many loads are often discrete. For example, electric
water heaters and small air conditioner compressors operate on simple on/off signals,
creating non-smooth load profiles. Second, most techniques, such as those in [1,41,53,
57,66,67], do not consider the network implications of implicit optimization methods
used in their solutions. For example, if a Newton-Raphson based method [68] is
used to converge around an optimal solution, all of the iterations are assumed to
occur in the same time instant. When networked, this implies that the load profiles
for consumers are stationary while a solution is found, eliminating the incorporation
of time-varying information during convergence. While prior work has created the
groundwork for feasible real-time transactive control at the consumer level [69], the
behavior of most algorithms is undefined if communications are lost from some clients.
The technique presented in this section is derivative-free, non-stationary, real-time,
and resilient to a variety of network conditions.
Distribution scheduling presents a unique set of challenges that this section ad-
dresses. First, large numbers of low-budget consumers are interacting with the power
market. This points to best-effort, existing network technologies for communication
among market players that introduce jitter, congestion, and reliability issues into the
communication infrastructure. The technique in this section provides mechanisms for
overcoming unstable communications via continuity planning and efficient inclusion
of outdated information where possible. Second, individual consumers may not have
well defined cost information, and it may change with time. To optimize price in
this context, derivative free techniques are used that make no assumptions about the
structure of consumer’s load profiles. Finally, since new consumer technologies such
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as plug-in electric vehicles can respond rapidly to price signals, on-line price signal
that changes rapidly without fixed windowing are used.
In order to address these challenges, the Nelder-Mead (NM) optimization heuristic
[70] is modified to work on an online, non-stationary stochastic objective function.
Standard NM is not designed to handle stochastic problems [71], so it is modified as
to tolerate stochastic processes. The algorithm is further enhanced by accounting for
non-stationary objective functions. The proposed optimization technique, though ap-
plicable to non-stationary stochastic problems, is still not robust to network failures
as each iteration requires an objective function evaluation that requires network com-
munication. The NM technique is further enhanced by providing network-immune
function evaluation via state projection and estimation.
Using this technique, it is possible to provide online, dynamic pricing for an exam-
ple distribution system’s power market. The technique is able to increase efficiency
by 64% over optimal 5-minute time-of-use pricing by rapidly issuing dynamic price
values to consumers. If a rapid transient occurs, then the online, algorithm is able
reduce residual power by 85% over an a priori time-of-use approach. The performance
of the technique is evaluated for a variety of network conditions, and it is shown that
even under high latency situations, with 20% of clients disrupted or less, the solution
still performs better than time-of-use solutions.
The rest of the section is structured as follows: Section 3.2.2 provides additional
background on the DSM problem. Section 3.2.4 provides an overview of related work.
Section 3.2.7 covers the solution technique, and Section 3.3 investigates networking
impacts. Section 3.4 evaluates the performance of the algorithm presented in this
section, and Sections 3.4.7 and 3.4.8 discusses and concludes it.
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3.2.2 Background
DSM, Dynamic Pricing, and the Power Grid
In the power grid, the goal is to constantly match supply with demand [1]. The
mismatch in supply and demand is known as residual power (RP), and without
widespread energy storage devices, it must be immediately corrected. Small amounts
of residual power is absorbed by automatic generation control and system inertia.
Large amounts of RP, however, can result in grid overload and cause brownout and
blackout conditions. To minimize RP today, power utilities implement day-ahead
scheduling based on energy usage forecasts. Market players submit bids some time in
advance to meet the forecasted energy needs at various intervals spread throughout
the day. While the vast majority of energy is scheduled a day in advance, a small
amount of generation participates in a ”real-time” market (RTM) that attempts to
rectify the residual power resultant from forecasting errors and unexpected transients
such as generator outages. In this case, real-time is relative to day-ahead, and the
market for one real-time period may close well in advance of that period. The prices
in the RTM can range from $30 in one 5-minute window to $300+ in the next. Dy-
namic pricing and demand side management are designed to reduce this variance by
bringing more market players, especially consumers, into the real-time domain.
Demand side management (DSM) [65] entails a large suite of technologies that
bring real-time flexibility to the smart grid. The components include digitally con-
trollable loads, network protocols, metering devices, and other pieces required to
adapt power supply and demand to a control signal, used by transactive control sys-
tems [72]. A general dynamic pricing objective function [73], used by DSM, is shown
in Equation 3.15. It minimizes RP by controlling the locational marginal pricing













where n ∈ N covers all the nodes in the power grid, Pi(λn) is the power used or
produced (negative) by each client at price λn, and Pt(n) is the inter-nodal power
transfer constrained by transmission capacity.
3.2.3 Real-Time Communication
The algorithmic core to dynamic pricing is a numerical optimization technique
used to solve Equation 3.15. The fundamental basis for dynamic pricing is that the
distributed consumers have access to changing, private information that is beneficially
incorporated into the pricing optimization problem, i.e. Pi(λn) is actually Pi(λn, t), a
continuous-time (though likely discrete) function. This inherently requires constant
communication between the DSM market players to adapt to changes as the system
evolves.
As DSM methods solve for new prices, they are broadcast system-wide to the mar-
ket players. The market players respond by adjusting consumption and production
values that the DSM algorithm samples for its next price calculation. This pro-
cess happens in two stages: negotiation and actuation. In the negotiation stage, the
prices are hypothetical and used to improve solution quality, for example in a Newton-
Raphson iterative process. Constraints or other dynamic information are exchanged
at this level, depending on the solution algorithm used for DSM. The actuation stage
sends contractually backed prices on which the consumers act. Figure 3.6 shows this
process.
Many DSM techniques convert the continuous-time DSM problem into discrete
windows for which a solution can be generated by a stationary optimization tech-
nique. Once the algorithm has converged, a new window can be created and the
algorithm advanced. A practical problem with this approach is that new information
cannot be incorporated into the problem until the next window occurs. Addition-
ally, the functions Pi are owned by the distributed market players and must be syn-
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Fig. 3.6. Communication pattern: Negotiation phase and actuation phase.
chronously frozen. Any deviation by the individual market players from the frozen
Pi can invalidate convergence properties that rely on stationary functions.
Nelder-Mead and Derivative Free Optimization
Many optimization techniques analytically derive Pi and use its formulation in
an interior point method or gradient descent to solve Equation 3.15. These methods
make assumptions about client behavior when formulating P ′i , and then iterative
methods such as the Newton’s method are used to optimally find λ as the roots of
Equation 3.15. These techniques, however, rely on the derivability of Pi(λ)
′ and may
not exist for Pi(λ, t) or at all for clients with discrete behaviors.
Derivative free optimization techniques such as the Nelder-Mead method [70, 71]
solve the optimization problem via heuristic searching without relying on derivations
of Pi. These techniques iteratively evaluate the objective function (RP) and make
algorithmic decisions on which point to evaluate next based on prior observations.
The convergence properties of these methods are not well guaranteed, but they do
usually generate sound solutions to the dynamic pricing problem when used in this
section.
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Practical Limitations to DSM
Optimizing DSM requires extensive network communications to occur over a wide
area network. Geographic limitations restrict the speed at which messages can be ex-
changed, and throughput limitations restrict how many messages can be transmitted
and received for any window of time. Therefore the cost of optimization is summarized
as the number of function evaluations required to reach an optimal solution.
The computational requirements for large optimization problems solved by Nelder-
Mead are rather minimal sorting and summation components across a fixed number of
historical values. Computational restrictions are therefore ignored. The networking
restrictions for a price-power exchange is roughly 100 bytes of data in each direction
(64 bytes for a TCP datagram and 32 for a value). A 10-Gbit connection could
therefore sustain a theoretical 1.5 million exchanges per second, a suitable amount
for a large power market.
3.2.4 Related Work
3.2.5 Existing DSM Techniques
A wide range of existing DSM techniques provide mathematical and heuristic ba-
sis for optimizing power delivery in the smart grid. Work in [41] creates a general
concave optimization problem around dynamic pricing and solves it using an iterative
gradient projection method. This approach, however, utilizes gradients in consumer’s
utility and solves optimization problems using fixed windows of time. Work in [53]
optimizes DSM with plug-in electric vehicle (PEV) consumers acting as the model for
Pi. This technique also uses integer programming or interior point methods to solve
for stationary dispatches. A common theme in DSM approaches [1, 57, 65] is to seg-
ment the energy market into windows in which the system is stationary and a solution
can optimally converge before adjusting the market. Most methods rely on station-
ary problem parameters and ILP/MILP/IPM to solve the distributed optimization,
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and they do not consider the communication patterns or overhead associated with
distributed gradient and function evaluations.
Work in [74] provides a distributed method for optimizing prices in DSM. The
technique, however, relies on broadcast messages to all connected clients which is
not a scalable solution. Additionally, the problem is assumed stationary between
iterations. In this section, a system that accommodates the delays due to real-time
communication and does not require the system to be stationary between iterations
is proposed.
3.2.6 Existing Latency Studies
There has been some work on DSM with lost communication messages in [57].
The authors frame the DSM problem using an interior point method to solve for
the prices, like several other techniques. They then analyze the convergence on lost
communications by solving the problem using stale, outdated information. Work
in [56, 75] and the results (also derived in [57]) show that convergence is still pos-
sible when the gradient/lagrangian are stationary buy delayed in time. In [56] the
convergence rate is shown to slow as a function of the amount of stale information
incorporated into the convergence process. Under latency conditions τ , the solution
convergence error for gradient descent is bounded by
√
τ/T where T is the number
of negotiation iterations [76]. These techniques, however, rely on stationary (and
existing) gradients at the market players. In this section, a system that is based on





The market consists of players or clients whose only action is to consume or
produce power. A central price-setting entity (assumed to be a distribution-level
utility) dispatches prices to clients as either hypothetical (negotiation) or actionable
as a control signal, and the power utilized by each client at a particular price point
is assumed authentic. Consumer/producer constraints are manifested in the cost
function as asymptotes. Non-participatory clients are modeled as offsets in the nodal
power balance.
Overview
In the nodal power balance model, the consumers are a distributed set of market
players connected to a central price coordinator. The coordinator controls the price
signals at each node to balance power in the grid. To do this, the market players reg-
ister with the coordinator and provide their real-time consumption levels in response
to a hypothetical or actionable price that is periodically transmitted to the clients.
The coordinator decides, via a pricing algorithm, subsequent prices in response to the
power levels provided by the market players. Whenever a new price is determined to
be more efficient than the existing price, it is made actionable. To determine optimal
prices, the ISO periodically transmits prices and waits for a fixed period for a reply.
In the event no reply is received from a market player, a substitute value for power is
used. In the event information arrives after a period has expired, it may or may not
be useful to the ISO for calculating future prices.
Non-Stationary Objective and Time-Scales
The underlying algorithm is designed around an implicitly non-stationary objec-
tive function. Each iteration of Algorithm 1 takes non-zero time, and this has an
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influence on the behavior of f(x, t), the objective function. A stationary x with a
varying t will ebb and flow with the overall supply and demand of electric power in
the grid, and sometimes during transient events such as faults, the change between
f(x, t − ) and f(x, t + ), denoted ∆f(), can be dramatic. The standard Nelder-
Mead algorithm on which Algorithm 1 is based will not converge if ∆f() escapes
the contracting simplex and the resulting finite, constrained search space. Several
modifications are made to allow large ∆f().
Nelder-Mead Optimization
Algorithm 1 contains the approach used to solve the optimal price in the system.
The algorithm is based on a standard Nelder-Mead algorithm [71] but modified to
support non-stationary problems. Three modifications are provided to enable the al-
gorithm to perform online optimizations on non-stationary objective functions. First,
the search spaced used by NM is modified to prevent collapse so that transients can
be detected. Second, the algorithm is updated so that cached function values are
updated to improve point-ranking. Finally, the algorithm is changed to enable quick
retracing of the simplex space during its shrink operation.
In the algorithm listing, the function evaluations are explicitly demarcated to
show where communication must occur as the evaluation of f(x). Since the power
consumption is determined by distributed clients, the x term must be transmitted to
each client. The clients reply with fc(x) and f(x) =
∑
∀c fc(x).
Simplex Collapse The standard Nelder-Mead algorithm collapses a simplex around
an optimal point in a search space. When the simplex is sufficiently small, or the stan-
dard deviation of f(X1), ..., f(Xn) is less than a threshold, the algorithm terminates
with a solution (however, the online method never terminates since the objective
function is non-stationary). If f(x) is non-stationary, then the optimal point may
move outside of the simplex and outpace the reflection point’s growth, especially if
the simplex is small and the change in f is large. In the standard Nelder-Mead algo-
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Algorithm 1: Modified Nelder-Mead
1 Initialize X1..n, f(X1..n)
2 while true do
3 Sort X1..n by f(X1..n) ascending f(X1) ≤ f(X2)
4 Set X1 as actionable
5 Xo = X¯1..n−1
6 Rv = rand(−0.5, 0.5)
7 R = Rv(ω + β/(std(X1..n) + β))
8 Xr = Xo + α(Xo −Xn) +R
9 Evaluate f(Xr)
10 if f(X1) ≤ f(Xr) < f(Xn) then
11 Xn ← Xr;f(Xn)← f(Xr); continue
12 end
13 if f(X1) < pi then
14 Re-Evaluate f(X1)
15 end
16 if f(Xr) < f(X1) then
17 Xe = Xo + γ(Xo +Xn)
18 Evaluate f(Xe)
19 if f(Xe) < f(X1) then
20 Xn ← Xe;f(Xn)← f(Xe); continue
21 else




26 if f(Xr) ≥ f(Xn−1) then
27 Xc = Xo + ρ(Xo −Xn)
28 Evaluate f(Xc)
29 if f(Xc) < f(Xn) then
30 Xn ← Xc;f(Xn)← f(Xc); continue
31 end
32 end
33 Xb = X1
34 for k=1..n do
35 Xk ← Xb + σ(Xk −Xb)
36 Evaluate, Store f(Xk)
37 end
38 end
rithm, the simplex can only expand in the case that f(Xr) < f(X1), the best point.
This means that the algorithm will become stuck in practice, especially since f(Xr)
will only become worse as the optimal point moves away from the simplex. The first
modification, in lines 6, 7, 8, adds random noise, inversely proportional to the size of
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the simplex, to the reflection point. This allows the simplex to expand, as a function
of ω, β, when the search space is very tight. If the reflection point is accepted, then
the centroid Xo can move a substantial amount, accelerating the pace by which the
simplex can track the non-stationary optimal point.
Inaccurate Ranking The sorting operation on line 7 operates on historical, mem-
oized function evaluations, each of which takes a non-trivial amount of time to cal-
culate. Consequently, if at any point X1 is close to the optimal X, then its rank
will become difficult to change by subsequent evaluations unless the simplex shrinks.
Line 13 contains a condition in a parameter pi to re-evaluate the optimal point X1.
Since the residual power problem is convex with a optimal point at zero, the amount
of re-evaluation requests can be throttled this parameter. Intuitively, when the ob-
jective value of f(X1) is large, the probability that f(Xr) < f(X1) will be large. This
compounds with the simplex expansion in Section 38, so that when the optimal point
leaves the simplex, the probability that the simplex updates with Xr increases.
Reflection Retracing The most expensive operation in terms of function evalua-
tions is the, reduction/shrink part of the algorithm starting on line 34. In this phase,
the entire simplex is reduced around the best point X1 as Xb. If the optimal point
moves quickly enough away from the existing simplex, then the condition that the
reflection point is worse than any existing point, f(Xr) ≥ f(Xn), will occur. Addi-
tionally none of the exploration points will be better than f(Xn), by assumption. As
a result, the algorithm will shift and re-evaluate every point in the history, including
X1. This expensive operation requires n function evaluations to complete, but it
will enable the efficient movement of simplex provided σ is not too small. By also
re-evaluating X1, the ranking of the new points can be updated.
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Fig. 3.7. Faults: When the communication channels are interrupted,
the algorithm operation becomes blocked (left). With a recovery
mechanism, a new price and power level can be used to continue
operations (right).
3.3 Networking and DSM
The behavior of most DSM algorithms is undefined whenever information does
not successfully arrive in each iteration, as shown in Figure 3.7. For example, Algo-
rithm 1 will not complete with even a single straggler in the function evaluation phase.
This section presents methodologies used to recover from non-linearity experienced
in networked and distributed systems.
3.3.1 Latency Influences in DSM
Negotiation
Traditional optimization techniques are designed to operate iteratively in lockstep.
The prices for the next iteration depend on the power levels of the previous iteration,
and these are assumed available at each iteration. In a large scale system, however,
this means that the real-time iteration speed is bounded by the slowest market player.
To solve this issue, latency can be accounted for by introducing stale information into
the optimization problem when communication is interrupted. Optimization occurs
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around z = f(x(t− τ(t))) instead of f(x(t)), for example. Each iteration is assumed
to take Ts seconds to complete before moving to the next step.
The relationship between τ and t is maintained by wall-clock speed of each itera-
tion, Ts. Each transmission of z(t) takes τR(t) wall-clock seconds. Each overall iter-
ation blocks for τI seconds, waiting for all replies to arrive, then τ(t) = b(τR(t)/τI)c.
This maintains the relationship that error reduction is bounded by the real-time speed
of the communication network. If the number of iterations completed in a window of
time is doubled, and min(τ(t)) ≥ 1, then τ ′(t) = 2τ(t), √τ/T = √2τ/2T = √τ ′/T ′.
The algorithm presented in Section 3.2.7 operates with a memoized history. La-
tency is captured by each function evaluation, where x is sent out to all the clients,
and they reply with fc(x), and the objective function is
∑
∀c∈C fc(x). Continuity is
guaranteed by using an approximation function for fc(x). Initially all values for f(x)
are populated with the projection function and then replaced as new values arrive
via communication systems. In this case, if τc(t) > 1, it will not be incorporated in
the initial evaluation of f(x) in the algorithm. Instead, the historized value of f(x)
is updated when the new information arrives. This allows for efficient a posteriori
incorporation of stale information, manifested via re-ranking of f(X1..n). The accu-
racy of the projection function will impact how well the method survives high latency
situations.
Actuation
Latency in the actuation loop for DSM introduces potential state inconsistencies
in the system. There are three hypothetical states in the system: the a posteriori
oracle-optimal xO(t), the DSM’s intended state x(t) and the experienced state x(t−
τ(t)). The DSM is intending to minimize the objective function f(x) which captures
the inefficiency of the state. At a base level, the penalty for actuation delays is
f(x(t− τ(t)))− f(x(t)) while the degradation performance of the system is f(x(t−
τ(t)))− f(xO(t)).
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Fig. 3.8. Asynchronous state traversal from x(t0) to x(t1) via several
potential paths, each a function of communication latency.
In existing DSM techniques, timescale for negotiating is much shorter than ac-
tuation, however, which leads to granularity issues in tracking the true impact of τ .
For example, the time-scale for actuation may be 5 minutes. Latencies between 0
and 5 minutes are captured by τ = 0 i.e. the actuation is based on a projection 5
minutes in the past, and as long as the message arrives by 5 minutes, there is no
consequence at this level. The problem is complicated due to the lack of a distributed
agreement protocol in the system. For example, consider a system in which τ(t) ≥ 1
for all market players. Since information is received asynchronously, the evolution
from x(t0) to x(t1) is asynchronous, as shown in Figure 3.8. With the right latency
values, the asynchronous state traversal may transit state spaces that perform poorly.
Ideally, the movement between states would be instantaneously, as modeled in DSM.
However, the speed at which traversal occurs, a function of communication latency,
impacts the performance of DSM. The movement between states is necessitated by the
encroaching ”degraded” operation space (i.e. S(x(t)) is becoming worse over time).
For this reason, costly distributed agreement protocols can have a high penalty.
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The algorithm presented in this section, however, actuates whenever any new,
more-optimal X1 value is found (i.e. X1(t − 1) 6= X1(t)). At this level, the system
responds much more quickly to changes in the power grid. Degraded states are much
more easily avoided. Stability can be ensured by coordinating, a-priori, the load
points that the consumer will use if communication is disrupted.
3.4 Experimental Results
This section provides and analyzes two primary experiments. In the first Experi-
ments, 1-3, the base optimization technique is evaluated and compared to the optimal
performance of other techniques. This section also analyzes the algorithm’s sensitiv-
ity to parameters described in Section 3.2.7. Experiment 4 analyzes the algorithm’s
ability to withstand uncertain network conditions expected to arise from best-effort
networks.
3.4.1 Experimental Setup
The experiment uses agent-based modeling to capture the behaviors of an example
smart grid setup. There are three primary agents: the consumer/producer, the market
manager, and the communication agents. The consumer/producer agent models a
generator or consumer in the system, the market manager implements Algorithm 1,
and the communication link accounts for latency and congestion behaviors in the
system. A central event-based queue manages the interactions between the agents,
and an external scenario file describes the transient behaviors of the agents.
Communications Model
The communication between the agents is managed via a FIFO queue. The deliv-
ery time for a message is calculated as latency plus transmission time (size/bandwidth)
with a maximum queue size that introduces dropped packets. The bandwidth and
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Table 3.1
Example parameters used in Figure 3.9
Pmin Pmax λmin λmax
Consumer 0 110 0 100
Generator -90 0 30 80
latency parameters can be controlled to introduce latency via agent-to-agent message
congestion or via external congestion.
3.4.2 Load and Generation Model
This experiment models supply and demand as scaled sigmoid functions, as shown
in Equations 3.16, 3.17 as P (λ). Figure 3.9 shows two example curves with the corre-
sponding residual power at each pricing point, based on the parameters in Table 3.1,
where the generator power level is presented as positive but actually negative. The
sigmoid function was chosen to allow responsiveness to price while also facilitating
asymptotic behavior at the extremes, capturing market-enforced constraints.
λs = 6 ∗ λ− λmin





For the experiments conducted in this section, unless specified, the parameters
used are as follows. There are 2 generators G, NG = 2, and 100 consumers C,




The Pmax for the consumers is
3PT
2NC
. The λmax for C is $100, and the λmin is $0. For
the generator it is $80 and $30 respectively.
The non-stationary components are as follows. The generator and consumer have
a time-constant τG, τC as
3600s
pi
for a period of two hours. The magnitude of change
AG, AC is 0 and
0.35PT
NC
respectively (generation is not time varying by default). For
generators, only Pmin is modulated as AG ∗ sin( tτG ). For consumers, both Pmax and
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Fig. 3.9. The supply (generator) and demand (consumer) are shown
for varying market prices. The residual power shown is the imbal-
ance between the generator’s output and the consumer’s input. Since
residual power can disrupt the grid and lead to inefficient generation,
the goal is to optimize the market price such that the residual power
is minimized.
Pmin are modulated by AC ∗ sin( tτC ). This creates periodic swings in demand that
require constant updating of λ to maintain system optimality.
Transient Events
To analyze the effectiveness of the online algorithm at handling unpredictable
transients, step changes in demand are introduced into the model. To model step






This shift is done at different points in time depending on the particular experiment.
3.4.3 Experiment 1: Analysis under Normal Conditions
In this experiment, the DSM technique is subjected to a two market scenarios:
one predictable and one unpredictable. The network conditions are assumed to be
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favorable such that 60 iterations can occur per minute (1 per second). A time-
changing scenario is run for one hour of simulation time and compared to an optimal
windowed output function, time-of-use (TOU). The primary difference between the
online method and the TOU method is the granularity of control.
In the first experiment, the market price is plotted across time for one hour,
shown in Figure 3.10, under the time-varying parameters described in Section 3.4.2.
Three different profiles are presented–the online, optimal, and 5-minute ideal time-
of-use (TOU) values. The online solution closely matches the optimal with a lag for
iteration-execution of one iteration (one second). The TOU solution is only optimal
at one point per window in this scenario. It is worth noting that as the window size of
TOU approaches zero, it matches the optimal solution (only with perfect prediction,
since TOU is scheduled in advance).
Fig. 3.10. The λ price values are shown for a particular one-hour
scenario. The optimal price is constantly changing, and the online
method is attempting to match it. The time-of-use (TOU) method
provides pricing windows with perfect prediction. The online method
is much closer to the optimal price than the TOU approach due to
increased granularity of control.
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The optimality of the online approach in the residual power domain is shown in
Figure 3.11. The online solution never perfectly matches the optimal solution, but it
gets close at the apex of the price curve where the system is slowly changing. The
TOU technique is only optimal at one location per window and suffers more when the
slope of change is highest. The online method reduces residual power by 64% over
the 5-minute time-of-use approach.
Fig. 3.11. The residual power in the market must be absorbed by
automatic generation control. Less residual power indicates optimal-
ity in the pricing method. The online method is able to outperform
the TOU method when changes occur in the system due to increased
time-precision, reducing residual power by 64%. When the system
is not changing rapidly, at the 30-minute mark, both approaches are
comparable.
3.4.4 Experiment 2: Unpredictable Step Change
This experiment adds an unpredictable step change to demand, as described in
Section 3.4.2, to the prior experiment. At 20 minutes in, a change in demand occurs to
simulate a large load suddenly coming online. At 40 minutes, the load is removed and
the system resumes its predictable behavior. Figure 3.12 shows the price response
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to this situation. TOU is unable to adapt to the transient since it is calculated a
priori while the online method is able to observe and respond to the changing market
condition.
Fig. 3.12. A step load is added and removed at 20 and 40 min-
utes respectively. The TOU method, calculated a priori, is unable
to adapt to the change in the system. The online method lags the
optimal method during the step transient, but it is able to adapt to
the changing market conditions.
The residual power from this experiment is shown in Figure 3.13. The online
algorithm adapts to the transient by observing market conditions and making real-
time updates to the price. The algorithm rapidly improves in a few market iterations,
resulting in a 85% reduction in residual power over TOU. Higher speed iterations (sub
one-second) could enable outage avoidance by curbing demand quickly in a transient
such as a transmission line being disabled.
3.4.5 Experiment 3: Sensitivity to β
A key parameter to the adaptability of Algorithm 1 is the β parameter which
controls the minimum exploration capability of the algorithm (e.g. the minimum size
of the simplex). Figure 3.14 shows how the system responds to various values of β
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Fig. 3.13. The residual power is shown for a step change in load. The
online method responds to the transient to curb residual power and
outperforms the a prior TOU method by 85%.
during a transient that lasts between time 200 s and 400 s. The lower values of β
allows tighter simplex solutions to exist. This hurts adaptability to change, both
time-varying and transient. The higher values allow quick changes to occur in the
simplex search space, and as shown in the figure, the high β values are quicker to
adapt to change. The lowest values are unable to adapt to the transient and become
optimal again once the transient ends. In some sense, the β parameter tunes the
responsiveness or long-term smoothness of the algorithm.
Figure 3.15 shows a spread of β values and the average impact on residual power
for scenario described earlier. Higher values of β give more flexibility to the system
and allow it to adapt to changing conditions. In low-transient situations, the value
of β has limited impact relative to other terms in the algorithm. This is because
when the system is tightly converged on a particular solution, explorations in new
directions yield dead ends, so there is limited impact.
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Fig. 3.14. Different β values for Algorithm 1 are plotted for a step
change at time 200-400 seconds. The high values of β improve adapt-
ability to transients while the low values resist drastic changes to the
price.
Fig. 3.15. The average residual power in the market decreases with
higher β values during the transient period. Without transients, the
β parameter has little impact on performance.
3.4.6 Experiment 4: Networking Impacts
For this experiment, the prior experiment is repeated with increasing latency. In
order to operate under latency, the ISO utilizes a power consumption estimate for
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clients that do not respond within one timestep. Equation 3.18 captures the model
used for this experiment. Pe is the pre-transient power and τ is the time since an
update was received from the client. Parameter Jo = −0.2 offsets the estimate and
Jv = 0.01 adds random noise to the offset with R being a sample from the normal
distribution with mean and variance equal to one. The Jt = 50s parameter controls
the time-dependent decay of the estimate accuracy. Using these parameters, the
online algorithm is harmed by non-reply from clients.
P ′ = (Pe(1 + Jo) + Pe ∗ Jv ∗R) ∗ τ
Jt
(3.18)
The networking model for this experiment is a star or hub and spoke topology.
Each client has two communication agents, one upstream and one downstream, in-
terfacing with the online algorithm. The latency values are assigned to each link as a
constant offset and the bandwidth is set to 1 Gbit. A random subset of communica-
tion agents have latency added, controlled by the fraction parameter. At 50 seconds,
the latency is added to the scenario. At 100 seconds, a transient occurs, and at 200
seconds the latency is removed from the scenario which terminates at 300 seconds.
Figure 3.16 shows the performance of the online algorithm with varying factions
of the communication agents experiencing high-latency situations. The fixed-price
solution shown captures the behavior if the perfectly projected price is used, absent
adaptation to the transient. When too many clients are disrupted, the online algo-
rithm is penalized by the inaccuracies introduced by Equation 3.18. Even with these
inaccuracies, the online algorithm is able to withstand 20% of clients being disrupted
before performing more poorly than the fixed/windowed solution. A more accurate
estimation function would improve performance.
3.4.7 Discussion
The algorithm presented in this section is designed to accurately respond to quick
transients in the power grid by using price signals. Much optimization, however, takes
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Fig. 3.16. This figure shows the performance of the system with a
varying number of clients experiencing latency conditions. As more
clients are exposed to latency, the system is unable to adapt well to
transients. Small populations are easily accounted for by the online
adaptability of the algorithm, but the larger populations place a high
reliance on the load-estimation function.
place in longer term planning. For example, work in [43] optimizes consumption cen-
trally by observing each loads needs and flexibility and developing a global operation
plan. The approaches are complimentary, however, since long term plans are inher-
ently not robust to changing market conditions. Ideally, the algorithm presented in
this section would be used in conjunction with global planning to create an optimal,
robust solution.
A limitation to this approach arises from developing ultra-precise control. Much
of the price fluctuations at fast timescales are viewed as noise, especially if the system
has substantial inertia e.g. synchronous motors as loads. For this reason, there is
usually resistance in moving from 15-minute to 5-minute windows, etc., especially at
a wholesale level. It is worth noting, however, that solid-state electronics such as
those found in electric vehicles can rapidly respond to market conditions.
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3.4.8 Conclusion
In this section, a technique for optimizing dynamic pricing signals for distribution
level power markets was presented. A Nelder-Mead optimization technique was mod-
ified to support non-stationary, non-smooth price-demand curves for consumers in
electric power markets. Network-aware enhancements were applied to the optimiza-
tion technique, and it was used to optimize dynamic prices for an example market
scenario. The technique was able to reduce residual power by 64% over 5-minute
time-of-use methods during stable scenarios and by over 85% during large transients.
In future work, the particular patterns of latency that are most disruptive to the
optimization problem will be analyzed, and that information will be used to model
strategic adversaries and cyber attacks on the grid.
3.5 Technical Market Conclusion
This chapter covered technical market operations—the mechanics and algorithms
by which market clearing prices are found. The two methods presented were analyzed
from a network perspective and shown to be resilient in some cases and unstable in
others. This chapter motivates the need for further strategic adversarial analysis, and
the next chapter combines this chapter and the previous one into a concrete strategy
space for lauching network attacks to disrupt power markets.
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In this chapter, the economic models from Chapters 2 and 3 are combined into a
unified model for strategic adversaries in cyber-physical systems. The first section of
this work has been published in COMSNETS ’16 [77].
4.1 Introduction
Dynamic pricing markets in the smart grid (SG) [58, 65] enable the optimization
of physical resource allocation. NYISO, the power system operator for the state
of New York, could realize as much as $400 million [64] in annual efficiency gains
by leveraging wide-area real-time dynamic pricing systems. These gains, however,
depend on consistent, reliable communication networks to facilitate control signal
and measurement exchanges. The control signals comprise the price signals that the
utility sends to the consumers and the measurement signals comprise the readings of
the electricity usage at the consumers. Consumer-grade networks are often unreliable
or congested at times, and they are highly susceptible to denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks that disrupt communications entirely. As researchers pursue SG and other
incentive-driven network control systems, they need tools to first understand what
will be impact of outages of the network infrastructure on the demand-driven pricing
mechanism on the SG and then how to mitigate the impact of this increasing attack
surface and improve system resilience.
Electric power markets suffer from volatility because electricity is not easily stored.
This volatility is expected to become much more acute with the increasing use of re-
newable energy sources, such as, solar and wind, that depend on the weather patterns.
This creates a constant need to match supply with demand, but presently demand is
inelastic and unaware of real-time market conditions. Supply and demand has histor-
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ically been predictable which has limited this mismatch of supply and demand to a
tolerable level. New renewable energy resources (RER) such as solar and wind driven
supplies, however, have reduced this predictability to the point that technologies like
roof-top residential solar are becoming cost-prohibitive [2] to integrate into the grid.
The future smart grid is designed to bring elasticity to demand via techniques such
as demand response (DR) [65] and transactive control (TC) [72] so that RER’s can
be better integrated and system efficiency improved. These techniques, however, rely
on extensive communication infrastructures to coordinate wide-area energy consump-
tion.
Transactive control enables distributed, independent control systems, operated
by independent actors or market players, to coordinate via incentive-driven signals
(prices). For example, the set point on an air conditioner may be sensitive to the
cost of electricity in an automated way. This incentive can be set a priori via time-
of-use pricing, but it is not sensitive to unpredictable changes in market conditions.
Alternatively, a central market coordinator can negotiate with these automated loads
by exchanging price and load information in real time with all of the actors. This
negotiation process enables actors to rapidly respond to fluctuations in grid supply
and by adjusting their energy usage based on price signals and their current exogenous
needs. It is possible to disrupt the price signal negotiation, however, via attacks on the
wide-area communication network. Since network attacks can influence the market
price of energy directly, via control signal disruption, a strategic adversary (SA) can
potentially launch attacks to manipulate prices in her favor.
When communications between market players are disrupted, the transactive con-
trol system becomes unable to influence consumption or production at those market
players. For example if there is a spike in demand, the price signal should rise to
curtail consumption and promote production. Producers who are aware of this sig-
nal increase their output and collect additional profits. An attack could disrupt the
market signal at the producer, however, and as a result, power output would re-
main stagnant. Consequently, the market price may rise higher than it otherwise
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would have to sustain equivalent demand curtailment, and this may benefit the other
producers in the market. It could also lead to blackouts if the disruption is severe
enough. If the SA is a producer, then direct financial benefit in the power market can
be gained from such an attack. The SA can also benefit from the profits of multiple
actors through various means such as investing in these actors. The ability for a
network attack to benefit the SA is called the attacker’s incentive, and this section
focuses on measuring and reducing that incentive via defensive maneuvers.
Prior work in [78, 79] has shown that network attacks in smart grid control sys-
tems can disrupt price signals and provide benefits to subsets of consumers. These
techniques, however, do not consider defensive maneuvers that the market players can
use to protect themselves. Additionally, they rely on a strong adversary that compro-
mises the entire market communication infrastructure. In this section, it is assumed
that only the attacker can disrupt network links. Additional work in [20–24] has cre-
ated a game-theoretic structure around attack and defense in control systems. These
works do not consider the financial incentives of the attacker, however. Instead they
focus on overall system performance or lower level dynamics and model the attacker
as benefiting from system disruption rather than profiteering. In this work, game the-
oretic strategies for smart grids are combined into an attacker/defender game, with
multiple defenders, that relies on financial incentives to motivate attack and defense.
This solution encompasses a method for estimating the attacker’s incentive through
attack strategies, mapping them to a game, and playing the game from a defender’s
perspective to minimize the attacker’s incentive. First, a model for translating attacks
and impacts on a smart grid is created to form a strategy space for the attacker. A
dynamic market is implemented with communication links that can be disrupted via
denial of service attacks to capture the attacker/defender strategies. From this space,
the attacks are optimized to maximize the attacker’s incentive (profits) by attacking
communication links that distort the market to benefit the adversary. This is done
via mixed integer linear programming (MILP). Then a model for defender is created
that attempts to minimize the attacker’s incentive by blocking certain attack strate-
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gies via defensive investments (i.e. DDoS protection). Since the model has multiple
defenders (actors), the impact of information sharing among the defenders on the
reduction in the attacker’s incentive is also explored.
The solution is tested with a smart-grid based transactive control system. The
baseline system optimizes power consumption by controlling the market price sig-
nal. A simulated communication network facilitates the exchange of price and load
information. The attacker can choose which communication links to disrupt with a
DoS attack, and the defender can choose some links to protect. It is shown that
the baseline attacker incentives can be as high as 51% of overall operating profits.
When the defender and adversary’s budget are equal, the attacker’s incentive is re-
duced by up to 70%. These results validate the utility of this section’s technique in
optimizing defensive investments. It points the way forward for practitioners (such
as, utilities) looking to deploy demand-driven pricing for electricity by showing how
much resilience in the networking infrastructure is needed to assure a certain level of
economic profit from the system.
The rest of the section is organized as follows. Section 4.2 covers the background
in dynamic pricing markets and how they can be manipulated. Section 4.3 outlines
the basic attack/defense strategy, and Section 4.4 expands the strategy to include in-
formation sharing among market players. Section 4.5 evaluates the strategies against
an example dynamic pricing market, and the related work is discussed in Section 4.6.
The section is concluded in Section 4.7.
4.2 Preliminaries
4.2.1 Electric Power Grids
Power grids are complex, interconnected systems composed of generators (sources)
and loads (sinks). Each generator and load is connected to a series of transmission
links (edges). A simple approximation of the energy system is a DC-load flow model
which can be represented as a flow graph [4] where each asset (load, generator, edge)
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in the physical system is an edge or node in the graph. Profit-seeking actors sell
energy above cost (generators) or transform that energy into something more useful
(loads). The system is most efficient when supply and demand are equalized since a
surplus of power is dissipated as waste heat and a shortage of power causes brownouts,
blackouts, and other grid stability issues. The imbalance of supply and demand is
known as residual power (RP), and power grid operators strive to minimize this
value. Dynamic market mechanisms [3] and demand response (DR) [65] minimize RP
by either direct load control (DLC) or dynamic real-time markets. The work in this
section focuses on power markets rather than DLC since the markets have a direct
impact to profitability and thus attacker’s incentive.
4.2.2 Power Markets
Power markets utilize a variety of economic strategies to minimize RP (4.1) and
maximize the system’s social welfare (SW). The SW defines the global system benefit
from energy transactions as shown in (4.2), where ωi is the value (consumers) or cost
(producer) of power at each actor or market player i, and Pi is the amount of power
consumed or produced by that market player. The parameter C penalizes the system
for residual power with C  ωi. While somewhat simple on the surface, the problem
of maximizing SW is complicated by time-varying changes in ω and the constraints on
P that arise from power grid topologies and physical power constraints. To address
these challenges, new smart grid models [3,53] allow real-time power markets to evolve
with changing system conditions such as outages or unpredictable RERs.
The power market utilizes (4.3) to minimize RP, effectively maximizing SW. Each
actor is exposed to the price λ, and they adjust their power output/input to optimize
their individual economic situations. For consumers, their individual profit is SWa =
Pi · (ωi − λ). If λ > ω for a consumer, then f(λ) = 0 since the consumer would
experience a net loss by consuming energy. Changes in energy needs or production
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Fig. 4.1. The residual power (RP) and market price (λ) are shown
for an example grid scenario based on prior market solution work,
later described in Section 4.5.1. The market experiences a demand
surge in Pi for consumers at t=100 s followed by a reduction at t=250
s. During the surge, residual power spikes until the market price is
corrected.
are captured by (4.4). For example, a wind power producer has a very low ω since








ωi(t)Pi(t)− C · |RP(t)| (4.2)
Pi(t) = fi(λ(t)) (4.3)
Pi(t) < Pi(t) < Pi(t) (4.4)
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Online power markets optimize (4.2) by repetitively sampling Pi and updating λ.
Each consumer receives a message containing λ and replies with Pi = f(λ). Fig. 4.1
shows how a market evolves during a step transient in (4.4). The implementation
of these systems, however, exposes security vulnerabilities that can be utilized by
strategic adversaries to extract profit from the system. For example, the value of
f(λ) may be based on an outdated λ during a communication outage thus reducing
the SW. The defensive strategies presented in this work curtail impacts to SW in a
cost-effective manner.
4.2.3 Profit Manipulation
Network disruptions have a direct impact on market price (λ). Whenever a dis-
ruption occurs, the market player enters a zero-order hold mode. For market players,
the price λ is fixed while P may change based on time-varying constraints. Conse-
quently, the market loses its influence on power usage for a subset of market players
whenever the network is disrupted. Fig. 4.2 demonstrates how the profits of a genera-
tor can be influenced by attacks on its communication link during the scenario shown
in Fig. 4.1 and detailed in Section 4.5.1. The generator loses money if its own link is
disrupted and can gain additional profits when some competitors’ links are disrupted.
Market players are retroactively charged the actual λ market price to promote market
participation—otherwise self-disconnection would be a valid strategy.
4.3 Attack and Defense Strategy
Definitions:
A set of market players
I set of target network links
SW social welfare or profitability of the system
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Fig. 4.2. The profitability for a generator is shown for two attack
scenarios. At t=50 s a DoS attack is launched on the communication
link connecting the generator to the market (self-attacked) or another
market player (others attacked), and it lasts until t=200 s.
SWa profitability of market player a
IM[a, i] impact or change in profit realized by market player a when network link i
is attacked
P atki probability of network link i being attacked
P [a, i] probability of network link i being attacked, as estimated by market player a
Di boolean indicating if network link i is defended
Ci cost to defend asset i
Ai boolean indicating if network link i is attacked by the SA
A[i, n] two dimensional Ai for n iterations in a game with imperfect information at
the various actors
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Oa, Oi set of network links owned by market player a, owner of asset i
σa knowledge level of market player a
4.3.1 Players and Definitions
The set of market players A in the power market wish to maximize their profit
SWa, as defined in Section 4.2.2. The power system is comprised of a set of assets and
their communication links in I. The term asset refers to both the physical system
consuming or producing energy and it’s associated target, the network link. There
is a one-to-one mapping of assets (and thus targets) to market players defined as
ownership such that one market player may own multiple assets. Each actor has a
defensive decision to make for each asset that it owns– whether or not to invest in
its defense Di ∈ 0, 1. This decision has a cost of defense Ci. If the asset is attacked,
Ai ∈ 0, 1, then the system experiences the impact IM from the attack, unless Di = 1
in which case the attack is assumed to fail via perfect defense.
4.3.2 Attacker’s Incentive
The strategic adversary (SA) attempts to profit from the manipulations described
in Section 4.2.3 by launching network attacks on the links that interconnect the
market players with the market mechanism and the price signal λ. Each attack
results in a change in the profitability of each market player, and this is captured
in the impact matrix IM[a, i] [4]. In this section, IM[a, i] is estimated via dynamic
market simulations (Section 4.5.1) by approximating the market conditions for each
player and evaluating the resulting changes in profit in the market. For example, the
impact of attacking each network link on the generator in Fig. 4.2 is summarized by
IM. The SA wishes to maximize the gain in profit for some market players with whom
she has a financial interest, shown in (4.5). A, I is the set of actors A and network






The probability of an attack on target i is proportional to the attacker’s incentive
gained from that attack. Abstractly, the target i could be any perturbation in the
system–network outages, power plant disruptions, transmission line faults, etc. In this
section, however, the focus is on a dynamic pricing system for the smart grid, and
the targets are limited to network link disruptions. Similarly, the actors that benefit
from the attack A are collections of consumers and/or generators participating in the
dynamic market.
4.3.3 Defensive Maneuvers
The market players in the system can estimate the IM via their own impact
analysis. Using their individual IM, they can also estimate the attacker’s strategy
and use it to construct a corresponding defensive strategy. Without any budgetary
constraints, the defenders will protect all the targets in I by investing in high capacity,
secured network links. Budgets are limited, however, so defenders must optimally
select targets to defend. Section 4.4 describes how the defenders can have different
views on the system parameters and still coordinate a defense.
Underlying Game
The impact matrix IM is computed by assessing the underlying game, i.e. the
power market, with successful attacks, as described in Section 4.2.3. Two versions of
the system are compared–in one version, the attack was successful and in the other no
attack is present. The resulting change in profitability for each actor is summarised by
IM as the difference between the profits for each market player in the two scenarios.
Each attack on the system causes an overall net-negative impact on profitability.
The system operates at a global-optimal whenever communications are uninterrupted.
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Table 4.1
Example Impact Matrix (IM)
T1 T2 T3
A1 -2 -2 3
A2 4 -4 -2
A3 -4 2 -4
Any perturbations that disrupt communications result in decreased efficiency because
of suboptimal responses to market prices (λ). Therefore, the sum across all actors for
any given target is always zero or negative. Some actors, however, may benefit from
competitor elimination, which is the basis for the strategic adversary’s profit model.
Table 4.1 shows an example impact matrix for three market players and three targets.
Ai owns target Ti.
4.3.4 Defensive System Overview
The defensive investment optimization problem is designed to minimize the at-
tacker’s incentive thus reducing the probability of attack and denying profits to the
adversary (resource exhaustion). An impact model is analyzed for each target and
assessed as an impact to the profitability of each market player (IM). Once the matrix
is calculated, it can be analyzed strategically to determine the best defensive action
for each market player as in [4]. Fig. 4.3 shows the system layout.
Defensive Investments
Each market player in the system has a choice to defend self-owned targets from
attacks at a cost Ci. If this cost is less than the expected reduction in profits, then
it is in the actor’s best interest to invest in defensive measures. The expected impact
is IM[a, i]P [a, i] where P [a, i] is actor a’s expectation that asset i will be attacked,
based on the SA’s optimal strategy. In game theory terms, this section follows the
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Fig. 4.3. In the overall system flow, set of defenders and a strategic
adversary each have a view of the system and its market. The system
is exposed to a physical scenario and analyzed for a set of potential
targets via a market mechanism simulation. From this simulation,
the profitability of each market player is captured in a set of impact
matrices (IM). Each market player has an independently calculated
IM and thus a different defense strategy that can be rectified via
collaboration.
Stackelberg model where the different parties move one after the other. In this case,
the attacker’s move is estimated and the defenders decide to defend the assets ap-
propriately. The attacker does not have the ability to come up with a repeat attack
after observing the defensive actions, so the Nash equilibrium point is not analyzed in
this model. Due to the slow-moving nature of defensive investments, the defender’s
strategy is not immediately observable by the adversary.
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4.4 Multiple Knowledge Levels
4.4.1 Multiple Underlying Games
Each actor a and the strategic adversary have their own underlying game Ga, GSA,
respectively, from which IM is calculated. This arises because the parameters ωi, fi, Pi, Pi
from Section 4.2.2 must be estimated by actors who do not own those assets, includ-
ing the strategic adversary. Each actor assesses the impacts from their independent
viewpoints of the system. The game Ga is derived from the ground truth game GA
by adding noise to the above parameters. In the perfect knowledge model, all of the
games are identical, Ga1 = Ga2∀a1, a2. Imperfect information is modeled by allowing
the underlying games to diverge by sampling i.e. fictitious play.
The game G itself contains a set of dynamic parameters x (ωi, fi, Pi, Pi) that
are used to determine optimal market price. Fixed components of the game are
the ownership and the network structure of the system. Each market player wants
to keep its parameters secret to maintain a competitive edge in the marketplace.
The dynamic parameters, however, can be estimated by observing market conditions
and surveying physical equipment infrastructures. Each market player therefore can
establish a ”noisy” view of the underlying game, as defined by (4.6). The dynamic
parameters are sampled from a normal distribution of the ground truth game. Sign
changes are not allowed because it is assumed that each market player knows if an
asset is a producer or consumer. The parameter σa defines the knowledge level of the
actor a, and it is applied to all parameters except parameters for assets that the actor
itself owns Oa. Intuitively, this parameter models the amount of information shared
among each other. Greater is σa, less is the information that actor a has.
x′ = N (x, σ2a) ∀x ∈ GA, x /∈ Oa,
x′ = x ∀x ∈GA, x ∈ Oa
x′ ∈ (−∞, 0] if x′ <0, else x′ ∈ [0,∞)
(4.6)
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4.4.2 Perfect Information Game
In the perfect information game, the strategic adversary and all actors have a per-
fect view of the system, GSA = GA, Ga = GA ∀ a ∈ A. In this form of the model, there
is a single, optimal outcome for the defenders. Since P [a1, i] = P [a2, i]∀a1, a2 ∈ A, the
defensive decision is the same for each actor, and if the costs are correctly distributed
among the defenders, then there is a single globally optimal defense strategy. The
maximization problem (4.7) is solved by the defenders via mixed integer linear pro-
gramming (MILP). The maximum value of this equation is zero because if no target is
attacked, then no defense is necessary. Practically, protecting a network link (e.g. via
DDoS protection) has some cost Ci for establishing a more reliable communication
channel. The defender that owns each link, must decide to invest in its protection or







The strategic adversary, the driving force behind Ai, is playing a similar game
in (4.5). Since everyone shares the same knowledge, the perceived impact at each
market player is the same, and all actors agree on which targets should be defended.





budget constraints on how many assets can be attacked and defended, respectively.
4.4.3 Imperfect Attack Strategies
The adversary is assumed to be perfectly rational (no anarchy) but may not have
perfect knowledge of the system and subsequently makes suboptimal decisions. To
capture this, Ai is evolved into a mixed probability-based strategy across several
underlying games for the adversary. The SA has a single, optimal (pure) strategy
per (4.5), and a mixed strategy is created by combining multiple pure strategies
into a single mixed strategy. Multiple IM′ are calculated for the strategic adversary’s
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underlying game GSA that are derived from GA as define in (4.6), with the caveat that
the SA owns no assets. Equation (4.5) is optimized for each IM′ across N fictitious
games, each with a knowledge level σ, as a noise ratio. This results in N strategies for
each asset i as A[i, n]. Equation (4.8) is the calculation for the probability of attack
on target i given the N fictitious games for the adversary. The outcome P ai is an






Defense with Mixed Attack Strategies: The defenders strategy, as captured in
(4.7), is modified below in (4.9) to account for the fact that the SA may have a non-
boolean attack plan. Previously, Ai was binary and now P
a
i is a rational number so






P ai IM[a, i](1−Di)−DiCi (4.9)
4.4.4 Multiple Defender Optimization
The maximization problems presented earlier for optimizing defensive investments
do not consider the scenario where multiple defenders do not have the same infor-
mation level and are optimizing around different underlying games. Each defender’s
underlying game, Ga, is used in place of GA to calculate a mixed attacker strategy
using (4.8). Each actor then has a different threat model P [a, i] based on Ga instead
of GA. (4.10) is performed by each actor to complete the optimization of Di. Only
the owner of asset i can determine the value of Di. This approach enables no sin-
gle actor to have a global view of the system which accurately models how a large






P [a, i]IM[a, i](1−Di)−DiCi (4.10)
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Cost Collaboration: This problem is supplemented with a collaboration method.
The cost of defense of target i is proportionally shared among benefiting actors. Since
defensive decisions are segmented by asset owner, and attacks against owned-assets
are always damaging, there is no Price of Anarchy (PoA) in this defensive model.
4.5 Experimentation
4.5.1 Experimental Setup
The underlying game, as described in Section 4.2.2, is solved via an online Nelder-
Meade (NM) [71] optimization technique. Each iteration of NM is assumed to take
one second and requires one round-trip communication of λ and Pi. The model for fi
is given in (3.17). In the case of a consumer, ωi = Pmax. For a producer, ωi = Pmin.
The source code and corresponding market model details are available at [80].
The model has 20 generators with an average Pmax = 0, Pmin = 5, λmin = 30, λmax =
80, and there are 100 consumers with Pmax = 1.5, Pmin = 0.3, λmin = 0, λmax = 100
for a total of 120 market players. The consumers Pmin is modified as P
′
min(t) =
Pmin + 0.30 · sin( pi·t3600), and all the other parameters are agnostic to time. At t=50s,
the targeted network links are disrupted such that the λ term is fixed for those assets.
At t=200s, the links are restored and communication is resumed. At t=100s a step
load is introduced by setting Pmax = 2, Pmin = 0.4 for all consumers. The parame-
ters are restored to the default values at t=250s. The simulation is executed for 400
seconds. This scenario can be seen in Figs. 4.1 and 4.2.
Communication Topology
In the experimental model, the communication paths between the market orga-
nizer (NM algorithm) and the individual market players are independent. In prac-
tice [81], however, there will be interdependence between communication failures
across the different market players as many of them will share common links at some
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point in the communication path. For this reason, the 120 market players are dis-
tributed on a tree topology with 4 top tier network links, 12 mid-tier links (3 for each
top tier link), and 120 leaf links to better capture the interdependent networking
impacts on smart grid topologies as shown in Fig. 4.4. Since future communication
topologies have not yet been determined, and because dynamic markets may not op-
erate on the same infrastructure as existing smart metering technologies, the topology
used is purely speculative. As concrete topologies evolve, they can be substituted into
this experimentation framework to identify changes in strategy and crucial network
links.
Fig. 4.4. The simulated network has four top-tier links, twelve mid-
tier links, and one hundred twenty leaf links.
4.5.2 Experiment 1: The Attacker’s Incentive
In this experiment, the strategic adversary attempts to maximize her incentive,
as described in Section 4.3.2. The strategy space I is the selection of links in the
communication topology to disrupt. Each disruption results in a particular IM that
is used to calculate the maximum attacker’s incentive. Fig. 4.5 shows the attacker’s
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incentive as a function of the number of links that she can attack simultaneously.
As the number of simultaneously disrupt-able links increases, the attacker’s incentive
also increases. The attacker’s incentive plateaus, however, when the overall system
performance degradation becomes the dominating factor due to large numbers of link
outages. The AI plateaus because the system as a whole becomes less profitable
whenever most network links are disrupted (e.g. the top-level link attacks).
Fig. 4.5. The strategic adversary attempts to maximize her incentive
by disrupting network links. In the graph on the left, the adversary
is disrupting leaf-links in the communication topology. In the middle
graph, the adversary is disrupting mid-tier links, and in the graph on
the right, the top tier links are disrupted. In each case, the attacker’s
incentive is maximized for the given targets attacked. The strategy
shown is maximized from (4.5) and compared to the mean of a random
target selection.
4.5.3 Experiment 2: Collaborating Defenders
In this experiment, the defense strategy presented in Section 4.4 is evaluated. The
defenders attempt to reduce the attacker’s incentive shown in Fig. 4.5 by securing
particular network links, thus eliminating them from the attacker’s profit pool. The
market players at each mid-tier communication hub are joined together so that there
are 12 owners with 10 assets each. Collaboration is then possible on the mid-tier and
top-tier network links, and they are the focus of this experiment.
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Fig. 4.6 shows the reduction in attacker’s incentive for different target budgets and
a fixed σ = 0.1 for each owner. The defensive budget is progressively reduced relative
to the number of attacked links. The defenders are able to significantly reduce the
attacker’s incentive in most large-attack cases at the leaf links.
Leaf Link Attack Budget
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33%   Def.
25%   Def.
Fig. 4.6. The attacker’s incentive is reduced by defensive investments
in communication links. As the number of links attacked increases,
the number of links defended also increases. The effectiveness of the
defense, however, is reduced by imperfect knowledge levels among
the defenders (σ = 0.1). Each line represents a different amount of
aggregate defense budget, relative to the number of links attacked.
Fig. 4.7 shows the reduction in AI for a range of knowledge levels across the
defenders. In this case, 75 links are attacked and 75 links can be defended. The
AI is maximally reduced when the owners knowledge levels are maximized (σ → 0)
indicating that collaboration can improve overall defense effectiveness.
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Fig. 4.7. This figure shows the cumulative reduction in attacker’s
incentive for different defender knowledge levels when 75 targets are
attacked and defended. Decreased knowledge levels (high σ values)
results in ineffective defense. As defenders are unwilling and unable to
collaborate on defensive investments, the system suffers overall from
poor defensive strategies.
4.6 Related Work
Game theory applications for the smart grid [20] have become an increasingly
important component of power system optimization. The core goals of these games,
along with other approaches such as dynamic market mechanisms [3], are to improve
the social welfare of the smart grid by utilizing market forces to balance demand with
supply. The usefulness of these games, however, has not been well studied in the
context of a strategic adversary that seeks to maliciously profit from the system by
launching attacks.
A separate but related set of game theories optimize the security of information
systems [26, 82] by playing attacker/defender games designed to create a defensive
strategy that is optimal for a given adversarial model. Most of these approaches,
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however, utilize qualitative metrics for target valuation, costs, and attack success
since it is difficult to value computer system breaches. The work presented in this
section applies attacker/defender concepts to a concrete smart grid cyber-physical
system in which the utilities of attack and defense are derived from their actual
operational influences. This also allows information exchanges to have quantitative
impacts on success metrics.
Several attacker/defender games or security games have been constructed around
Stackelberg games [83] for solving defensive investment optimization problems and
scheduling patrols [84]. These games solve an attacker/defender model where the
defender moves first in response to a perceived adversary and have been extended
to support multiple human-modeled adversaries [85] in a computationally efficient
way. These models, however, do not address defenders who exist in a competitive
environment. The work presented in this section analyzes attacker/defender games
in a competitive environment.
The long-term financial impacts of attacks have been studied in [30]. Adver-
saries are modeled in [30] as has having budgets that deteriorate with unsuccessful
attacks, resulting in reduced attack viability. The model captures some of the eco-
nomic factors in this section, but it does not make a connection between the physical
system’s behavior and the resulting financial outcome of attacks. Similarly, game
theoretic techniques in [20–24] have proposed methods for determine how adversaries
might manipulate the physical control systems via attacks, but they do not draw
the financial connection between physical perturbations and adversarial profits. The
work presented in this section focuses on the financial motivations of attackers and




Prior work in [78] has focused on data integrity attacks in real-time pricing in
smart grids. This work provides a model for a strategic adversary manipulating
pricing information in a real-time market similar to DMM. However, their work does
not involve large-scale systems or ones in which loads are time-varying, utilities are
non-linear, and does not focus on economic dispatch. This work improves on this
state of the art by evaluating large scale systems with real-time operating constraints
(as emulated in DETER), specifically focusing on the delay-type attacks.
Work in [79] has analyzed market responses to integrity attacks in smart grids.
The work provides an adversary model and analysis for a game-theoretic model of
dynamic pricing systems in smart grids. This work focuses on the real-time implica-
tions of information-flow failures rather than continuously manipulated price signals
which is more consistent with resilience and broadly available attack vectors (DoS)
as opposed to manipulation attacks which are harder to implement in practice. This
work is improved by executing the demand-response market algorithms in real-time
and establishing interrupt-able communication between the market players.
Resilience improvements to control algorithms have been considered in [86], how-
ever this work focuses on grid stability and automatic generation control rather than
market stability or cases where communication occurs over wide areas.
4.7 Conclusion
In this section, a modeling technique was presented to connect the networking
components of a dynamic pricing market with a security strategy to defend against a
profit-motivated adversary. This model allows the economics of cyberattacks on power
markets to be captured and used to assess the risk to assets in the system. The amount
of information that competing market players share about assets in the system is also
modeled and used to analyze the benefits of collaboration in a defensive context.
Techniques were then applied to mitigate the attacker’s incentive thus improving
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system resilience. It was shown that the baseline attacker incentives can be as high
as 51% of baseline operating profits. When the defender and adversary’s budget are
equal, the attacker’s incentive is reduced by up to 70%. These results validate the
utility of this section’s technique in optimizing defensive investments. The model
presented in the section and the simulation results show promising approaches to
countering the growing threat of cyberattacks in smart grids.
In future work, models of online learning aspects of dynamic pricing markets could
improve attack strategies. In such a model, the attacker seeks to learn through itera-
tive attacks, which also reveal more information about the system and the defensive
strategies. Conversely, the defender also seeks to learn of the attack strategy through
a multi-round strategy. The next chapter covers one angle of this approach.
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5. NETWORK ATTACKS IN MARKETS
This chapter introduces a real-time heuristic to attacking real-time pricing systems.
The previous chapter covered a strategy that is solved via mixed integer linear pro-
gramming (MILP), but the problem size becomes intractable as the number of ele-
ments in play increases. It also does not consider multiple time-instants. To overcome
this limitation, this chapter introduces a real-time heuristic to attack (and defend)
real-time pricing systems.
5.1 Introduction
In the emerging smart power grid, new control methods such as demand response
(DR) and real time pricing (RTP) are under development to improve the efficiency
and reliability of the power grid [65]. RTP methods utilize economic incentives across
networked control systems to stabilize imbalances of power in grid supplies and loads,
minimizing waste and maximizing renewable power integration. The growth of these
systems counters the uncertainty of renewable energy resource outputs and allows
power fluctuations to be absorbed by flexible loads. Much like networked control
systems (NCS), RTP methods rely on wide area communication networks to send
economic incentive signals to the flexible end load points. Since the time period of
the power fluctuations can be small, of the order of minutes, it is important to provide
such signals in a timely manner to the end points. However, strategic adversaries can
disrupt these signals, changing them, delaying them, or dropping them altogether. A
recent NESCOR report [87] cites blocked DR messages as highly ranked failure sce-
nario (”DR.1”), and it has been shown by prior work [88,89] that disruptions of price
signals can cause disruption to power consumers. This section further demonstrates
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how a strategic adversary can orchestrate and profit from such disruptions in these
real time pricing systems, along with a mitigation technique.
RTP systems are particularly susceptible to network attacks because of the tightly
coupled price–power feedback within such systems. Much like in other NCS’s, an
RTP controller samples a process variable, in this case the flows of electric power,
and modulates a control variable to minimize power imbalance over a communication
network. Unlike networked control systems, however, RTP systems must coordinate
among devices that are owned by different economic entities, requiring pricing or
incentive based control instead of direct modulation of loads and supplies. In price
based systems, the amount of energy input and output at each end point is a function
of market price, and the system modulates the price to establish an efficient market
clearing such that the sum of power inputs and outputs in the grid is zero. Since the
price and power signals traverse geographically diverse end points, it becomes feasible
for a strategic adversary to disrupt the power grid by disrupting the communication
channels on which the smart grid relies.
This section develops a strategic adversary who capitalizes on the arbitrage of
prices caused by disruptions in the RTP communication network. Each disruption
removes controllable loads and supplies from the RTP system such that the market
price trends higher or lower than in the attack-free case. The attacker then picks
a set of network targets and disruption times with a goal of maximizing arbitrage
opportunity. For example, if an attack is predicted to raise the market price by an
additional $20, an adversary with a large-sized battery can buy power to charge the
battery, launch the attack, and then sell it back for an additional profit.
First an adversary with only the ability to delay RTP communications is explored.
The market price changes due to both traditional load swings and network attacks in
real time, and the adversary makes market observations from an end user perspective
in order to plan attacks. She then launches denial of service (DoS) attacks against
other end users by using a parametric algorithm triggered on the real-time price signal.
Then allow more complex, RTP price signal manipulation (e.g. man-in-the-middle
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attacks) is allowed for comparison with the simpler DoS attack strategies. Using these
strategies, it is demonstrated how an adversary can increase arbitrage profitability by
69% using delay attacks and 98% using signal manipulation.
A novel defense mechanism is then put forward that randomizes the adversary’s
view of the network targets for the load end points. Consequently, the adversary’s
plan of targeting certain end points calculated through its algorithm can no longer be
faithfully executed. The difference between the adversary’s view and the actual sys-
tem can be controlled by a defense parameter, namely, how many end point network
addresses to randomize. This defense mechanism can be deployed through moving
target defense mechanisms implemented by the RTP system operator. The network
address assigned to the end load points is permuted either periodically, based on mar-
ket fluctuations, or based on indications of attacks to minimize the impact of network
disruptions on the RTP signal.
This work builds on two closely related prior approaches in [78] and [88]. Prior
work in [78] measured the impact of delay and integrity attacks on RTP feedback sig-
nals. The authors showed that carefully planned attacks can create large oscillations
and instability in market price, potentially crashing the market. In this chapter, it
is shown that profit-driven attacks can be successful without destabilizing the grid
control loops or damaging grid equipment. The attacks that are studied here are
more feasible to be launched and are more likely to stay under the radar, thus hav-
ing the potential for greater impact. Further work in [88] analyzed the impact of
arbitrary delay and modification attacks on the incentive signals in the RTP sys-
tem. They modeled a strategic adversary that could manipulate an RTP system if
both the incentive and load signals are known for each consumer in a game theory
structure. They did not, however, consider attacks that evolve in real time–instead
they focused on day-ahead market planning techniques. In this chapter, there is a
focus on real-time attacks where the adversary is aware only of local market price.
This defense mechanism also distinguishes us from the two previous closely related
approaches which focus on the attack modeling.
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In the experiments, it is shown that an adversary could potentially profit from an
RTP system with a simple rechargeable battery and access to a denial of service as a
service provider. The adversary is able to extract up to $119 per day from the RTP
market using DoS methods, 69% higher than without attacks. If the adversary is
able to compromise 20% of the devices, revenue could be increased by 98% or more.
In the future, if fluctuations increase and battery prices decline, the profit amount is
expected to increase further. Then it is shown that a defender, utilizing the shuffling
and deception strategies, can reduce the adversary’s profitability by 30%.
In this chapter, the following novel contributions are made:
• A strategy for a strategic adversary to illicitly profit from a real-time pricing
mechanism in the smart grid is presented. The attack relies on delaying com-
munication on a subset of the network links and for a subset of time, given by
the adversary’s algorithm.
• A defense strategy customized for protecting against such market manipulation
attacks is presented. The defense strategy can be customized to fit within a
certain defense budget and the benefits scale proportionally to the defense cost
incurred.
• The cost to launch an attack of the type presented here, the economic advantage
that can accrue to the attacker, and the cost of defense, all based on real-world
scenarios and data is quantified.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 covers the market
mechanism background for real-time pricing. Section 5.3 details the attacker’s strat-
egy in the RTP system. Section 5.4 details some defensive techniques to stop attacks
presented in this chapter. Section 5.5 details the experimental setup, including the
particular RTP system in use. Section 5.6 has the experimental results. Section 5.7
provides some topic discussion, and Section 5.8 concludes the chapter.
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5.2 Background and Market Operations
The goal of RTP systems is to constantly match supply with demand. The mis-
match is known as residual power (RP). Without widespread energy storage devices,
it must be immediately corrected since positive RP (power surplus) is shunted and
wasted while negative RP (power shortage) causes frequency droop, brownouts, and
possible equipment damage.
5.2.1 Real-time Markets
To minimize RP today, power utilities implement day-ahead scheduling based on
energy usage forecasts. The vast majority of energy is scheduled a day in advance
(e.g. by time of use (ToU) contract), but a small amount of generation participates
in a ”real-time” market (RTM) that attempts to rectify the residual power resultant
from forecasting errors and unexpected transients such as generator outages. The
prices in the RTM can range from $30 in one 5-minute window to $300+ in the
next [90], creating significant arbitrage opportunity and fueling energy storage device
growth [91]. RTP systems stabilize these fluctuations by bringing more generators
and consumers into the real-time market, and these needs will grow with increased
renewable integration.
5.2.2 Demand-Side Management
Demand side management (DSM) [43, 65] entails a large suite of technologies,
including RTP and communication protocols, that bring real-time flexibility to loads
in the smart grid. The components in DSMs include digitally controllable loads,
network protocols, metering devices, and other pieces required to adapt power supply
and demand to a control signal. A general dynamic pricing objective function [73],
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used by RTP, is shown in Equation 5.1. The objective is to minimize RP by controlling









where N covers all the consumers/generators in the power grid, and Pi(λ, t) is the
power used or produced (negative) by each client at price λ for time t. Large systems
may have multiple λ’s for different locations in the power grid, but this chapter is
focused on a smaller market region with a single price signal.
5.2.3 Real-Time Communication
Real time communication provides the ability to incorporate dynamic pricing in-
formation at the consumer. Distributed consumers have access to changing informa-
tion that is beneficially incorporated into the pricing optimization problem, i.e.
P (λ, t) = Pforecasted(t) + Pflex(λ, t) + Punpredictable(t) (5.2)
This inherently requires constant communication between the RTP market players to
adapt to changes as the system evolves in time. As RTP methods solve for new prices,
those prices are broadcast system-wide to the market players. The market players
respond by adjusting consumption and production values (i.e. Equation (5.2)) that
the RTP algorithm samples, in the physical domain, for its next price calculation.
RTP Controllers
The core control function samples Equation (5.2) and then solves Equation (5.1).
Any number of solutions, from feedback controllers to gradient descent methods, can
be used to solve for λ. The information flow in such algorithms may become irregular
with imperfect networks, however. In such cases, the market may not perform as
expected.
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Research in [57] showed that with gradient descent based RTP systems, lost com-
munication messages (e.g. via DoS) would not cause system instability. They assumed
that the functions Pi(λ) are stationary and convex—neither of which can be assumed
for a distributed system in which the clients can control their own Pi function. In
contrast, work in [78] showed instability for a feedback-based RTP calculations with
delays. RTP systems in [3,41,53] rely on (mixed integer) linear programming, gradient
descent, interior point, or other optimization techniques to solve for λ. Since these
techniques do not account for real-time communication during negotiation phases,
technique is utilized and described in Section 5.5.1 to facilitate delay-tolerant solu-
tions to Equation (5.1).
Impact of Network Outages
Network outages disrupt the communication of λ from the RTP controller to the
end users. The Pi(λ, t) for each disrupted i becomes fixed with λ = constant, frozen
in a zero-order hold. This causes the gain of future λ’s, i.e. δP
δλ
, to decrease since less
devices can respond to the change in market price. As a result, λ must go higher
or lower to correct for the same amount of RP than in the perfect communication
case. To maintain connection incentives, market players are charged retroactively
for their power consumption based on the actual market price. This ensures that
consumers do not self-disconnect when market conditions appear poor. The residual
power measurement is assumed reliable and sampled out of band, e.g. via a dedicated
state estimation system.




J Set of targets
λ Market clearing price ($)
Tw Attack decision window (s)
S(t) Energy strategy ∈ [Pmin, Pmax]
Pi(λ) Power removed from grid (kW)
Aj(t) Attack target j at time t, ∈ 0, 1
Patk Estimated price impact of attack ($)
Dj Flexible load coefficient or gain for target j (kW/$)
Cj(t) Cost to attack target j at time t ($)
5.3 Strategic Adversary
5.3.1 Strategy Summary
The adversary owns a energy storage device (e.g. a rechargeable battery) and
profits by purchasing power at a low price and selling it back into the market at a
higher price. To maximize profit, first the adversary monitors the real-time pricing
signal and establishes charge and discharge price thresholds. Then she attempts to
increase profit by estimating the price impact of a DoS attack by monitoring the
gradient of the market price history. Peaks in attack impact are identified as they
evolve in real-time, and attacks are launched whenever the peak estimated market
price exceeds the charge or discharge thresholds. In this way, the opportunity for
arbitrage is maximized, and the adversary increases profitability.
5.3.2 Capabilities and Resources
In this chapter, a model is used where the strategic adversary as a single end
user in an RTP system. The adversary can view the price signal and launch attacks
against other users in the system.
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User Discovery
Since practical RTP systems are still under development, the attacker is assumed
to know the IP addresses of clients participating in RTP market. It is hypothesized,
however, that the adversary could discover these addresses in three ways. First, since
the market operates on a local level and the potential addresses of Internet-facing
devices are geographically correlated for ease of routing, reviewing public IP address
registries could reveal targets, especially if RTP participation is widespread. Second,
many microgrid applications could utilize peer-to-peer services, especially for islanded
operation. These applications could require peer advertisements or open ports that
would reveal addresses and service locations. Third, many last-mile network connec-
tions utilize shared infrastructure such as cable modem services or passive optical
networks. Promiscuous modems could reveal periodic access patterns that are unique
to RTP devices, for example. Other alternatives include hacking the RTP controller
or other man-in-the-middle security breaches.
DDoS Attack Capability
The adversary has access to a DDoS-as-a-Service providers or ”booter/stressers”.
Such services offer chunks of attack time for a nominal monthly fee. Armed with
a target IP address, the adversary can simply pass it via a web interface and start
an attack. It is assumed that consumer grade connections are of sufficiently low
capacity such that multiple users can easily be taken offline simultaneously. Addi-
tionally, since the attacks are deep in distributed last-mile networks, filtering costs
may be prohibitively high. Other smart grid vulnerabilities listed by NESCOR [87]
include easy to jam wireless communication channels and physical or logical access
to communication channels for entities that do not require it.
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Energy Storage
The adversary is armed with a rechargeable battery that can charge and discharge
at a particular rate, has a limited useful lifetime, and a maximum capacity. The
battery is assumed to be 100% efficient such that no energy is lost in the charge and
discharge process.
5.3.3 Strategy Definition
The adversary’s arbitrage strategy is to charge the battery when energy is inex-
pensive and discharge when the price becomes higher:





where T is the set of market clearing windows of negotiation, λ(t) is the market
price at time t, and Tw is the market clearing or attack strategy window width chosen
to discretize the strategy space. S(t) is the adversary’s energy strategy–charge or
discharge at time t. The adversary’s goal is to maximize profit by manipulating λ(t)
via DoS attacks.
5.3.4 Price Manipulation
The adversary can strategically manipulate the market price by launching denial
of service (DoS) attacks in the following way. Section 5.2.3 described that whenever
clients are disconnected from the marketplace, e.g. via DoS, the effective gain of the
price signal decreases. For example, if Pi(λ) = Cλ for some constant C, and 10 clients
are connected, P (λ) = 10Cλ. If a DoS attack removes 5 clients, then P (λ) = 5Cλ, for
an attack impact gain of 5C. To achieve the same ∆P , λ would need to change twice
as much during the attack. This means that a high RP coupled with client outages
leads to more dramatic price swings, and the adversary can leverage these swings to
increase revenue. The price manipulation strategy can be broken into estimating RP
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and the change in the gain due to a DoS attack to calculate the manipulative power
of an attack.
Target Gain Estimation
In order to influence λ, the adversary needs to know the price gradients of each
target’s Pi(λ) function. This function is private for each user and unknown even by the
RTP service, so the adversary must estimate the gain δPi
δλ
for each user. One method
is to compromise the Internet-connected devices in users home, such as by default
passwords or weak encryption, and directly reveal the functions to the adversary.
Alternatively the adversary can estimate the gain as Dj for target j in the following
way. First the adversary measures the gradient of price as a moving average over k
timesteps, e.g. as 1
10C
. Then the adversary attacks target j and measures the new
gradient over an additional k timesteps, e.g. as 1
9C
. The gain is then calculated as
Dj = 10C − 9C = 1C. The goal is to observe increases in market prices (or similarly,
decreases) and if the attack causes a market participant to go offline, then the rate that
the price changes will increase i.e. become convex temporarily (|λ′pre-atk| < |λ′post-atk|).
This type of approach is not perfect–it is quite possible that targets will be miss-
classified due to external market conditions such that the price may be concave even
without an attack. This classification error simply erodes the adversary’s ability to
efficiently utilize attack resources (a parameter in experimentation).
Residual Power Estimation
In the RTP system, the residual power is only known by the RTP controller, as
the output of Equation (5.2) and the input of Equation (5.1). The RTP controller
decreases and increases λ as a function of RP. Therefore the gradient of λ is loosely
proportional to the amount of RP in the system. If RP is negative (shortage), then
λ′ will be positive, and vice versa for a positive RP. If the gains for every client are
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known, then the system gain D =
∑
Dj can be used to estimate RP as Dλ
′. The






where J is the set of valid targets, λ′ is the current gradient smoothed over k timesteps,
and Dj is the estimate for P
′
j(λ). It is assumed Patk(t) = 0 ∀ S(t) 6= 0 since the attack
is already ongoing. If a net imbalance of power exists, and the RTP signal is actively
correcting this by increasing prices, for example, then the attack will cause the price
to overshoot by approximately Patk.
5.3.5 Attack Strategy
Once a set of viable targets and their gains are known, then the adversary may use
them to influence λ(t) in an attempt to improve Equation (5.3). First, the baseline
strategy is developed with λ¯buy as the target price for charging periods and λ¯sell as
the target price for discharge. This price is established by a-priori observations of
RTP price trends.
Algorithm 2 contains the strategy for attacking targets. Lines 1-3 represent the
buying strategy and lines 5-8 the selling one. Line 1 states that whenever the current
market price plus the power of attack (which can be negative) is less than the buying
price threshold, then the attack should be launched and the battery should charge.
Similarly, line 5 sells when the estimated price after attack is higher than the selling
threshold. Lines 9-12 stop the attack if the price is not within the buy or sell thresh-
olds. Additional constraints (not shown) keep the battery’s energy within capacity.
The net benefit from the attack is measured by comparing (5.3) with and without
attack for the same scenario.
Algorithm 2 can be further enhanced by peak detection on Lines 1 and 5 rather
than operating on the first point that meets the attack standards. The authors of [92]
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Algorithm 2: Basic DoS Strategy












map real-time peak detection to best choice and optimal stopping problem, and the
algorithm is further enhanced by selecting λ¯ based upon outlier detection on the
λ(t) + Patk signal, as described in [92] Section 3.3.
5.3.6 Integrity Attacks
While the focus of this chapter is on network-based attacks, it is also possible to
launch integrity attacks on the market. If λ values sent to some subset of clients can










where Pj(λ),Pj(λ) represent the maximum and minimum power output for each target
j. Algorithm 2 is supplemented by these strategies where Line 1 gets Patk-(t) and
Line 5 gets Patk+(t).
Using this strategy, whenever the market price is decreasing due to positive resid-
ual power, even more positive residual power is added by further reducing the load
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(atk-), causing the market price to plummet further. Similarly, whenever the market
price is increasing due to negative residual power, even more load is placed on the
system thus increasing price. The net effect is that compromised devices make poor
market decisions that benefit the adversary.
Cost of Attack












where Aj(t) is the binary attack indicator and Cj(t) is the cost per second of attacking
target j. The adversary is still attempting to maximize profits in the left term, but
each attack that influences λ(t) also has a cost = Aj(t)Cj(t) in the right term, which
can be constrained by a budget (cost ≤ budget).
The costs can be optimized by sorting targets by their cost-impact factors CjDj
and prioritizing target above a threshold Dthresh:
Aj = 0 ∀ CjDj < Dthresh, j ∈ J (5.8)
where Dthresh eliminates cost-ineffective targets. This restricts the attack strategy by
reducing Patk to constrain costs.
5.4 Defender Strategies
This section covers defensive strategies that can minimize the attacker’s profit.
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5.4.1 Moving Target Defense
The adversary can be countered in two ways. First, the ability to manipulate
RP directly can be removed through device security. This is not the focus of this
chapter, and is left to other research. Second, the RTP service could remove the
ability to disrupt communication links, however the RTP operator would need to
harden hundreds or thousands of links to distributed end homes instead of just the
network’s edges.
Other defensive maneuvers can still be made, however. Intuitively, some targets
are ”safe” from attack because (5.8) marks them inefficient. The targets Aj represent
IP addresses that will be DDoS’d by the adversary. The defender can mitigate attacks
by shuffling the targets (Ax → Ay) so that the attacker’s efforts to attack the IP
of target x actually disable target y. High value targets can then be swapped for
low value targets so that the attacker’s profits are minimized. This can be done
by synchronizing dynamic IP assignment operations with regional Internet service
providers (ISPs)–the RTP operator requests the ISP swap the addresses of x and y.
The impact is not negligible, however. A forced IP reassignment will cause temporary
client interruption, and the creation and support of infrastructure to perform such
reassignments would require at least some engineering support. The attacked client
would also effectively pay penalty rates for power, so the RTP operator would need
to properly incentivize participation.
The defender can strategize about which targets’ IP’s to swap. Optimally, the
highest-value targets would be swapped for the lowest-value targets, and this is what
Algorithm 3 performs. The list of targets is sorted by their estimated impact Dj and
the lowest value k targets are swapped with the highest value targets. This minimizes
the change in λ due to Aj
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Algorithm 3: Defender Moving Target Strategy
1 Sort J by Dj descending
2 k ← 0
3 while k < |J |/2 AND DJ(k) > Threshold do
4 Swap IP of J(k) with J(|J | − k)
5 end
5.4.2 Detection via Deception
The strategies in Section 5.3.3 are all driven from the end-user’s observable incen-
tive signal. A false incentive signal could be sent to suspects in the system in order
to trigger false attacks on the system. Correlation can be drawn between false signals
and corresponding DoS attacks to identify the adversary. For example, a deceptive,
high λx value could trigger Line 5 in Algorithm 2, and the RTP operator could send
this false signal to a potential adversary and observe Aj via heartbeat signals. This
strategy has a cost in that if the signal is sent to a non-adversary, the market effi-
ciency decreases because load will be added or removed contradictory to the current
market price λ:
Cost of Deception = |Twλ(Pi(λ, t)− Pi(λx, t))| (5.9)
where λx is the false price and Tw is the duration of the false price signal. If deception
occurs for one Tw then the cost is effectively the change in revenue that the client i
was providing to the market. For example, a client uses 1 kWh of energy during Tw.
When the adversary check is run, λx is set to 2λ and the client consumes 1/4 kWh.
The cost is then 3/4 · λ.
5.5 Experimental Setup
This section covers the real time pricing mechanism used for experimentation and
the load/supply models for evaluation. The full details are covered in Section 3.2
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5.5.1 Overview of RTP Controller
The price setting algorithm inside the RTP controller minimizes an implicitly non-
stationary objective function, the residual power (from Equation (5.1)). Traditional
market solutions in [3, 53] utilize gradient descent and interior point methods to
solve Equation (5.1), but these techniques require convex objective functions and
gradients. Each iteration of an optimization algorithm takes non-zero time, and this
has an influence on the behavior of the objective function that may violate necessary
assumptions. A stationary λ with a varying t will change with the supply and demand
of electric power, and during transient events such as faults or surge in demand, the
change between P (λ, t− ) and P (λ, t+ ) can be very large. These existing solutions
are not equipped to operate in this environment and instead rely on freezing t for
some negotiation period and independently solve for λ. To overcome this limitation, a
modified Nelder-Mead (NM) [71] algorithm is utilized that does not make assumptions
about the of the objective function and can adapt to large ∆P ().
Three modifications of NM are completed to enable the algorithm to perform
online optimizations on non-stationary functions. First, the search space used by NM
is modified to prevent simplex collapse so that transients can be detected. This is
done by adding noise to the points of the simplex so that it maintains a minimum
size. Second, the cached function values P (λ) are updated periodically to reflect the
current value, and this is used for relative point ranking. This enables the algorithm
to adapt to large ∆P (). Finally, the algorithm is modified to perform re-evaluation
of the simplex space during its shrink operation. Source code for this algorithm is
available publicly1, including all code used to generate data for this chapter.
5.5.2 Load and Generation Model
In this chapter, supply and demand are modeled as scaled sigmoid functions, as




Parameter distributions used in Experiments, respectively for the
Consumer (C) and the Generator (G)
Pmin (kW) Pmax (kW) λmin ($) λmax ($)
C |N (0, 0.52)| |N (3, 12)| 0 |N (250, 752)|
G -|N (150, 502)| 0 |N (30, 52)| |N (80, 52)|
λ. Fig. 5.1 shows two example curves with the corresponding residual power at each
pricing point, based on the parameters in Table 5.2, where the generator power level
is negative. The sigmoid function was chosen to allow responsiveness to price while
also ensuring feasible behavior at the extremes, i.e., a consumer cannot have a load
greater than Pmax or lower than Pmin and similar constraints for a supplier.
λs = 6 ∗ λ− λmin
























Fig. 5.1. The supply (generator) and demand (consumer) are shown
for varying market prices. The residual power shown is the imbal-
ance between the generator’s output and the consumer’s input. Since
residual power can disrupt the grid and lead to inefficiencies in the
energy use, the goal is to optimize the market price such that the
residual power is minimized.
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For the experiments conducted in this chapter, unless specified otherwise, the
parameters used are listed in Table 5.2. There are 2 generators G, NG = 2, and 100
consumers C, NC = 100. The adversary’s battery has a capacity of 1200 kWh and
a charge/discharge rate of 600 kW/h, and Tw is 5 minutes. The capacity is selected
to supplement one generator in the system for 8 hours (e.g. a solar farm during the
night).
5.5.3 Real-World Dataset
To analyze the effectiveness of the attack strategy at handling unexpected fluc-
tuations in power, the forecasting error from several days of New York Independent
System Operator (NYISO) data is used to generate an error function. The difference
in the day-ahead forecast and actual load model for June 19-26, 2015 are used to
create this signal [90]. The uncontrollable load signal is scaled so that the highest
and lowest values are no more than 50% of the maximum and minimum amount that
can be absorbed by the generators and consumers in the system. In training, where
necessary, the first 7 days are used while the last day is used as the test in all of the
experimental results.
5.6 Experimental Results
This section covers the results of the evaluation. First the baseline arbitrage
opportunities in the market are identified. Then the economic advantage that an
adversary can achieve by blocking the communication to a subset of the consumers,
first with a na¨ıve attack and then with an attack that tracks the real time price
fluctuations, are considered. Then it is evaluated to what degree the attack can be
reduced through the defense mechanism. The experiment is concluded by considering
the financial gains or investments in dollar terms for the attack.
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5.6.1 Experiment I: Baseline Profits
In this experiment, the baseline profits are established for any consumer in the
attack-free case. As the experiment day progresses, unpredictable changes in con-
sumption cause the price of power to increase and decrease, as shown by the price in
Fig. 5.2. The adversary’s rechargeable device participates in this market, attempting
to minimize the average buy-price and maximize the sell-price to turn a profit.
The charge and discharge duration is limited to two hours by the capacity and
charge rate of the battery described in Section 5.5.2, and in this scenario, the ad-
versary is able to profit $116.48 for the 24 hour period from buying low and selling
high. For this strategy, λ¯buy = $64.48, λ¯sell = $146.62 were chosen via repeated search
optimization on the test day. This level of precision is not attainable in practice
because the market is assumed unpredictable, so the revenue here is a maximum
value using the attack-free strategy in Algorithm 2. This value is not the true max-
imum possible, since additional arbitrage opportunity exists between hours 20 and
24, but it shows the maximum effectiveness of the heuristc. A more realistic value
of λ¯buy = $65.18, λ¯sell = $111.20, selected by the top 15% and bottom 15% quantile
of prices over the training period, yields a reduced profit of $70.88. Note that the
attack-free strategy is not a harmful event for the power grid–this stabilizes market
price and grid loading which is beneficial to consumers and grid operators.
5.6.2 Experiment II: Impact of DoS Attacks
In this experiment, the adversary is given the ability to disrupt communication
with |J | = 20 users connected to the market. These disruptions increase market
volatility by forcing the attacked users to enter a holding pattern in energy con-
sumption. To maximize profits, the adversary implements Algorithm 2. First the
adversary selects the parameters λ¯buy, λ¯sell, and she does this by observing λ(t) +Patk
during the training phase. It is assumed that Dj is known by the adversary, and
λ¯buy = $65.00, λ¯sell = $111.35 are selected by quantiles of 15% and 85% respectively.
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Fig. 5.2. The market price during optimal baseline operation is shown.
The charge and discharge markers indicate the adversary’s optimal
charging strategy.
The values for Dj, Patk during the test phase are shown in Fig. 5.3. The value of
Dj, shown as the sum over all J targets, peaks when the market price is relatively low
and is suppressed during peak prices. This is because the two largest market players,
the generators, are producing maximal output after about $80. Fig. 3.9 shows that
after the $100 price range, there is only a gradual change in consumption with price
increases, mainly by small consumers. In this experiment, the cost of each target is
assumed equal, and therefore the power of attack is dominated by the generators.
The adversary implements Algorithm 2 and launches attacks during market op-
erations. Fig. 5.4 shows how the market responds during the attacks. At around 5
hours in, the adversary begins to launch her attacks, and the market price begins
dropping in response to these attacks. Once the battery has charged, the attacks end
and the market begins to behave normally. After the price rises, the adversary again
attacks to increase the market price further. The increase at this price level is smaller
due to the low Dj values in this price range. The attack yields $119.77 of profit for
the day, an increase of 69% over the baseline charging profile.
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Fig. 5.3. The power of attack and the gain for 20 targets is shown for
the day. The Dj term becomes saturated at high market prices due
to output saturation at the largest market players.
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Fig. 5.4. The market price is shown when the attacker implements a
DoS attack strategy on 20 targets.
5.6.3 Experiment III: Impact of Integrity Attacks
In this experiment, the adversary is given the capability to manipulate individual
price signals. The underlying methodology behind the attack is identical to the denial
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of service case, but the loads are provided a manipulated price signal instead of a stale
one, and the Patk is calculated appropriately.
Fig. 5.5 shows impact of compromising devices in the RTP system. The adversary
is able to impact price and extract additional profits totalling $140.36, 98% higher
than the baseline. For this attack, the adversary compromises the λ signal as it is
sent to the consumer device. The Patk, Pj is achieved by sending λ = 1000, when
the adversary wants to buy, and Pj with λ = −1000, when the adversary wants to
sell to the grid. This causes the loads imbalance power directly, greatly increasing
the effectiveness of the adversary. A cost comparison with DoS attacks is difficult to
achieve, however, since the cost of compromising encryption or passwords on consumer
devices is not easily quantified.
The effectiveness of these attacks suggests that compromised devices could signif-
icantly impede RTP system deployment. Effective defenses, however, are known and
need to be deployed more widely, such as, the use of strong authentication scheme
and enforcing non-default, and strong passwords. This type of attack can also be
very damaging to grid equipment since coordinated loads can cause large transients
in voltage and current to occur in the grid, along with instability of RTP systems
as has been shown convincingly in [78]. However, that goal is not the focus of this
chapter.
5.6.4 Experiment IV: Defensive Strategies
Experiment IV analyzes the defensive strategies presented in Section 5.4. The
defender’s goal is to reduce or eliminate the adversary’s profits. The first defense that
the defender implements is protecting the information about the individual consumer
loads, Dj. Investing in stronger end-device encryption and protections, for example,
can protect this information. Fig. 5.6 shows how the effectiveness of the attack in
Experiment II decreases as the accuracy of the adversary’s Dj terms also decreases.
Random noise is added to the Dj values used in the attacker’s strategy to reflect
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Fig. 5.5. The market price is shown when the attacker implements a
integrity attack strategy on 20 targets. During the charging phase,
consumers are mislead into conserving power, and during discharge,
consumers are misled into over-purchasing power, and this results in
price increases and decreases for the adversary to leverage.
inaccurate collection techniques (Section 5.3.4): D∗j = N (Dj, σ2). The lack of good
target information significantly reduces the effectiveness of the adversary, making
attacks less profitable. Initially, the adversary’s profit drops sharply and then the law
of diminishing returns kicks in and the curve flattens out. In this part of the curve,
the adversary’s estimates are already quite inaccurate and additional noise does not
make a significant difference.
Another defensive technique is to swap targets Dx with Dy, as described in Sec-
tion 5.4.1 where the targets are rearranged using Algorithm 3. Fig. 5.7 shows the
profit of the adversary versus the number of swaps that the defender is allowed. As
the number of swaps increases, the profit decreases but at a lesser rate–the adversary
routinely targets the most valuable assets, and since these are first swapped with the
least valuable, the impact of the swaps drops off rapidly. When 8 targets are swapped,























Fig. 5.6. The reduction of the adversary’s attack-induced profit is
shown as her information about the targets decreases. Errors in target
value effectively reduce the profit of the adversary.
5.6.5 Return on Investment
The energy storage device used by the adversary, as described in Section 5.3.2
has a particular cost to install and maintain, and the attacks have a particular cost,
based on ”DDoS/Booter” service pricing [93]. These absolute values can factor in
to Equation 5.7 to determine the economic viability of the attack strategies. For
revenue, if the adversary repeatedly executes the strategy in Experiment II, amounts
could be as much as $43,000 per year. For cost, storage device prices are expected to
fall to $200 per kWh by 2020 [91] and continue to fall with increases in production,
so a yearly battery cost of $24,000 is estimated and amortized over a 10 year lifetime.
The net profit is then $43, 000− $24, 000 = $19, 000 per year. This cost analysis does
not include residual value or added benefits of a distributed battery system such as
improved reliability during grid failures. An important note is that if the strategy
is profitable, then more devices can yield more profit, or groups of attackers could
form battery-consortiums for example. Booter service costs can vary, but average
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Fig. 5.7. The reduction of the adversary’s attack-induced profit is
shown as targets are swapped by the defender. Since the swaps are
optimized on target impact, there is a diminishing return on invest-
ment for swapping all of the assets. The first swap protects a large
generator with the most impact.
residential Internet connections are low-bandwidth and easily disabled with attacks
relative to high-visibility targets like news websites, which keeps these costs low.
Based upon the results in [93], a few hundred dollars can maintain a botnet for
launching these attacks. For example, 212-booter launched 1993 attacks over 57 days
with profits of $509, suggesting 1,000 attacks could be purchased for about $250
per month. The end result is that the adversary in this experiment could come out
$15,000 ahead each year with a 1.2 MWh battery.
5.7 Discussion
5.7.1 Grid Dynamics in Real-Time
Traditional power markets have mostly operated well in advance of actual oper-
ation via contracts and optimal schedules. For example, security-constrained unit
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commitments (SCUC) [94] have been designed to plan resources with constraints on
grid operation contingencies (e.g., to provide stability during generator faults). These
systems are still reliant on forecast models, and energy sources that rely on solar and
wind will always be subject to some level of uncertainty due to weather patterns. For
example, partly cloudy skies can create uncertain solar outputs. This necessitates
RTP systems because highly accurate prediction may be implausible. Existing RTP
work in [41,65,95] has shown the viability of RTP systems to improve efficiency, and
a recent study also claimed that dynamic pricing could yield as much as $400 million
per year in savings for the NYISO [64]. These works suggest that the benefits of
RTP systems are real, as long as they are properly and securely implemented. This
chapter serves to show one way to achieve such secure deployment.
5.7.2 Attribution for Attacks
There is some risk that the adversary reveals herself by a posteriori profit calcu-
lations, i.e., suspicion grows of some market participants that are routinely making
gains through price arbitrage or the defender can try to identify the adversary via the
technique of injecting false price signals described in Section 5.4.2. Both legitimate
consumers and the adversary could respond in similar ways to the market price shifts,
however, so plausible deniability may exist from a legal standpoint.
5.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, it was presented how a strategic adversary could profit from a
real-time pricing system in the smart grid by launching denial of service attacks on
consumers connected to the pricing system, i.e., delaying the price signal being sent
by the system operator to the consumers. It was shown that an adversary could
increase arbitrage revenues by 69% by disrupting up to 20 clients or by as much as
98% if the integrity of the pricing signal is compromised. Then it was shown how a
RTP system operator could mitigate network attacks by strategically reconfiguring
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the device network. In this way, a defender is able to reduce the adversary’s profits
from DoS attacks by 30% with 8 IP address swaps. This work exposes some risks to
real-time pricing systems in smart grids and provides a novel technique for defending
against these attacks.
The next chapter introduces a denial-of-service defense technique that can be used
to further reduce the costs of defense for RTP systems.
156
6. DEFENSES
This chapter introduces a denial of service elusion (DoSE) technique for low-cost
defense of Internet-facing services. The goal of this chapter is to provide a low-cost
framework for protecting RTP operators from attack, especially if the services are
regionally operated with a small number of clients. The work presented here also
appeared in [96].
6.1 Introduction
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are a continually evolving class of attacks that
seek to degrade the ability of legitimate clients to utilize computer resources. De-
fending against this kind of attack has traditionally been the responsibility of large
network operators and internet service providers; however these attacks are increas-
ingly impacting smaller networks or even individual users [97]. The observed trend
of increasing attack size, duration, and frequency [98] points to failures in the state-
of-practice to mitigate such attacks, especially on an infrastructure level. This is
exacerbated by the decreased cost of launching DoS attacks combined with the high
relative cost of defending against them with commercial solutions. Time-shared DDoS
attacks can be purchased for as little as $12.99 per month [99] while defense can cost
$2,000 per month [100–102] or more. As long as economic factors favor DoS attacks,
they will become increasingly common and persistent occurrences. A low cost solu-
tion is needed to prevent stifling of free speech, on the individual side, and to increase
the efficiency of doing business, for small to mid-sized businesses.
In this chapter, the beginning effort is presented at achieving the above goal, a
system called Denial of Service Elusion (DoSE). Due to the requirement for low
economic cost, the defense solution is limited to methods that do not require any
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enhancements to the core network infrastructure. Instead, DoSE focuses on using
hosting services with widespread and relatively low cost availability such as cloud
computing infrastructure and content delivery networks as cornerstones to mitigate
attacks. These service have become relatively inexpensive and offer “pay-as-you-
go” options which allow flexibility in the mitigation technique. DoSE leverages low
cost of public infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) cloud and content delivery networks
(CDN) to meet an economical cost of roughly $30 a month for DoS protection for
1,000 clients.
The general approach in DoSE is to connect clients to relays, in an overlay net-
work, instead of directly to a protected service so that DoS attacks cannot easily be
launched directly at the service. This technique alone is not novel. However, DoSE
adds in a smart management layer which acts to conceal relays from attackers and pro-
vide an attack-resistant connection establishment mechanism while most importantly
minimizing costs. The relays are created on cloud infrastructure as virtual machines,
so the number of relays can expand and contract easily to adapt to changing network
conditions. Client-to-relay assignments are communicated over a push-based CDN
system that allows for fast reassignments during attack periods, unlike traditional
domain name systems (DNS), as well as enabling client-specific assignments. The
clients are partitioned among relays and each new relay’s address is selectively re-
leased to clients so that if an attack occurs, a set of suspect clients can be identified.
The suspects are then separable from the legitimate clients, and with each attack,
the suspicion set can be narrowed down. Suspicious clients can be connected to the
same relay so that future attacks impact only a small subset of the users.
Prior work in this area is capable of stopping attacks but fails to address the
economic considerations of DoS defense. Techniques, such as Portcullis [103] and
Epiphany [104], require Internet-wide infrastructure upgrades to combat attacks.
Portcullis relies on the assumption that attackers and legitimate clients have similarly-
balanced computing power, which may not hold. Epiphany relies on router upgrades
(to support reverse multicast) and the availability of thousands of proxy nodes to
158
defeat DoS (according to their experimental setup - Section V-A). MOTAG [105,106]
and other overlay network type techniques [107–109] fail to address the resiliency of
the client assignment or initial connection channel, relying instead on Portcullis [103]
and other existing techniques to stop attacks on a management channel. The work
in MOTAG [105] and its subsequent work [106] operate moving target defenses using
similar techniques to DoSE. These solutions are not cost-conscious and call for 1,000
active relays for example. Without cost consideration, optimization, or evaluation,
they are susceptible to economics-based attacks, whereby the attack exhausts the
budget of the consumer for supporting network traffic.
In terms of contributions, DoSE shows how to achieve low cost DDoS attack
mitigation for small hosting clients or medium-sized organizations, which have a
limited security budget that precludes them from getting a dedicated filtering net-
work or some special arrangements from an ISP. DoSE designs a novel approach
for connecting clients to relay proxies and new methods for assigning clients to re-
lays to mitigate network layer attacks while minimizing costs. This work does not
address attacks capable of disabling large data centers or other large infrastructure
networks by well-resourced attackers, or application-layer attacks, i.e., attacks that
exhaust the application’s capacity by sending a large number of legitimate-looking,
but computationally-expensive-to-process requests.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 6.2, background infor-
mation is provided on the different kinds of DoS attacks. In Section 6.3, a high-level
view is given of the workings of DoSE, followed by the detailed design in Section
6.4. In Section 6.7, the economic costs of using DoSE are layed out versus two ex-
isting approaches, one from the commercial domain and the other from the research
literature. In Sections 6.5,6.6, the experiments are described with varying numbers
and capabilities of legitimate and adversarial nodes and measure what fraction of the
non-attack traffic can be supported when the service is under attack. In Section 6.7,
the costs of DoSE are analyzed and Section 6.8 presents the conclusions.
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6.2 Background and Related Work
6.2.1 Traditional Defenses
Traditional DDoS defenses technologies rely on filtering or rate limiting traffic
along different points of the network [110], such as with access control lists and
firewalls. Each technique addresses a way to distinguish legitimate from malicious
traffic and then provides a mechanism for increasing goodput [111] by filtering.
The foundation of filtering techniques have a major pitfall, however, because the
victim has no control over routers on other autonomous systems (AS) and must rely
on cooperation or ingress capacity to begin filtering. To counter this limitation, over-
lay networks, where traffic is routed to an intermediate server which filters before
forwarding on to the destination [107–109], allow defenders to distribute filtering ca-
pacity in public clouds without relying on Internet infrastructure support. If the
overlay servers are well distributed then a large filtering capacity can be established
without modifying any Internet topology devices like firewalls or routers. Another
capacity handing mechanism uses anycast [104] that forces traffic destined for a par-
ticular victim to be routed to several different servers or networks, each containing
the same IP address, so that capacity is improved via redundancy.
6.2.2 Overlays and Moving Target Defenses
DoSE builds on two prior techniques, overlay networks and moving target de-
fenses, to achieve low costs. Overlay networks [107–109] provide a layer of indirection
to shield protected IP addresses from attacks, and moving target defense techniques
control how and where these intermediate computers or relays process traffic to best
curtail an attack. With modern cloud computing infrastructure, overlay networks can
become elastic and nimble to cheaply dodge attacks, as shown in MOTAG [105,106]
and utilized by DoSE. This elasticity has to be carefully managed, however, to keep
the cost of defense low. Simulated attacks in [106] use 1,000 relays over 60 ”shuffles”
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which each require additional virtual machines to implement. In Amazon’s EC2 ser-
vice this would translate to as much as 60,000 billable hours of usage, or over $700 in
costs to repel a single attack. The existing moving target methods are stateless and
do not account for clients leaving and joining, or the fact that non-aggressive attackers
may take hours between subsequent attacks. DoSE focuses on different assignment
techniques that minimize these costs by dynamically managing the expenses paid and
the number of active relays for any particular defense situation.
6.3 DoSE Overview
6.3.1 Threat Model
DoSE is targeted at protecting small to medium-sized services, so the adversary is
generally comprised of critics and competitors rather than highly skilled cyberwarefare
attackers or those with extensive resources. DoSE is designed to defend against
attackers that are capable of disrupting communications to a few public IP addresses.
DoSE then makes maneuvers to thwart the attacker by making the target unclear
and difficult to determine if an attack was successful.
6.3.2 Workflow of DoSE
In DoSE, a client does not directly connect to the protected service; in fact, the
location of the protected service is kept hidden. Instead the client connects to a relay
node on a public cloud infrastructure, which in turn reaches the protected service
as explained in Section 6.4.1. DoSE then utilizes a commercial Content Delivery
Network (CDN) based system to disseminate the client-specific relay information to
each client. The dissemination of relay information to a client is done securely through
an Assignment Service, with the channel between the Assignment Service and the
client being made secure through a shared key that is established as a part of DoSE.
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Fig. 6.1. Overview of Infrastructure deployed as part of DoSE: The
attackers and clients exist on the Internet and are attempting to access
a protected service that is either located in a data center or on a small
business network (SBN).
A malicious client cannot enumerate the list of relays, preparatory to attacking them,
or connect to a relay that it has not been assigned to, as presented in Section 6.4.2.
Figure 6.1 details how the different elements of DoSE are laid out. The protected
service is in a network which is potentially limited in bandwidth, while the relays
are in the network of a public cloud provider (denoted as “datacenter” in the figure).
The assignment service, responsible for assigning clients to relays, can be located
in either the data center network or the small business network (SBN). A plausible
deployment will have all the entities - the protected service, the relays, and the DoSE
management service – in the cloud environment.
6.3.3 Client-Relay Assignment
Whenever a relay is attacked, it can be taken offline and a new relay brought
up in its place as in an elastic cloud. This allows the defender to have a seemingly
endless supply of fresh relays, whose addresses are selectively released to clients.
Further, DoSE keeps track of the assignment of clients to the relays so that if a
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relay gets overwhelmed due to traffic, a set of suspect clients can be identified. By
progressively partitioning suspect clients among multiple relays, DoSE can identify
persistent malicious clients as described in Section 6.4.3.
6.3.4 Defense Against Some Obvious Adversaries
Here some obvious ways are layed out in which an adversary can launch a DoS
against the protected service or one of the entities that DoSE introduces.
An attacker identifies the IP address to which she is connected (a relay) and
launches an attack at that IP, disabling it and any other clients also connected to that
address. Consequently, DoSE creates new relay(s) and re-assigns clients among these
new relays. The threat has several characteristics that inform DoSE’s assignment
strategy. Each time the client attacks, she is deemed by DoSE to have a higher risk
due to prior behavior, i.e., her client being connected to the attacked node, and is
therefore managed in such a way to minimize the impact of future attacks as explained
in Section 6.4.4.
In the previous attack, the adversary can spawn a new client and try to access
the protected service again, concealing her identity. This is handled by the design
that a new client is considered inherently “risky”. DoSE will then effectively place
new clients in a kind of holding tank to establish trust. Therefore, even under intense
attacks, well established and well behaved clients can maintain communications with
the service. In the event that an attacker is not aggressive, client connections can be
consolidated to a few relays to save costs during non-attack periods and redistributed
according to risk when an attack resumes.
6.3.5 Cost Minimization
Relays are only needed during attack periods. As more clients are involved in
attacks, more relays become necessary to maintain communications. The number of
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active relays in DoSE is a function of the total connected client risk, controlled by
cost parameters via a feedback controller.
6.4 Detailed Design of DoSE
6.4.1 Relays
The relays are simple software filter and forward firewalls on virtual machines in
the cloud, mediating client-service communications. Each relay has a set of whitelist
firewall rules and rate limiting for each assigned client, and the only entities in the
white list are those clients that have been assigned to the relay. For each whitelisted
client, there is a rate limit built in at the relay. This can be accomplished with
iptables for example.
Attack traffic can come from two sources. The first source is an established client
itself, in which case the attacker is known and the excess traffic is stopped by the rate
limiting portion of the firewall. The second source is from a non-whitelisted address
in which case it is simply dropped. In either case, however, the inbound bandwidth to
the relay may become overloaded resulting in a disruption to all of the clients assigned
to a particular relay. When an overload occurs, the relay is abandoned and a new
relay is established in the cloud. How an attack against a relay node is detected is
not central to DoSE, and any monitor which identifies when a relay is inaccessible to
the clients is sufficient.
6.4.2 Client-Relay Assignment Infrastructure
The client-relay assignment infrastructure is responsible for communicating the
assignment of a client to a relay to the client. It must provide an attack-resilient
announcement of IP addresses to those clients while maintaining two properties. First,
it must provide each assignment secretly—only the intended client must be able to
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read an assignment. Second, it must be able to provide this assignment information
to anonymous clients.
To create attack-resilient relay announcements, the assignment is stored on a
content distribution network (CDN). These networks store files in a distributed set
of caching locations and provide only simple file transfer services (e.g. hash table
lookups) which makes them difficult to target at an application layer for attacks.
The content itself is replicated across several independent data centers with very fast
network connections that make direct infrastructure attacks difficult. The CDN can
operate as a push-only replica where the content must be pushed by the provider to
the CDN, thus shielding the back end assignment infrastructure. This allows DoSE
to withstand large attacks from unauthenticated clients.
This protocol seeks to provide each client with a secure way to acquire its relay
assignment using push-only files. At a high level, this is done by having each client
solve a puzzle and the solution to the puzzle gives the name of a unique file in the
CDN. Following the content in the file, the client is able to contact the relay that it
is assigned to.
In the first stage, the CDN has many files with a large number of puzzles and
an index, managed by the Identity Establishment Service (IES). A client fetches the
index from the CDN and decides randomly to solve one puzzle from the set. The
puzzle itself contains an ID, a CAPTCHA image, an integer ”PoW Difficulty”, and a
partial solution hash. The solution to a puzzle comprises of guessing a number from
a pre-specified range (PoW) and solving a CAPTCHA, serving as a decryption key.
The client, after solving the CAPTCHA text, guesses a value for the first compo-
nent of the hash function (“PoW guess”), calculates the hash value, and checks if the
hash matches the partial value provided by the puzzle. If it does (say, outcome “A”),
it uses the entire hash value as the name of the file to retrieve from the CDN. If it
does not (say, outcome “!A”), the client has clearly not guessed the random number
correctly. So it tries the next guess. If all guesses are exhausted, then the CAPTCHA
was incorrect and a new puzzle must be selected. The scheme forces the client to do
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some work before it gains service, limiting request rates. Under outcome A, the client
is able to acquire a file from the CDN, call this file “foo1”. This file is itself encrypted
using symmetric encryption and the key used is simply H(PoW guess+1,CAPTCHA
text). This seemingly contrived design is such that a brute force reading of files from
the CDN provides no usable client assignments. The file “foo1” has a client ID and
a short-term cryptographic key Ks. The client ID maps to the name of a file also
stored in the CDN, call this file “foo2”. This file has the assignment of the client
to a relay node, i.e., reveals the IP address of the relay to the client. During the
first interaction with the relay node, made secure using Ks, the client provides its
client ID to the relay node. If, due to collision of the puzzle space, the client ID has
already been assigned to a previous client, the relay rejects the initial request from
the client. The client then has to go back to the beginning of the process and solve
another puzzle en route to getting a new client ID. If, on the other hand, the client
ID is unique, then the relay node accepts the request of the client, i.e., forwards it to
the ultimate destination. Also, the relay provides a long-term cryptographic key Kl
to the client and to the IES. When the client will be re-assigned to a new relay, say
due to an attack, then it will repeat the part of the protocol starting from accessing
“foo2” on the CDN. Since it has already acquired a unique client ID, it does not
need to repeat the first part of the scheme. For all subsequent interactions with relay
nodes, the client will use the key Kl.
The above scheme for informing a client of its relay assignment achieves the goal
that it is using a vanilla CDN, which is “simply” a mechanism to distribute content
(files “foo1” and “foo2” in this case). The IES of the DoSE simply pushes content to
the CDN and the clients are never allowed to pull information directly from the IES.
This provides a level of protection against DoS against the Management service (the
IES is part of this) of DoSE.
The “PoW Difficulty” parameter allows the server to control the amount of work
it will have the client do before it is allowed to connect to a relay; a higher value
implies higher amount of work. The set of puzzles will expire after a certain length of
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Fig. 6.2. The client interacts with static files stored on the CDN to
retrieve an identity for obtaining future relay assignments in the event
of an attack. The client selects a random puzzle from a set on the
CDN and then does a proof-of-work to solve the puzzle and retrieve an
initial Client ID and relay assignment to begin accessing the protected
service.
time, say after T time units, to prevent solution caching. To reduce the likelihood of
collision of the puzzle that a client solves, the number of puzzles in a set will be kept
much larger than the number of new clients that are expected to connect to DoSE in
time T . Finally, the client-CDN connection can be established over SSL to prevent
man-in-the-middle attacks. An attacker may attempt to solve several puzzles to deny
service to new clients by forcing collisions. This attack would require extensive com-
putational resources on the attackers end, especially if the “PoW Difficulty” remains
high, resulting in high expenditures for an attacker relative to the IES.
Several conditions must be maintained for this system to be successful. With
period T the content on the CDN is expired and removed. Clients arrive at a rate
Cr, and puzzles are generated at a rate Pr. Since clients choose puzzles randomly,
Cr << Pr ensures a low chance of collision. Pr is a function of the computation and
network capacity of the key management service. A modest capacity of 10 Mbit/s
of network upload could provide up to 1000 puzzles per second, assuming a 1 KB
image size. The PoW Difficulty parameter allows the server to control the computa-
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tional advantage it has over malicious connecting clients at the expense of new client
connection establishment times.
6.4.3 Client-Relay Assignment Strategy Overview
At the core of DoSE is the many-to-one client-relay assignment strategy in which
careful assignment reveals the attacker’s identity.
Two categories of adversaries are differentiated. In the first category, the adversary
connects, attacks, disconnects, and creates a new identity for herself (as explained in
Section 6.4.2). She then launches an identical attack against the newly assigned relay.
This type of adversary is a lone drone. In the second category, the adversary creates
multiple clients concurrently, each assigned to a relay. The clients stay connected to
the relay for an extended period, and then, in a coordinated manner, launch a DoS
attack against all the relays. This type of adversary is an aggregate insider.
In considering the assignment strategy, the notion of risk is introduced for each
client. Risk is the likelihood that a client will launch a DoS attack in the future.
The information items that DoSE currently uses are — length of time the client has
used the service (in a well-behaved manner) and whether it is suspected to have been
involved in an attack in the past. The latter factor is coarse-grained because when a
relay is determined to be under attack, the suspicion falls on all the clients assigned
to the relay.
New clients are slowly relieved of the lone drone risk by the function P (lone
drone|tL) = e
−tL
EXP (t) where tL is the connection lifetime and EXP (t) is the expected
connection lifetime. If a set of clients is connected to a relay that gets attacked, each
client has a uniform probability of being the attacker. The risk assigned to each client
is then proportional number of clients connected to a relay. The statefulness of the
risk assessment is maintained by recording both the clients involved in each attack
and the increase in risk for each client involved in an attack. When an attacker is
identified, the risk that was added for all clients implicated in attacks in which the
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known attacker was also a suspect, is removed. In summary, the factors that drive
the risk estimation of clients is as follows:
• Each client begins with a suspicion of being a lone drone.
• As time progresses, the probability that a client is a lone drone exponentially
decays.
• If a client is connected to a relay which comes under attack, its level of suspicion
is incremented inverse-proportionally to the number of other clients connected
to the relay.
• When an attack is solved, the suspicion of clients associated with the series
attacks is reduced.
Note that DoSE still allows for anonymous clients. It only requires there be a
secure session between the client and the relay, but it does not require a specific
identity of the client to be divulged to the service.
6.4.4 Formal Relay Assignment Strategy
The assignment strategy is designed to minimize percentage of disrupted clients
which means evenly spreading risk among each relay.
With the notion of a high risk client being associated with its own relay comes the
parameter risk per relay (RPR), which is defined as the maximum cumulative risk
any relay will tolerate. The total number of relays to use is then calculated as the
sum of client risks divided by the RPR. If a set of clients connected to a particular
relay is implicated in an attack and this causes the risk on each client to double, say,
then the set of connected clients will be split among two relays. Another parameter is
the cumulative risk per attack (CRPA). This is the total risk increment when a DoS
incident occurs. This increment happens for all the clients connected to the attacked
relay and the CRPA is divided by that number of clients to arrive at the per-client
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increment of risk. The CRPA is parametrized and scaled to control the growth rates
of relays. The RPR and CRPA work together to control how the clients are spread
during attacks. The higher the CRPA
RPR
ratio, the more quickly the attacker is isolated,
but also higher is the number of required relays. If the time to bring a new relay into
service increases, then the time to find the malicious client will also increase.
6.4.5 Optimizing Cost
Cost is the direct function of the number of relays utilized and can be controlled
by the RPR parameter. A proportional-integral-derivative (PID) controller [112] can
be used to adjust this parameter to control long term cost targets at the expense of
mitigation effectiveness, specifically by the integral term in the controller.
6.5 Experimental Results
Measuring the effectiveness of Denial of Service mitigation is a challenging task,
especially when comparing techniques that operate on fundamentally different prin-
ciples. Prior work [113] suggests using the percentage of failed transactions (PFT) to
establish effectiveness which is used to measure the success of DoSE.
The effectiveness of different assignment strategies can be assessed without the
need for hardware implementations. The actual implementation parameters that
influence the performance of DoSE can be easily measured, e.g., relay creation time,
iptable filtering rule creation time (at a relay). These performance parameters are
then used in an agent-based simulation to evaluate the DoSE approach. While other
testbeds exist [114,115], their goal is to assess filtering methods, which must operate
on real-time traffic. In the case of DoSE, once a relay is determined to be unusable
due to an attack, it is null routed and henceforth, the actual size of the attack does
not have any implication on the network.
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6.5.1 Management Service Overhead Analysis
The management service has three components that need analysis. The first is the
CDN system itself which has been measured sufficiently by prior studies [116, 117].
The second component is the puzzle generation system. Proof-of-work systems are
not new, and Portcullis [103] is one example of a network defense implementation
which has done performance testing on hash functions. Hashing performance was
measured on an EC2 “m1.small” instance to be 1 million hashes per 1.71 seconds,
sufficient for DoSE. The next component is the CAPTCHA generation. With 1 ECU,
10,000 GTT’s, 4.2 KB each, were created in 5.11 seconds using libcaptcha. The final
component is the assignment and client tracking system. Each session is associated
with a key, assignment, and a risk value which is only a small amount of data to
store. The assignment algorithm itself is simple — a client is greedily placed on the
lowest-risk relay. The conclusion then is that simple EC2 instances can generate a
sufficient number of puzzles to supply 10-100 new clients per second with identities.
6.5.2 Agent-Based Simulator
To model the DoS scenario, an agent-based simulator [118] is constructed in MAT-
LAB. The simulator facilitates event scheduling and agent-to-agent communications.
The agents constructed are the clients, attackers, relay nodes, the assignment service,
and the end application. The client is modeled as having a request rate distribution
to mimic UDP streaming applications. The attacker has the ability to disable its
assigned relay node at any time, causing all traffic to be dropped by that relay.
In the rest of the section, the terms legitimate clients and malicious clients will
be used. Where it can be used without ambiguity, the term client, it will refer to a
legitimate client. The term attacker will be synonymous with malicious client.
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6.5.3 Experiment 1: Single Adversary
The first experiment has 1,000 legitimate clients and a single attacker to mimic
the impact of a DDoS-for-Hire service. Initially all of the clients and the attacker
connect at the same time with uniform risk. Then attacker continuously attacks, and
the experiment ends once the malicious client is isolated.
Figure 6.3 shows the average PFT for the set of connected clients. In this case,
the minimum number of relays is two. After the initial attack, one relay is disabled,
resulting in a PFT of 50%. Additional relays are brought online to distribute the now
high risk set of disrupted clients. This continues until 3.9 minutes into the simulation
when the attacker is identified. The time needed to neutralize the malicious client
depends on the cumulative risk per attack (CRPA) parameter and the time to bring
a relay online (40 seconds), as described in Section 6.4.4. Over the time span of the
entire experiment, the average PFT is 0.118, meaning that an average of 88.2% of
the requests are satisfied during the mitigation period.
Another important metric is the number of relays used in the defense. Figure 6.4
details how the number of relays grows with time, growing from an initial 2 relays to
16 relays. The growth rate is a function of the CRPA
RPR
ratio. After each attack cycle,
additional relays are created to reduce the impact of attacks and prune the suspect
list. The number of relays is also dependent on the number of clients connected.
Figure 6.5 shows the number of relays in use during the same attack but with only
100 clients. In this case, the attacker is found more quickly and the overall usage is
lower, growing to a maximum of 11 relays. This drives home the point that costs
in DoSE are client-dependent. Note however, that there is no strict proportionality
between the number of clients and the number of relays needed to mitigate the attack.
The formulae used in the algorithms for assignment of clients to relays are non-linear
and this explains the observation.
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Fig. 6.3. Percentage of Failed Transactions with a single attacker: The
attack begins at 80 seconds and is progressively mitigated with each
relay-creation cycle until the attacker is identified and neutralized at
3.9 minutes. The relay power-on time is 40 seconds, the approximate
width of the steps.
6.5.4 Experiment 2: Streaming Attack
In the second experiment, the stress due to the attack is higher with multiple
malicious clients launching coordinated attacks. This is referred to as the Streaming
Attack, consisting of aggregate insiders. New legitimate clients connect to the service
uniformly every 1.6 seconds and stay connected for 400 seconds, averaging 250 con-
nected clients. The attackers arrive in sets of 10 every 160 seconds and simultaneously
attack. Eventually, the malicious clients are identified and neutralized.
Figure 6.6 shows how the PFT is impacted by the streaming attack. The initial
attack is difficult to mitigate because all clients have uniform risk, few clients are
legitimate, and the relay count is small. As the client base matures, subsequent
attacks have a much lower impact on the PFT because the new clients are high
risk compared to existing, legitimate ones. It is seen that even the spikes, which
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Fig. 6.4. Number of Relays Used: Defending against a single attacker
with 1000 clients shows increased relay counts until the attacker is
found.
correspond to the arrival of the new batch of malicious nodes, only go up to 20%
failed transactions.
6.5.5 Experiment 3: Attackers Present at Startup
In this experiment, the case when the malicious clients are present at initialization
is evaluated. The performance of DoSE is evaluated as the number of malicious
clients is varied from 1 to 500, with a constant legitimate client base of 1,000. The
PFT and relay count metrics are averaged over 800 seconds, by which time the last
malicious client has been identified and isolated.
Figure 6.7 shows how many relays are used to defeat attacks of varying sizes of
number of malicious clients. With a large number of attackers, the number of relays
required to distinguish between attackers and legitimate clients becomes large as well.
With 1 malicious client, the number of relays required is 6; with 15, it is 30; and, with
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Fig. 6.5. Number of Relays Used: Defending against a single attacker
with a smaller number of clients shows the relay count to be smaller
than with 1,000 clients.
500 malicious clients, the number of relays required is 154. There are two factors to
note here. First, the ratio of adversarial to legitimate clients of 1:2 is rather high, and
second, the growth in the number of relays is slower than the increase in attackers.
Also, an insider and a legitimate client begin with indistinguishable features and
history. A more likely case is that some clients will have a higher trust due to a long
association with the service.
Figure 6.8 details the impact on the average PFT during the attacks. Expectedly,
as the number of attackers increases, the PFT increases. As each attack occurs, the
legitimate clients are prevented from accessing the service until a relay is assigned
only legitimate clients. With this level of discrimination, the malicious client(s) can
be isolated. However the convergence time to reach this point increases with the
number of attackers, thus driving up the average PFT.
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Fig. 6.6. Percentage of Failed Transactions with the streaming attack:
The attack begins at 160 seconds and is repeated with 10 malicious
clients arriving every 160 seconds. A legitimate client arrives every
1.6 seconds and stays connected for 400 seconds. As time progresses,
the risk profile of the legitimate clients decreases leading to a better
isolation of the malicious nodes. Consequently, the PFT decreases
compared to the initial burst of attack.
6.6 Result Analysis
6.6.1 Sensitivity to CRPA
The CRPA parameter, as described in Section 6.4.4, controls the amount of relay
growth per attacked relay. If the CRPA is 2 and the RPR is 1, then a single attacked
relay will be replaced by 2 new relays. Figure 6.9 shows the relay growth from
Experiment 1 (single attacker, Section 6.5.3), with varying CRPA factors.
In this experiment, the attacker is flooding the relays continuously and therefore,
the high CRPA value gives the best result—the time to identify the attacker is the
lowest (compared to lower CRPA values) and the total cost is the same. The down-
side of a high CRPA value will be exposed if the attacker is more subtle, and after
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Fig. 6.7. Number of Relays vs Number of Malicious Nodes: The
number of legitimate clients is kept fixed at 1,000 and the number of
malicious clients is increased. All the clients are present at startup.
The increase in the number of malicious clients is met with auto-
matic and progressive increases in the number of relays, to isolate the
malicious nodes.
launching an attack (and causing a large number of relays to be created), it lies low
for a while. The spurt in the number of relays does not help DoSE if condensed prior
to a subsequent attack.
6.6.2 Quantitative Comparison with Epiphany and Speak-up
A quantitative comparison of Epiphany [104] and Epiphany is done, coupled with
Speak-up [119] with DoSE for the setup of experiment 3. DoSE is executed and
the number of relays used is given as the number of proxies in Epiphany. To do a
comparison, a distribution was created of clients and attackers on the Internet, such
that 10% of the Internet is “unclean networks”, where 80% of the IP addresses are
attackers. The remaining 90% of the Internet is split between completely clean and
partially clean networks, with the clean network accounting for 10% of the addresses,
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Fig. 6.8. PFT vs Number of Malicious Clients: The number of le-
gitimate clients is kept fixed at 1,000 and the number of malicious
nodes is increased. All the clients are present at startup. The in-
crease in the number of attackers causes the average PFT over the
attack simulation window to grow as a larger-sized attack impacts
more client-connected relays.
defined as having no malicious address. The partially clean network has 20% of its
addresses as attackers. The design of Epiphany suggests that if a legitimate client is in
the unclean network, then she will not be able to have any successful transactions. If
the client is assigned to a clean network, then there will be no impacts of the attack.
Therefore the percentage of failed transaction varies between 10% and 90%. The
remaining clients may or may not be connected to proxies which contain attackers. If
there is an attacker, then the ratio of successful transactions is the percentage of good
clients connected. Thus if there are 9 clients connected to a proxy and 1 attacker,
90% of the transactions will be successful, modelling the behavior of Speak-Up +
Epiphany [119]. In the alternative mode, without Speak-Up, any client assigned to a
relay with an attacker will not be able to access the protected service.
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Fig. 6.9. Number of relays over time for varying CRPA factors: The
number of relays utilized peaks to a much higher number with high
CRPA values, however the attacker is found much more quickly. The
factor controls the growth rate in the number of relays created in
response to an attack.
Figure 6.10 shows the results of the comparison. At a low number of attackers,
DoSE is able to maintain the advantage. At higher numbers of attackers, Epiphany
+ Speak-Up is able maintain the best advantage while DoSE outperforms the pure
Epiphany solution. However, as pointed out earlier, DoSE requires no widespread
network infrastructure upgrades.
6.6.3 Comparison with MOTAG
MOTAG [105] provides an alternative approach to client-relay assignments from
DoSE. It uses a greedy assignment algorithm in an attempt to save as many clients
as quickly as possible. To make a comparison between DoSE and MOTAG, DoSE
was run and the average number of relays used during the scenario was used as
the input to MOTAG. MOTAG also relies on a set of shuffling proxies and a set of
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Fig. 6.10. Comparison of DoSE to Epiphany and
Epiphany+Speakup: At low ratio of number of attackers to le-
gitimate nodes, DoSE outperforms other solutions, while at mid to
high ratios, Epiphany+Speak-up outperforms DoSE.
serving proxies, and legitimate clients are moved from the shuffling to the serving
proxies as the attack progresses. It is assumed that there is a distribution of half and
half between the shuffling and the serving proxies. Additionally, MOTAG provides
an estimation technique for the number of insiders; here, the truth value is simply
provided to MOTAG. In this evaluation, a rate of one IP address is being revealed
per minute so multiple insiders are independent sources of addresses for attack.
Figure 6.11 shows that MOTAG takes much longer to isolate the attackers than
does DoSE. This is because MOTAG relies on stateless transitions between attacks
while DoSE builds a long-standing history, through the risk value, for each client.
Therefore an insider who stops attacking is not forgotten, while in MOTAG, the
insiders may continue to impact legitimate clients if moved to a serving proxy. A
higher time to find the attacker results in increased costs since a larger number of
relays are ultimately used in defense, thus DoSE costs 59% less than MOTAG. Figure
6.12 shows the number of failed transactions per second, averaged across the total
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Fig. 6.11. Comparison of DoSE to MOTAG. The time it takes to
find all of the insiders is significantly lower in DoSE, especially as
the number of insiders increases. This is due to the smart relay man-
agement which divides the clients during successive attacks in DoSE
while MOTAG relies on a stateless classification which lets intelligent
adversaries fool the system.
simulation time. Since DoSE finds the attacker more quickly than does MOTAG,
fewer transactions fail when using DoSE to defend against this attack scenario.
6.7 Costs and Discussion
The costs of DoSE are application dependent with two components: time-of-use
resources (relay instance runtime) and bandwidth-based network resources (cost to
forward). Relay nodes on EC2 [120], for example, cost $8.64 a month for the smallest
instance or $2.23 with spot pricing. Network resources are a function of legitimate
client traffic that must be passed from the cloud to the protected service. Costs for
forwarding traffic out-of-network are priced per GB and range from $0.05 to $0.12
per GB, but can be mostly avoided by co-locating the relays and protected service.
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Fig. 6.12. Comparison of DoSE to MOTAG. DoSE is able to keep
the number of failed transactions lower during the simulation because
it better isolates and identifies the attacker more quickly, resulting in
less clients co-located on relays with insiders.
A comparison can be made between the cost of DoSE and existing commer-
cial solutions. For a representative sample, Staminus Communications [100] will be
used. The defensive cost is related to the capability of the adversary, since a filtering
technique is used, and the cost comes to about $35 per Gbit, $175 per MPPS of
attack protection. The defensive cost for an average attack of 9.7 Gbit/s, 19.8 MPPS
peak [98] would be $3,465 per month.
The cost of DoSE can be compared to Epiphany [104] and MOTAG [105, 106].
For the former, a set of static proxies are needed as entry points into the Epiphany
routing structure. The cost of operating a proxy for Epiphany will be 50% higher
than EC2 because it is transitioning from a datacenter style location to a more end-
user style location (drawing from Amazon’s differentiated tiers). To estimate the
router upgrade cost, if each router takes 1 man-hour to reconfigure, and there are 1
million routers in the system, then upgrading 0.01% (a parameter chosen in [104])
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of the routers to support Epiphany would require 1,000 man-hours or $100,000 at
$100/hour for a network engineer. If there are 10 routers between the source and
destination and each router has 10 output ports enabled, the amount of bandwidth
used will be 100 times the original transmission due to reverse-multicast.
For MOTAG, cost-equivalent performance comparisons can be seen in Section
6.6.3. As tested in [106], MOTAG relied on 1000 replicas through 60 shuffles which
amounts to 60,000 billable hours (at 1 hour minimums) on EC2, or over $700 to stop
a single attack. With that many replicas in play, more efficient static approaches
could keep clients connected.
These findings are summarized in the following table using the shorthand “R” for
relay, ”m” for month, and R-dependent means it depends on the number of relays.
Defense Overhead BW Atk. Size
DoSE $9/R/m 2x Independent
Epiphany $22/R+$1670/m 100x R-Dependent
Commercial $3,465/m Included 100 Gbps/20 MPPS
Another cost of using any design as in DoSE of separate entities—relay and
protected service—is the latency penalty for taking alternative routes in the network.
This has been measured in [105], and a round trip time penalty of 70 ms would be
typical for the continental US.
The cost of DoSE for the experiments in Section 6.5 can be calculated for EC2.
In the first attack example 6.5.3, a maximum of 16 relays are used, and there are 5
rounds of relay expansion captured by the number of steps seen in the graph. Since
EC2 requires a minimum billing of 1 hour for each instance started, the 5 instances
that were disabled by the attacker along with the 16 relays consumed are billed for 1
hour, totaling 21 hours of billing on the smallest EC2 instance. The cost is then $0.42
for on-demand instances or $0.07 for spot instances to stop this attack. Additional
costs will depend on how much Internet bound traffic passes through the relay.
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6.8 Conclusion
DoSE was presented as a method for mitigating network-layer Denial of Service
attacks. DoSE uses cloud-based relay nodes to hide protected services from direct
attack while acting as sacrificial targets. The key idea behind DoSE lies in its ability
to assign relays to specific clients and by re-assigning suspect clients to a progressively
smaller set of relays, to identify and isolate the malicious clients. DoSE also smartly
manages the set of relays to optimize cost while allowing maximal attack mitigation.
The technique is capable of quickly mitigating attacks while continually improving
on the legitimate client’s ability to complete transactions. It is believed that DoSE
is the first technique that can achieve DoS protection for a price point that would be
acceptable to medium-to-small-sized businesses, of less than $100 per month.
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7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
7.1 Conclusion
Cyber-physical systems, especially those that control electric power consumption,
will continue to expand and grow as new control models such as real-time pricing
continue to improve the efficiency of a variety of industrial processes. These systems,
however, may be vulnerable to availability attacks via network disruptions. In this
dissertation, Chapter 2 introduced the energy-specific usage cases for cyber-physical
systems. Renewable energy resources and market deregulation motivated the creation
of a multi-agent profit-oriented model for strategic adversaries. Chapter 3 introduced
the technical underpinnings of operating such a CPS via real-time pricing systems
and dynamic market mechanisms. The impacts of latency were also examined in that
chapter. Chapter 4 combined the previous two chapters into a attack/defense game
for launching network attacks on an real-time pricing system. The results validated
the work in this dissertation, but it introduce some shortcomings in the strategy
space due to its large size. Chapter 5 then demonstrated a technique for attacking
systems in real-time with a charge/discharge strategy and denial of service attacks.
Finally, Chapter 6 provided a denial-of-service defense with low cost optimizations.
This technique can be combined with the RTP system to achieve low-cost resilient
market operations.
The primary contributions of this dissertation include:
• A multi-agent model for energy-based cyber-physical systems where one or more
agents are malicious
• An attack and defense strategy for those CPS executed under MILP
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• An analysis of low-level network attacks and their mapping to the attack/defense
strategy space, including defensive maneuvers
• An analysis of latency impacts on two CPS control models, including a novel
control system
• An on-line attack heuristic for extracting profits from a real-time pricing system
• A low-cost denial-of-service defense technique (DoSE) for lowering the cost of
defending such systems
In summary, this dissertation has laid the groundwork for engineering resilient
cyber-physical systems from the perspective of a strategic adversary. As CPS grow
and include multiple financially independent entities under their control, financial
incentives will need to exist to promote cooperation. Such systems, like real-time
pricing, may be subject to exploitation by strategic adversaries as shown in this
dissertation.
7.2 Future Work
Several future directions for additional work include:
7.2.1 Multi-Round Attacker/Defender Games
The game theoretic models in Chapters 2 and 4 are designed as single round games.
The defender first strategies on defense and then the adversary makes a move based
on static knowledge about the system. This model can be improved with multi-round
games that allow the adversary to adapt to the defenders’ moves. Such a system
would improve the fidelity of both the attack and defender models and would provide
additional insight into asset protection schemes and cost sharing models.
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7.2.2 Stateful Real-Time Attacks
The attack models covered in Chapters 4 and 5 are based on stateless consumers
and producers. This means that their loads and needs are modeled as exogenous
functions that are not dependent on what happens in the operational system. Prac-
tically, these producers and consumers operate with time-shiftable loads, fixed fuel
storage, etc. that would cause stateful responses in the power grid. For example, if
a consumer avoids loading the grid at t = 10 h due to market conditions, then that
consumer would have a much higher need to load the grid at t = 11 h. The impli-
cation is that the fidelity of the post-attack response of the grid can be improved by
including stateful client models in the RTP system. This future work would enhance
the adversary’s profit if properly executed.
7.2.3 Client-Side DoSE
DoSE, presented in Chapter 6, is designed to protect a single service with multiple
clients from attacks. Some RTP systems, and those that are designed in the future,
exist where the clients are the attack target rather than the central service. Such
attacks require new overlay network design models to protect clients from attacks,
e.g. via intra-overlay routing. Methods that secure this kind of interaction at low
cost could protect the systems described in Chapter 3.
7.2.4 Algorithm Resilience
This dissertation focuses on mitigating attacks by undoing their effect (i.e. stop-
ping a DoS attack). An alternative or supplemental approach is to design the algo-
rithms to operate in a degraded state such that the impact of attack is minimized. For
example, in the market mechanisms presented in this dissertation, the clients enter
a zero-order hold state after attack. Instead, clients could adopt some contingency
plan or some other operational state that reduces the adversary’s profit, etc. Such
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work would further improve the defensive strategies that could be used in the game




Throughout this dissertation, several simulation tools were utilized to produce exper-
imental results. This appendix describes those simulation tools and provides links to
source code where available. Additional source code not listed in this appendix can
be retrieved by contracting the Dependable Computing System Lab1.
A.1 Game Theoretic Model for CPS
Chapter 2 contains several computational models for calculating the optimal at-
tack/defense strategies in CPS. This model is available publicly2 or via DCSL. The
model exists as MATLAB code with several functions designed to create and solve the
intermediate steps of generating the impact matrix and using it to drive strategies.
The folder IDD Model contains the information about the experiment, and the folder
cluster scripts contains several examples on how to generate results from this model.
A.2 Agent-Based Model
Several models in this dissertation are based on an agent-based framework in
MATLAB3. This framework contains an event scheduler, agent models, and a mech-
anism by which agents can schedule events and communicate with each other. A
logging mechanism is also included in this model. An additional batch script tool is
available4 that allows jobs to be submitted to a cluster for quick evaluation of various







Chapter 3 covers two market models, DMM and NM. The former is not available
publicly because a core component of the source code (the DMM itself) is not yet
released. The Nelder-Mead model and its supporting framework is available publicly5,
including the code to generate figures used in this dissertation. This model utilizes
the agent-based framework with a market operator and connected clients.
A.2.2 Technical Markets and Game Theory
Chapter 4 utilized NM with the work in Chapter 2. The source code for this is
available publicly6. The source code under the Models folder in this repository can
be used to re-create all of the figures in the experiment.
A.2.3 Real-Time Market Attacks
Chapter 5 utilized the NM market mechanism with an on-line attack heuristic.
This code is available7, but it does not utilize the agent-based scheduling framework
provided. Instead, function calls are made directly to the objects to reduce execution
overhead.
A.2.4 DoSE Model
The experiments in Chapter 6 are based on a publicly available model8. The
agents include the end clients, the protected service, and the assignment service.
The CDN is not modeled directly, and client assignments are assumed to always be
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